

CONTRIBUTORS



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EDITORIAL

MAY 2003

With the recent war in Iraq, worldwide attention shifted away from the East Asian sphere, only to return to the region once Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) began to spread from China to Southeast Asia and beyond. As the mysterious virus from rural Guangdong province continues to capture headlines, a number of incredibly important issues facing East Asia remain underemphasized in both the press and academia. In this edition we at the *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs* have attempted to draw attention to some of these issues. The internal political workings of the Chinese and North Korean leadership present important areas of study as one regime responds to growing pressure for liberalization and the other regime pursues an ideologically-charged policy of isolationism and brinkmanship. Japan and the Southeast Asian nations have faced significant questions over their political and economic roles in the larger region. Within this edition are also articles covering AIDS in China, the radical left Japan, Taiwanese democracy, and the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos. Maintaining our commitment to include papers beyond the realms of politics, economics, and history, we have also included in this edition an analysis of Chinese tragedy and a discussion of the Japanese masterpiece *Gengi Monogatari*.



All four pieces in the China section seek to shed light on subjects that previously have received little attention. In his article, **Tie Wee Tan** argues against the predominant assumption made by scholars of Taiwan that democracy was the sole end of democratization in Taiwan. Tan illustrates that Lee Teng-hui's attempts to consolidate the separation between Taipei and Beijing through constitutional reform during his presidency. Also looking back on the past, **Jessica Chen Weiss** provides an overview of the destabilizing effects of economic reform in China and seeks to draw attention to the People's Congress system. She argues that while this set of institutions is not particularly highly visible, it is an important way for the Chinese leadership to effectively deal with increasing political demands on the part of disaffected citizens. Meanwhile, **Ian Carmichael** provides a compelling introduction to the crisis of AIDS in rural China, a problem that is increasingly gaining international attention. Finally, in "The Tragic and the Chinese Subject," **Alexander Huang** discards the notion held by some literary critics that Chinese tragedy does not exist and, in turn, illuminates the particular Chinese sense of the tragic – one, he suggests, that focuses on a character whose isolation occurs in the context of a moral community and a web of interpersonal relationships.



The papers featured in this year's section cover a broad period in Japanese history ranging from the Heian era through the East Asian Financial Crisis. In "*Genji Monogatari: A Romance in Three Parts*," **Leslie Inamasu** analyzes the "Tale of Genji" as a social commentary on womanhood in medieval Japanese society. Inamasu argues that *Genji Monogatari* uses three woman protagonists to construct the ideal female life—a combination of passion, motherhood, and spirituality. **Kenji Hasegawa's** "In Search of a New Radical Left: The Rise and Fall of the *Anpo* Bund, 1955-1960" examines the short-lived student movement that spearheaded massive protests against the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty (*Anpo*). Hasegawa places the Bund in the larger context of Japan's radical student movement, and explains why the Bund dissolved at the height of the anti-*Anpo* demonstrations. Lastly, **Phillip Lipsy** in "Japan's Asian Monetary Fund Proposal" describes the emergence of the AMF as a Japanese initiative, and explores the motivations that led the Japanese government to propose a new monetary fund at the height of the Asian Financial Crisis. Lipsy also discusses the feasibility of a future AMF. Together, the articles in this year's section provide a wide-ranging examination of premodern, postwar, and contemporary Japan.



This issue's Korea paper deals with *Juche* – the North Korean ideology of self-sufficiency and independence. **Grace Lee** considers the origins and philosophical meaning of *Juche*, the ideology responsible for the secrecy and isolation that surround the Stalinist state. Lee argues that an understanding of *Juche* will go a long way towards understanding the North Korean regime itself, at a time when North Korea has claimed the world attention again with the re-opening of its Yongbyong nuclear reactor and admission of nuclear weapons possession.



As world affairs paint an ambivalent picture for the future of small states, our two contributors reflect on issues of sovereignty and representation. In "The 'ASEAN Way': Non-Intervention and ASEAN's Role in Conflict Management," **Gillian Goh** addresses the collective actions of Southeast Asian nations in regional conflicts in light of a tradition of non-intervention. In particular, she contrasts ASEAN's intervention in Cambodia from the late 1970s to the 1980s with that of the organization of American States (OAS) in Haiti a decade later, examining the potency of international action and questioning the effectiveness of military force. **Kenji Kushida**, meanwhile, tackles the Philippines' apparent exclusion from the Asian economic miracle in "The Political Economy of the Philippines under Marcos." Using theories of Verticle Political Integration, the International Context, and the Stationary Bandit as frameworks, he traces the roots of the Philippines' modern political economy to the "commitment problem" during Ferdinand Marcos's reign.



Hu Jintao and the Consolidation of Power

The 16th Communist Party Congress in November 2002 ended with the selection of Hu Jintao as the Secretary General of the CCP. However, the Congress left Jiang Zemin in control of the Central Military Commission, exercising final political authority over the armed forces. For the most part, Hu Jintao has deferred to Jiang on issues ranging from foreign policy to the political transformation known as the “Three Represents.”

The Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) is also dominated by Jiang’s Shanghai Faction allies, with six of the nine members affiliates of Jiang. The 4th generation leaders include Hu Jintao and vice-premier Wen Jiabao. Although this committee’s composition will likely remain set until the next Communist Party Congress in 2007, Hu Jintao has begun moving younger party

members, particularly those from the Communist Youth League (CYL), into positions of power. In particular is the case concerning Li Keqiang. During the 16th Congress, Hu attempted unsuccessfully to have him elevated to the PSC as a representative of the so-called 5th generation. However, on 31 December 2002, Li was appointed as the Communist Party secretary of Henan, the most populous province in China. In addition, several other cadres have achieved ministerial status, such as Zhao Leji, Governor of Qinghai Province and Zhou Qiang, the party secretary of the CYL. Although Hu cannot yet elevate these potential allies into the highest echelons of power, it is likely that he will continue this trend of moving 4th and 5th generation leaders into ranking positions to build his solidify his own power base.

China’s Space Program

On 29 December 2002, China launched its *Shen Zhou 4* spacecraft into orbit. The unmanned craft stayed in orbit until 5 January 2003, leaving its orbital module in orbit as a functioning satellite. This is a significant development especially in light of the success of the *Shen Zhou 3* spacecraft in April 2002. By all indications, China is set to send astronauts or *yuhang yuans* into orbit in the second half of 2003. This is because the *Shen Zhou 3/4* missions seem to be identical to the *Shen Zhou 5* mission with the first Chinese crew. Prior to the launch of the *Shen Zhou 4*, Chinese crews practiced working inside the spacecraft and emergency exits simulating problems on the launch pad.

Orbital reconnaissance of the Jiuquan launch sites has indicated the construction of a second

launch pad. This will probably function as a backup in case of a launch pad accident, but will also enable the Chinese the capability to ready two *Shen Zhou* type spacecraft within a couple days of each other. If China does succeed in placing a crew in orbit, it will be only the third nation, behind the US and Russia, capable of manned space flights. Twelve to fourteen astronauts have been undergoing training in anticipation of the first manned missions. In addition, China ambitiously plans on sending a manned mission to the moon by 2010, barring any complications with its space program. It hopes that the success and technologies derived from the space missions will enhance its bidding for lucrative satellite launch contracts, as well as provide important advances in fields ranging from meteorology to agriculture.

<http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/11/24/china.wen/index.html>
<http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/12/31/china.fifth/index.html>
<http://www.cnn.com/2002/TECH/space/05/20/china.space/index.html>
http://www.janes.com/aerospace/civil/news/jsd/jsd030108_1_n.shtml
<http://www.cnn.com/2002/TECH/space/03/25/china.launch/index.html>

Donald De Bona

China's Brisk Economic Growth Continues

China's rapid economic growth continues after ascension to the World Trade Organization despite a lackluster global economic situation. Chinese government figures indicate that total Gross Domestic Product in 2002 exceeded 10 trillion yuan (\$1.21 trillion) for the first time in history and GDP growth accelerated to 8 percent from 7.3 percent in 2001. Driving this economic growth has been record foreign direct investment, strong exports, rising production, and heavy government spending. Foreign direct investment hit a record \$52.7 billion surpassing the United States to become the world's top recipient of foreign direct investment. Companies shifted production in order to take

advantage of China's cheap labor, favorable investment climate and huge domestic market.

One industry driving the expansion of industrial production and foreign direct investment is auto production, as competition between foreign automakers for the growing Chinese market heated up. Early investors in domestic production such as Volkswagen and General Motors have seen strong sales and secured a significant market share of the domestic market. Fear of losing footing in a potentially enormous market forced other automakers such as Toyota, Nissan and Ford Motors to switch from exports to local production.

Infrastructure Projects Worsen Budget Deficit

China is in the midst of a spending boom on large national and regional infrastructure projects in order to keep the economy growing quickly. Shanghai just completed the world's first commercial magnetic levitation train that speeds to the new Pudong airport at up to 170 miles per hour, at a cost of \$1.2 billion. The train is just one of many current and planned projects such as the Qinghai – Tibet railroad, the Three Gorges Dam, a high-speed rail link between Beijing and Shanghai, a massive West-East natural gas pipeline, and a \$60 billion project to divert water from the Yangtze to the

Yellow River in the north. All told, state and private spending on infrastructure projects was more than \$200 billion last year. The government justifies such spending as a way to spur growth while consumer spending is still relatively low and to maintain stability by employing migrant workers. The plan appears to be working, as economic growth and foreign direct investment have remained strong, but the budget deficit reached a high of \$37.4 billion this year, amounting to 3 percent of the GDP, considered by many economists to be an alarming level.



JAPAN

Johnny Chen

Kidnapped Japanese Return Home

Five Japanese who were kidnapped by North Korea in the 1970s returned home to Japan on 15 October 2002, and nearly seven months later they still have no clue when they will be re-united with their families who continue to reside in North Korea. The visit,

which was supposed to be short, ended up being a potential diplomatic disaster when Japan refused to return the five kidnapped Japanese to North Korea. Pyongyang has responded by denying their combined seven children from visiting them.

Johnny Chen

Transition to New Financial Leadership

Japan, mired in the last decade by a repressed economy and sluggish economic stimuli from the central banks, recently underwent a shuffling in the cabinet as the outgoing Bank of Japan Governor Masaru Hayami was replaced by former chairman of the Fujitsu Research Institute Toshihiko Fukui. Along with the appointment by Prime Minister Koizumi were two deputy governors Toshiro Muto, a former vice minister of Finance, and Kazumasa Iwata, a director general at the Cabinet Office. All three men have declared Japan's bad debt problem as a crucial component to their upcoming terms, and have targeted Japan's negative real interest rate and deflationary pressures as items to address.

Japan, facing an economic depression which is forcing fickle exchange rates in the yen and a seemingly unstoppable deflation spiral, must turn to its newly appointed Bank of Japan officials for guidance in an increasingly uncertain global economy worsened by the US war on Iraq and multiple corporate scandals. In a nation with one of the highest global savings rates, falling consumer demand, increasing unemployment, rising pensions costs, and a Nikkei index at a 20-year low, fiscal relief such as tax cuts and cutbacks to government spending seem to offer few answers to Japan's economic conundrums.

Governor of Tokyo Re-Elected

The incumbent Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara has been re-elected in a landslide, an event which raises the likelihood that he will succeed Junichiro Koizumi as Prime Minister. Running as an independent but supported by the Liberal Democratic Party, Mr. Ishihara

who is now 70 years old earned approximately 70 percent of the votes. Mr. Ishihara has been known to have made controversial remarks regarding the 1930s Nanking Massacre as well as sovereignty disputes over islands in the East China Sea.



KOREA

Georgi Diankov

The Koreas: Hope amid Broken Promises

After several months of provocative declarations, in January 2003 North Korea expelled the arms inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency and announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as the Agreed Framework of 1994. There is speculation over whether the regime of Kim Jong Il used the US preoccupation with Iraq as a cover for its actions, or whether the North Koreans coolly planned the re-start of their nuclear arms program. Evidence suggests that the Stalinist regime has never abandoned its covert desires for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. This would imply that in his January 2002 "State of the Union" speech when President Bush included North Korea in his "axis of evil" he

was not provoking the crisis but accurately assessed the mindset of the increasingly besieged North Korean regime.

For all the danger associated with introducing nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, a military solution seems out of the question, even for the hawkish Bush administration, which settled on diplomacy. A tense international environment and the US involvement in Iraq have given North Korea a larger than usual latitude for brinkmanship. A conflict in Korea is the last desire of policy makers in the US and abroad. The current attitude toward North Korea is vastly different from the international reaction in June 1994, when the Clinton administration was close to authorizing hostile actions. In part, this

difference is due to the change in South Korea that President Kim initiated through his "Sunshine Policy." South Korea has distanced itself from its ally the United States and has become more eager to assume greater responsibility in dealing with North Korea. The election of Roh Moo-hyun as President of South Korea bodes well for the continuation of a cautious but forward-looking version of Kim's "Sunshine Policy." It does not bode so well for the future of South Korea's security alliance with the US. While nobody expects a break between the allies, rising negative attitudes toward the US in Korea ensures that the US may no longer have the complete support of Seoul.

Despite the futility of any attempt to read the minds of the inscrutable North Korean regime, it is reasonable to assume that North Korea is both genuinely attracted to the option of possessing nuclear weapons and that it is

brandishing the nuclear threat to extort fuel, food and money from the world community. Contradictions are not new to Pyongyang.

On the economic front, North Korea is continuing its plunge, despite slow changes such as the setting up of two special economic zones, which some say have promise. Food shortages and famine are expected again in 2003. South Korea continued to post impressive gains, with GDP growth of 5.7 percent in 2002. Growth is expected to drop slightly in 2003. Markets are starting to shake off the initial anxiety about a leftist President Roh, weakening big business in the name of populism. President Roh will probably fall in line.

Finally, two celebrations occurred in February 2003 – Mr. Kim Jong Il celebrating his 61st birthday and Mr. Roh assuming post as President. Festivities were muted. The big celebration for all Korean people, on both sides of the border, has been, again, postponed indefinitely.



GREATER EAST ASIA

Johnny Chen

Indonesia targets terrorism

Riots and defiance of authority has wrapped Southeast Asia in turmoil over the past several months. In Jakarta, Indonesian police are troubled by continuous bursts of bombings on the island as authorities continue their investigation into last October's bombing on the island of Bali that killed 192 people, a majority of them foreigners at the popular vacation spot. Islamic extremists and the Jemaah Islamiya group, one which is linked to the Al Qaeda

terrorist network, have been blamed for the attack. The recent capture of the head of the Singapore branch of the Islamic militant group, Mas Selamat Kastari, is reported to be a successful thwarting of the group's attempt to further spread the network to Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. Police are also hunting for perpetrators of a string of bomb attacks that shattered the religious community across Indonesia on Christmas Eve, killing and injuring a score of people.

Thaksin ends Thai Anti-Drug Crackdown

In late April Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra officially ended the government's controversial campaign against drug lords and drug dealers. Speaking to reporters on 7 May, Thaksin declared the

campaign a success and claimed that it "had helped the whole world, especially the Western countries." Official statistics from the Thai government indicate that 2,274 individuals had been killed since 1 February.

On 1 February, Thaksin began the anti-drug campaign by presenting Thai provincial governors with a list of 46,177 individuals with alleged links to the drug trade. Provincial governors were then ordered to “reduce” the individuals on the list by a quarter within three months. After some local officials complained that they were being forced to meet body-count quotas, Thai Interior Minister Wan Muhamad Noor Matha warned that governors would be replaced if they did not meet national government targets.

Thailand’s latest attempt to battle its drug problems was widely condemned by human rights groups, foreign governments, and international organizations. On 26 February UN human rights official Asma Jahangir expressed concern over allegations of extra-judicial killings and excessive use of force by Thai law enforcement authorities. Amnesty International condemned the anti-drug campaign as following a “de facto

shoot-to-kill policy.”

While admitting that some innocent individuals might have been killed, Thaksin has vigorously defended the Thai government’s actions, describing them as necessary “eye-for-an-eye” measures to combat the country’s severe drug problems. According to newspaper polls conducted at the height of the campaign, 80-90 percent of all Thais supported Thaksin’s crackdown on drug traffickers. Thailand is the world’s largest consumer of methamphetamines, with about five percent of the population regularly abusing the drug.

The Thai press has been circulating reports that, in order to extract revenge on Thaksin, Thai drug lords have placed a \$2 million bounty on his head. Press reports also indicated that ethnic Wa drug lords in Burma were planning an assassination attempt against the Thaksin, an allegation denied by the Burmese military government.

Consolidating Separation: The Lee Teng-hui Administration and The Political Status of Taiwan*

Tie Wee Tan

A divergence of views on the political status of Taiwan lies at the heart of the cross-Strait impasse. Although Taiwan does not currently fall under its jurisdiction, Beijing insists that Taiwan is a part of China that will eventually be reunified with the mainland under the “one China” principle.¹ However, Taipei claims that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent state, for which reunification is but one of several options for its political future.² More importantly, the inability of the two regimes to come to an agreement on the political status of Taiwan within “China” or with respect to “China” in the international system has re-emerged as a source of regional instability with the sudden escalation of military tension in the Taiwan Strait in 1995.³

As with many events that diminish in importance over the inexorable march of history, it is easy for the contemporary observer to overlook the fact that there existed between the two sides of the Strait a mutual concordance with regard to the geo-political extent of China. Although the Republic of China (ROC) government was obliged to retreat to Taiwan in 1949, it remained steadfast in its determination to recover its mainland provinces. Similarly, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) swore to

liberate the island from the remnants of the Kuomintang (KMT). Indeed, both regimes believed that they were locked in a mortal struggle from which only one would emerge victorious to rule all of China, including the province of Taiwan. While sporadic military confrontations did occur, neither side was strong enough to defeat the other militarily. Therefore, the diplomatic struggle over the right to represent China took center stage. Despite strong international pressures to seek an alternative solution to their standoff, both regimes never wavered on their common stand on the “one China” principle. Both sides were unanimous in their opposition to “two Chinas,” and rejected dual recognition by third countries. The two regimes might have competed for the right to represent China, but they were in agreement for four decades over the political status of Taiwan as a province of China.

However, this consensus began to fall apart during the Lee Teng-hui administration. Indeed, by the end of Lee’s two terms in office, Taipei’s political self-identification had undergone such dramatic changes that the political status of Taiwan as part of China was no longer certain. This study examines the legacy of the Lee administration in influencing the determination of the political status of Taiwan. Specifically, this article argues that the Lee administration attempted to redefine the political

* In this paper, the term “Taiwan” refers to the geographic entity comprising the island of Taiwan and other outlying islands currently under the direct jurisdiction of the Republic of China, whereas the term “China” refers to the geopolitical entity that includes both Taiwan and the Chinese mainland.

¹ White Paper issued in February, 2000. See PRC, State Council Information Office, *Yi ge zhongguo de yuanze yu taiwan wenti (The One China Principle and The Taiwan Question)* (Beijing: State Council Information Office, 2000). Available at <http://www.peopledaily.net/GB/channel1/10/20000910/226296.html>.

² Interview with CNN on September 23, 2000. Chen was reiterating his remarks made during his Central American tour in August. See Chinoy, Mike, “Taiwan’s Chen on reunification: ‘Some things cannot be rushed’,” available at <http://www.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/east/09/23/Chen.interview/index.html>.

³ For an excellent treatment of the origins and consequences of the 1995 crisis, see Zhao Suisheng, ed., *Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995-1996 Crisis*. (NY: Routledge, 1999).

status of Taiwan so as to consolidate the state of separation of Taiwan from the mainland. Examining the democratization policy of the Lee administration, this article contends that Lee's agenda lies not only in the future of democracy in Taiwan, but also in trying to cast Taiwan's separation from the Chinese mainland into permanence.⁴

The existing literature on the political development of Taiwan tends to assume the attainment of democracy as the ultimate goal of the democratization process. Thus, many scholars focus on identifying the causes for the occurrence of democratization on the island or dwell on the implications of Taiwan's democracy for its political future.⁵ However, these two approaches presuppose a democratic Taiwan to the neglect of a direct examination of the relationship between the political status of Taiwan and the process of democratization itself. This article hopes to bridge the gap by analyzing the evolution of the political status of Taiwan over time during the democratization process of constitutional reform on the island to support its contention.

It will be shown that Lee sought to codify Taiwan's state of separation from the mainland into law by exploiting the contradictions peculiarly inherent in the democratization of Taiwan initiated by the late Chiang Ching-kuo. In a series of constitutional changes, Lee dismantled the national apparatus of the ROC for the representation of all China and localized the ROC to Taiwan under the guise of democratization. This article also examines Lee's so-called "pragmatic diplomacy" to demonstrate his reluctant attitude towards reunification and his ultimate aim of securing for Taiwan a political status independent of "China."

Codifying Separation

The future of the ROC looked bleak indeed after the American derecognition that resulted in

the loss of its single major diplomatic ally. However, the ROC under Chiang remained committed to its sacred mission of recovering the mainland provinces.⁶ Recognizing the futility of clinging to its hope of a return to the mainland by force of arms, but convinced of the eventual collapse of the Communist regime, the ROC decided on a strategy of peaceful subversion by engaging its Communist antagonist in an ideological competition. The ROC quietly dropped references to its former battle cry of launching a counterattack on the mainland but played up the strategy of relying primarily on political means to recover the mainland. Specifically, the ROC now placed its hopes on its tormented citizens "behind the enemy lines" to rise up in rebellion against their communist oppressors.⁷ Taiwan province would no longer be the launch pad for a military counter-offensive on the mainland. Instead, it would be built into a socio-economic showcase demonstrating the achievements and superiority of the "three people's principles" over communism. The ROC now placed its faith on its citizens on the mainland to choose the better system and rise up against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In the meantime, Taiwan province was to be the beacon of hope for her suffering citizens on the mainland as the ROC enlisted the help of Time in her mission to achieve national reunification under the "three people's principles."

To this end, Chiang initiated political reforms in the ROC along the lines of the "three people's principles" beginning with Taiwan province and within the context of "one China." As the practice of democracy in a state necessarily involves the participation of all its citizens in the political process, the democratization process presented a peculiar problem for the ROC because the main body of its population on the mainland lay beyond

⁴ Myers makes a similar argument contending that Lee used Taiwan's democratic credentials as an excuse for resisting reunification, but he stops short of saying that the democratic reforms during the Lee administration were aimed at consolidating separation. See Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, *The Divided China Problem* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 2000).

⁵ Wachman believes the democracy on Taiwan will lead to a redefinition of national identity that will reshape cross-Strait relations. See Alan M. Wachman, *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization* (NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994). Copper argues a democratic Taiwan will remain politically separate from the mainland. See John F. Copper, *As Taiwan Approaches the New Millennium* (NY: UP of America, 1999). Rigger notes that most studies identify other causes of democracy on Taiwan to the neglect of the role of elections in bringing about democracy. See Shelley Rigger, *Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy* (NY: Routledge, 1999).

⁶ "Jue bu fangqi guangfu dalu zhengjiu tongbiao zhi shengsheng shining." Address to the nation by ROC President Chiang Ching-Kuo on December 16, 1978. Reproduced in Academia Historica, *Documentary Collection Vol. I*, p. 337.

⁷ "San fen junshi, qi fen zhengzhi: san fen di qian, qi fen di hou." Speech by Chiang Kai-shek. See Academia Historica, *Documentary Collection Vol. I*, p. 435.

its direct jurisdiction. For now, the conundrum was to be resolved by carrying out democratic reforms in the province within the edifice of a larger Chinese nation, the semblance of which was to be maintained by National Assembly that consisted mainly of representatives of ROC citizens on the mainland who had attended the inaugural session in 1946. In short, Chiang had sought to democratize all of China in a process that was to begin with the political liberalization of Taiwan – there was to be a democratization of Taiwan within its Sinic orbit.

In 1984, Lee Teng-hui was appointed Vice-President as part of Chiang's policy of bringing Taiwanese into government. As a technocrat specializing in agriculture, Lee had no political base within the KMT and stood above the factional politics. At the same time, Lee had also proven himself to be a capable administrator during his stints as mayor of Taipei and as governor of Taiwan province. Most important of all, Lee had publicly stated his opposition to independence for Taiwan.⁸ Chiang must have thought that his protégé embodied ideal qualities for the vice-president of the ROC – a non-partisan native Taiwanese who held conservative views.

However, Lee in fact did not share his mentor's sense of mission in national reunification. Lee had been born and raised in Taiwan under Japanese occupation and had always thought of himself as Japanese until Taiwan's retrocession in 1945.⁹ Therefore, it was understandable that Lee had a greater affinity for Taiwan and Japan than for the foreign Chinese mainland on which he had never set foot but for which he was obliged to demonstrate affection in his capacity as vice-president of the ROC.¹⁰ In any case, as Lee himself admitted, Chiang probably never planned to pass the reins of power to his protégé.¹¹ Nonetheless, when Chiang suddenly passed away on January 13, 1988, Lee was sworn in as the fourth president of the ROC.

An Accidental President

The new president was initially perceived as an interim figurehead to be replaced at the end of Chiang's term in 1990. Indeed, Lee had little legitimacy except as the constitutional successor to the late president. Conservative mainland members of the KMT were naturally suspicious of Lee, who was a native Taiwanese. Madame Chiang Kai-shek even let it be known that she preferred not to elect an interim leader for the KMT. Similarly, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hao Bei-tsun was inclined to agree with Madame Chiang even though he had pledged to uphold the late president's will and support Lee as his constitutional successor. However, reformists groomed by the late president such as James Soong and Ma Ying-jeou, voiced their support for Lee to assume the position of party chairman concurrently. Lee was eventually named party chairman, but he also understood the need to cultivate the support of the reformist faction of the KMT. This he strove to achieve by presenting himself as the worthy protégé of the late president faithfully carrying out his mentor's wishes.

To assuage Madame Chiang, Lee called on the *grande dame* the day after his appointment as party chairman and promised to fulfill the wishes of the late president.¹² In his opening address to the 13th Party Congress of the KMT in July 1988, Lee reaffirmed his commitment to the national mission of recovering the mainland and reunifying China under the "three people's principles." Besides reiterating the official line that the achievements of the ROC bastion of Taiwan demonstrated the superiority of the "three people's principles" over communism, Lee also took care to emphasize that the future of Taiwan lay in the completion of this task – implicitly repudiating independence for Taiwan.¹³ In 1989, he rewarded the reformist

⁸Taylor recounts Lee's denunciation of Taiwanese independence in a speech to the Provincial Assembly that caught Chiang's attention. See Taylor, p. 379.

⁹ Lee takes pride in the fact that he held the rank of Lieutenant in the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War. See Lee, *With the People*, p. 318.

¹⁰ In contrast, Lee spent almost three years in Japan attending Kyoto Imperial University.

¹¹ Lee, *With the People*, p. 62.

¹² Taylor, pp. 423-424.

¹³ Academia Historica, *Documentary Collection* Vol. I, pp. 468-470.

secretary-general of the KMT, Li Huan, by appointing him premier and made peace with General Hao by extending his term as military chief by a year.¹⁴

Lee was rewarded for his efforts. Most KMT members came to be convinced that he would not rock the boat set on course towards national reunification by the late president. This image of Lee as a dutiful protégé possessing an unquestionable loyalty to the ROC was so entrenched that he was even able to convince the elderly National Assemblymen to force the withdrawal of a rival KMT ticket that had emerged in the presidential elections of 1990. In fact, the native Taiwanese Lin Yang-kang and the mainlander Chiang Wei-kuo represented the conservative faction in the KMT that had mounted the challenge against Lee because they questioned the true motives behind Lee's reform efforts.¹⁵ Ironically, they were compelled to withdraw from the elections by party elders whose very interests they sought to protect, so trusting were the elders of Lee.

However, behind his façade of loyalty, Lee in fact held views different from that of his mentor when it came to "identification with Taiwan."¹⁶ Lee did not share his mentor's conviction that the development of Taiwan had to be constrained by the goal of eventual restoration of ROC rule over the mainland. Lee believed that the purpose of political development of Taiwan should not be one of influencing developments on the mainland. Rather, Taiwan should "first seek international recognition and status, and leave the question of China for the future."¹⁷ Despite his image as a dutiful protégé of Chiang, Lee placed a priority on reunification lower than that on political liberalization and the latter was to be achieved

independent of its Sinic orbit. In fact, Lee had a vision of a "new sense of *national* [emphasis added] identity impelled by the force of the ballot box" based on a "New Taiwanese consciousness" among the populace on the island.¹⁸ Myers notes the significance of Lee's use of the term "New Taiwanese" instead of "Chinese" to describe the "new national identity of Taiwan."¹⁹ Indeed, Lee sought to create an "imagined community" on Taiwan that was to be independent of the Chinese mainland.²⁰ To this end, Lee hijacked the process of political liberalization initiated by Chiang to achieve aims very different from what his mentor had intended.

Lee suggested that his mentor did not give much thought to the political consequences of a democratic system centered on the population of Taiwan.²¹ Indeed, Lee understood that democratization would transform the population on Taiwan into the single source of political legitimacy for any governing authority on the island. It therefore could be manipulated to blur the distinction between the national and provincial governments such that the state would become so closely identified with Taiwan as to render any claim to represent all of China appear ludicrous. Rather than attempting to strengthen the sense of national identification with the ROC among the Taiwanese, Lee exacerbated the contradictions of democratization on Taiwan by exhorting the people to "identify with Taiwan" – rather than with the ROC – so as to engineer a crisis of national identity.

His reputation as a loyalist having been established with the help of the reformist faction, Lee sought to diversify his power base by drawing on popular disenchantment against the National Assembly. A golden opportunity presented itself

¹⁴Ramon H. Myers, "Building the First Chinese Democracy: the Crises and Leadership of President Lee Teng-hui," in Lee Teng Hui. *Peace Through Democratic Reforms* (Taipei: Wen Ying Tang Press Inc., 1996) p. 175.

¹⁵Rigger, p. 151.

¹⁶"Rentong taiwan." See Lee, *With the People*, p. 62.

¹⁷Lee, *With the People*, p. 63.

¹⁸Lee Teng-hui, "Understanding Taiwan." *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 6 (November/December 1999): p. 9.

¹⁹Chao and Myers, p. 2.

²⁰The term "imagined community" is first coined by the anthropologist Benedict Anderson in his definitive work on the evolution and definition of the nation-state, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (NY: Verso, 1991). Lee's use of the phrase to describe the "imagined community" of people on Taiwan reflects his position on the appropriate status for Taiwan in the community of nations. See Lee, "Understanding Taiwan." *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 6 (November/December 1999): p. 9.

²¹Lee professes his admiration for his mentor although he does not share the latter's beliefs and apparent lack of foresight. See Lee, *With the People*, pp. 62-63.

on March 17, 1990, when some 22,000 college students demonstrated against a proposal by the National Assembly to grant itself more power. Lee swiftly positioned himself on the side of the students, promising to convene a National Affairs Conference (NAC) in June. He also succeeded in dissuading the elderly assemblymen from approving their unpopular proposal. In the end, the demonstrators were won over and Lee was duly elected the eighth President of the ROC on March 21 – his double game had paid off. Lee also relieved the conservative stalwart General Hao of his military command on the pretext of appointing him as Premier.²² Still, Lee continued to pay lip service to the “one China” principle, stating in his inaugural address, “Taiwan and the mainland are inalienable territories of China.”²³

The NAC was convened on June 28. Ostensibly an avenue for all segments of society to voice their opinions on issues of concern to the future of the ROC, the NAC included even vocal advocates of Taiwanese independence from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who nonetheless merely represented the views of an extreme minority in that period.²⁴ Since the Constitution did not provide for such a body, the NAC could be described as an extra-constitutional mechanism devised by Lee that ultimately lent the DPP a semblance of respectability, in contrast to its public image as a bunch of rowdies who disrupted every ceremony they attended.²⁵ Indeed, DPP assemblymen were openly contemptuous of the ROC and even refused to take the national oath. The secessionists made good use of the extensive press coverage of the event to exacerbate the crisis of national identity that was brewing in the post-Chiang era by raising such divisive issues as direct presidential elections and calling for

plebiscites to ratify the conclusions of the conference.²⁶ The NAC also proved to be an unqualified success in public relations for Lee, who portrayed himself as the champion of democracy willing to listen to both ends of the political spectrum. Claiming to have obtained the mandate of the people through the NAC, Lee was now able to bring popular pressure to bear on the conservative faction in the KMT as he worked towards his goal of consolidating separation in the name of constitutional reform.

Codifying Separation

Lee handpicked the members of the National Unification Council (NUC) that was established on October 7, 1990.²⁷ The ostensible purpose of this presidential commission was to chart the course for the ROC to national reunification. On January 28, 1991, the Mainland Affairs Council was established through the promulgation of the “Organic Statute for the Mainland Affairs Council” by presidential decree to regulate the growing interactions between Taiwan and the mainland in the non-governmental sphere.²⁸ At the recommendation of the NUC, a private body known as the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) was set up on February 19 to deal with the mainland authorities at an unofficial level. Finally, on February 23, the National Unification Guidelines (NUG) were promulgated. The NUG represented a formal codification of Lee’s cherished principle of “Taiwan First” by subjecting reunification to the precondition of “first respecting the rights and interests of the people in the Taiwan area, and protecting their security and welfare.”²⁹

Lee also imposed stringent conditions that the PRC had to meet before he would even

²² These events are narrated in Myers, “Building the First Chinese Democracy,” in Lee, *Peace*, pp. 178-179.

²³ “Taiwan yu dalu shi zhongguo bu ke fengge de lingtu.” See Academia Historica, *Documentary Collection* Vol. I, p. 484.

²⁴ Even as late as 1994, the Lee administration had to concede in its White Paper of 1994 that advocates of Taiwanese independence are but a minority. “Zhuzhang [taidu] zhe bijing zhi shi taiwan diqu renmin zhong de shao shu (After all, advocates of ‘Taiwanese Independence’ are but a minority among the people in the Taiwan area).” Perhaps a reason for Lee’s covert but incremental approach. See ROC, MAC, “Taihai liang an guanxi shuomingshu (Explanatory Document on Relations Across the Taiwan Strait),” in Academia Historica, *Documentary Collection* Vol. II, p. 70.

²⁵ Xie recounts the antic by DPP Assemblyman Huang Zhaohui who overturned 7 tables at the official luncheon hosted by the President for members of the National Assembly. See Xie, p. 218.

²⁶ Reported in “Gaijie pai daibiao jianchi guo shi huiyi jielun yin jiao you gongmin fajue (Reformist Delegates Insist NAC Conclusions Be Ratified By Plebiscite),” *China Times*, June 29, 1990, p. 1.

²⁷ Myers, “Building the First Chinese Democracy” in Lee, *Peace Through Democratic Reforms* p. 182

²⁸ See <http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/orafunc/ora01.htm>.

²⁹ ROC, MAC, “Guojia tongyi wangling (National Unification Guidelines),” *Dalu gongzuo fagui huibian (Compilation of Regulations Towards the Mainland)* 4th Ed. (Taipei: Guanshun Publishing Co. Ltd, 1999), p. 6(2).

contemplate engaging the PRC in negotiations. While Chiang had set an ideological clause in the eventual reunification of China under the “three people’s principles,” Lee further inserted an economic condition for reunification by calling for an “equally prosperous” China, with the knowledge that the PRC would not be able to raise the living standards of the mainland provinces to match that of Taiwan in the short run.³⁰ Lee thus strove to postpone the reunification issue for as long as he could while he consolidated Taiwan’s state of separation. Myers goes further and argues that Lee was in fact buying time to implement his strategy of making “Taiwan into a nation-state, outside of the orbit of China.”³¹

In fact, the NUG proposed a three-staged approach to reunification and stated that the two sides must end their state of hostilities before they could even proceed to the next stage. Given that it was unlikely that any self-respecting state committed to the defense of its own territories would renounce its sovereign right to the use of force within its realm, unless both regimes were willing to give up their claims to “one China,” it was unlikely that there would be any progress towards reunification. Therefore, in the context of the “one China” principle, the refusal of the PRC to renounce its sovereign right to the use of force on its territories was but a demonstration of its firm adherence to the principle. However, in a series of constitutional changes subsequently, Lee renounced the use of force, thereby surrendering the sovereign right of the ROC to the mainland and repudiating the “one China” principle implicitly.

Localizing the ROC

Having shelved reunification into the future, Lee now worked to localize the ROC to Taiwan through constitutional changes. On May 1, 1991, Lee terminated the “Temporary Provisions Effective for the Duration of the

General Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion” and enacted the “Additional Articles” to the ROC Constitution concurrently.

The “Temporary Provisions” were terminated despite the fact that the communist rebellion in the mainland provinces of the ROC had not been successfully suppressed. While this could be seen as a rational adaptation by the ROC to the reality of its inability to recover its mainland provinces by military means, the abrogation of the “Temporary Provisions” presented the ROC with a conundrum because it necessitated the acknowledgement of the legality of the communist regime on the mainland when the ROC still claimed sovereignty over the mainland. Therefore, although the communist regime was no longer condemned as a rebel organization, the ROC still could not recognize the PRC as a state without negating the “one China” principle.

Recognizing the inherent contradiction in this move, DPP legislator Frank Hsieh suggested, “In recognition of the success of the communist rebellion, the ROC should also acknowledge the reality of the independence of the mainland, and forswear the use of force against the mainland.”³² Indeed, it was obvious that the termination of the “Temporary Provisions” was not merely a necessary stage in the democratization of the ROC. It was also a double-edged sword that could potentially lead to the recognition of the PRC as a separate state that would set the stage for Taiwan’s own legality in the community of nations.

Lee nonetheless refrained from an outright repudiation of the “one China” principle for fear of losing the support of the still powerful conservative faction. Lee needed to reassure the conservative faction that he was merely realizing the late President’s democratic aspirations. As such, Lee made his contribution to diplomatic terminology by proclaiming that

³⁰ “Junfa de zhongguo.” See ROC, MAC, “National Unification Guidelines,” *Compilation of Regulations*, p. 6(1).

³¹ Chao and Myers, p. 4.

³² Press comments made during NAC. Reported in “Zhengzhi kanliuan shiqi de tong shi yin chengren zhonggong panluan chenggong (With the Termination of the Period of General Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion, the ROC Should Also Recognize Success of Communist Rebellion),” *China Times*, July 1, 1990, p. 4.

the PRC was not a state, but a “political entity” whose jurisdiction over the mainland provinces was recognized by the ROC.³³

In tandem with this approach, the “Additional Articles” that replaced the “Temporary Provisions” upon the abrogation of the latter delineated Taiwan as the “free area” that was distinct from the “mainland area.”³⁴ Having made this distinction, Lee proceeded to freeze the clauses in the original constitution that provided for the representation of the mainland provinces in the National Assembly and in the Legislative and Control Yuans. Instead, legislators and assemblymen elected in the “free area” would suffice in providing legitimate representation for all citizens of the ROC on these “national” bodies.³⁵ In short, the “Additional Articles” replaced clauses in the original constitution that bore no relevance to the administration of Taiwan, effectively limiting the jurisdiction of the ROC to Taiwan. Lee had further undermined the ROC’s claim of sovereignty over the mainland.

Although it can be argued that Lee was only acknowledging the reality that the ROC no longer exercised jurisdiction over the mainland, it is suggested that it was also possible to reconcile the contradiction without having to eliminate all semblances of representation for the mainland provinces. In particular, it is inconceivable that the “Additional Articles” should fail to ensure explicit representation for the erstwhile citizens of the ROC resident on the mainland when these same articles provided for the representation of Overseas Chinese, including even those ethnic Chinese who held foreign citizenship.³⁶ In addition, seats for the so-called “non-differentiated constituencies” were not subject to direct elections but distributed among those parties winning more than 5 percent of the votes in a proportional representation system similar to the Japanese system. This overturns the

argument that the inability of the ROC to hold elections in the Communist-occupied mainland provinces necessitated the elimination of representation for these territories of the ROC in the name of democratization.

Lee was merely making use of democracy to realize his goal of localizing the ROC to Taiwan. Although he continued to insist that both the “free area” and the “mainland area” belonged to “one China,” Lee in fact had a perception of “one China” radically different from the “one China” principle of the Chiang era.

Redefining One China

The true motives behind these constitutional changes were revealed in the White Paper issued by the Lee administration on July 5, 1994. It stated that the abrogation of the “Temporary Provisions” was in fact a renunciation by his administration of the ROC’s right to the use of force to retake the mainland and a declaration of its intention not to compete with the communist regime for the right to represent China.³⁷ Lee’s surrender of the ROC’s sovereign right to the use of force flew in the face of the lip service he paid to the maintenance of the ROC’s sovereignty over the mainland. It is impossible to reconcile the Lee administration’s professed adherence to the “one China” principle with its lack of interest in the international title of China. Whereas Chiang believed the ROC would eventually recover the title of China when the imminent collapse of the Communist regime finally occurred, Lee simply did not deign to compete for the title.

It also became apparent that Lee did not subscribe to the “one China” principle as had been understood by the international community since the retreat of the ROC government to Taiwan. The White Paper stated that the “one China” as postulated by the NUG referred only to the “historical, geographical, cultural and familial

³³ Remarks by Lee at press conference on April 30, 1991. Reproduced in Academia Historica, *Documentary Collection Vol. II*, p. 15.

³⁴ “Ziyou diqu yu dalu diqu.” As stipulated in Article 10 of the Additional Articles enacted in the first constitutional revision of 1991. Reproduced in Xie, p. 235.

³⁵ Additional Articles 1, 2 and 3 superceded Articles 26, 64, 91 and 135 of the original constitution that provided for representatives from Tibet and Mongolia on these national bodies. See Xie, p. 234.

³⁶ Additional Articles 1, 2 and 3 provided for Overseas Chinese representatives by means of party list proportional representation in the National Assembly, and the Legislative and Control Yuans. See Xie, p. 234. For explanation of political participation of Overseas Chinese, see ROC, GIO, *Republic of China Yearbook 1995*. (Taipei: GIO, 1995) p. 199.

³⁷ Academia Historica, *Documentary Collection Vol. II*, p. 65.

“China,” and not in the political sense of the term.³⁸ Therefore, the “one China” that the Lee administration claimed to be working towards under the NUG was not a political reunion between Taiwan and the mainland as envisaged by Chiang, but merely a reluctant acknowledgement that Taiwan could never break free of its Sinic orbit completely. Reunification with the mainland was no longer an assumed eventuality, but merely an option for Taiwan at best. Indeed, Lee went so far as to denounce the KMT, whose chairmanship he held, as “an alien regime” imposed upon Taiwan.³⁹ Lee was gradually revealing his true colors.

Dismantling the ROC

The retirement of the senior parliamentarians and dissolution of the First National Assembly in 1991 eliminated the bastion of conservative power, and Lee moved swiftly to deliver the coup de grace by maneuvering for the resignation of Premier Hao and replacing him with a close associate in 1993. With his hold on power thus consolidated, Lee initiated yet another round of constitutional revision in 1994 that provided for the election of the ROC president from the electorate on Taiwan only.

Under the ROC constitution, the National Assembly had previously served as an electoral college that elected the president, thus enabling the ROC to maintain its claim of sovereignty over the mainland under the “one China” principle, since the National Assembly included representatives from the mainland provinces. The secessionists criticized this as a departure from reality because the ROC had been unable to conduct regular elections on the mainland to fill these seats since 1949.⁴⁰ This had provided the justification for Lee to initiate a round of constitutional revision in 1991 to cease representation for the mainland provinces in the

National Assembly, although the authority of the National Assembly to elect the president was not revoked.

In 1994, Lee went one step further and abolished the electoral college function. In this round of constitutional revision, Additional Article Two stipulated the direct election of the President by the people in the “free area” of the ROC.⁴¹ Therefore, the ROC President was now merely the elected representative of the people in the “free area” and could no longer claim to represent his erstwhile fellow citizens in the “mainland area.” Since Lee had already recognized the PRC’s powers of jurisdiction over the mainland in 1991, the so-called “free area” referred only to Taiwan. The restriction of the electorate of the ROC to only those citizens living on Taiwan transformed them into the single source of political legitimacy for any governing authority on the island. Lee had rectified the fiction of representation of the mainland provinces to create a new reality – even the presidency of the ROC was localized to Taiwan.

The new provisions took effect in the presidential election of 1996. Victory in the first direct presidential elections emboldened Lee to complete the localization of the ROC to Taiwan. Previous rounds of constitutional revision passed into law provisions for the direct election of the governor of Taiwan province, who had previously been a political appointee of the president.⁴² As a result, the first gubernatorial race was conducted with great enthusiasm among the population of Taiwan on December 3, 1994, with a voter turnout of 76.76 percent. Taiwan province had a constituency of 11 million, representing more than half of the population of the “free area.” In an expression of true democracy, the position was hotly contested in a five-way fight that was eventually won by the KMT candidate, James Soong, with a clear mandate of 52.05 percent of

³⁸ “[Yi ge zhongguo]: shi zhi lishi shang, dili shang, wenhua shang, xue yuanshang de zhongguo.” See Academia Historica, *Documentary Collection Vol. II*, p. 66.

³⁹ Interview with visiting Japanese scholar Shiba, Ryotaro in 1994. Reproduced in Lee Teng-hui, *Jingying da taiwan (Managing Greater Taiwan)*. (Taipei: Yuan Liu Publishing, 1995) p. 477.

⁴⁰ Frank Hsieh’s press comments during NAC. Reported in “Zhengzhi kanliuan shiqi de tong shi yin chengren zhonggong panluan chenggong (With the Termination of the Period of General Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion, the ROC Should Also Recognize Success of Communist Rebellion),” *China Times*, July 1, 1990, p. 4.

⁴¹ Text of the Additional Articles enacted in the 1994 constitutional revision is reproduced in Xie, p. 302.

⁴² Additional Article 17 enacted in the constitutional revision of 1992. See Xie, p. 267.

all votes cast. Interestingly, Soong was known for his reunification tendencies. In contrast, the DPP candidate campaigned on a Taiwanese independence platform that cost him the race with only 39.42 percent of the votes.⁴³

This arrangement was an example of how democratization on Taiwan could have been achieved without compromising the ROC's claim to represent its mainland constituents. The conduct of island-wide provincial elections provided channels for the realization of the aspirations of the population on Taiwan, without modifying the national structure of the ROC that encompassed the mainland provinces. In fact, the clear victory of the reunificationist James Soong over his secessionist rival implied that a majority of the population on Taiwan still preferred eventual reunification to outright independence.

Unfortunately, the results of this fair and democratic election were soon to be nullified by none other than the self-proclaimed champion of democracy himself. Even before Soong had completed his term in office, Lee was already working to undermine his position. The sweeping victory of Soong haunted Lee, who now feared a "Yeltsin effect," whereby the popularity of the provincial governor would outstrip that of his own.⁴⁴ Therefore, Lee collaborated with the DPP, which also wanted to remove any connotation that Taiwan was but a mere province of China, to remove Soong from power in the name of improving government efficiency.⁴⁵ On July 21, 1997, Lee announced the suspension of the office of the governor of Taiwan, with effect from December 20, 1998.⁴⁶ The dismantlement of the national structure of the ROC was complete, and the ROC melted into the last province of China that it had held since 1945. Soong was understandably disillusioned with Lee, whom he had supported against the conservative faction back in 1988, and he later left the KMT in disgust.

The removal of a democratically elected representative of the people from his office demonstrated Lee's disregard for the democratic process, which he simply regarded as a tool to assist him in the consolidation of the state of separation of Taiwan. The elimination of the provincial layer of government completed the localization of the ROC to Taiwan. The island was no longer a mere province of the ROC. Indeed, Taiwan was now synonymous with the ROC. The people of Taiwan no longer elected a governor, but chose a president as their direct representative. The mainland provinces were no longer represented in the National Assembly or any other "national" body of the ROC. Indeed, in his interview with *Deutsche Welle* in July 1999, Lee declared that the government on Taiwan as defined by the "Additional Articles" introduced since 1991 derived its legitimacy from the Taiwanese, represented only the Taiwanese, and bore no relationship whatsoever with the people on the mainland.⁴⁷

In his address to the 13th Congress of the KMT shortly after the death of Chiang in 1988, Lee had echoed the late President's national policy of "restoring ROC rule over the mainland" with Taiwan serving as the "bastion for national recovery," as he maneuvered frantically to consolidate his position as KMT Chairman.⁴⁸ However, these traditional references had since disappeared from the official pronouncements of the Lee administration.

The ROC of the Chiang era was no longer.

"Pragmatic Diplomacy"

While he was dismantling the national structure of the ROC through constitutional changes, Lee was concurrently engaged in high profile diplomatic efforts aimed at creating an international awareness of the "political entity" on Taiwan, in what came to be known as "pragmatic diplomacy." Trumpeting the

⁴³ ROC, GIO. *Republic of China Yearbook 1995*. pp. 136-137.

⁴⁴ Xie, p. 366.

⁴⁵ Lee's collaboration with the DPP to undermine the popular Provincial Governor, who belonged to the same party as Lee, was condemned widely within the KMT. See Clough, p. 83.

⁴⁶ Additional Article 9 suspended the office of the Governor. See Xie, p. 350.

⁴⁷ Interview with *Deutsche Welle* on July 9, 1999. Reproduced in "Li zhongtong: liangan wenti bu zai tongdu er zai zhidu (President Lee: Cross-Strait Issue Lies Not With Independence-Reunification But With Ideology)," *Central Daily News*, July 10, 1999, p. 3.

⁴⁸ "Taiwan fuxing jidi, Guangfa dalu." Address reproduced in part in Academia Historica, *Documentary Collection Vol. I*. pp. 468-469.

economic and democratic achievements on Taiwan, Lee justified his reluctant attitude towards reunification by citing reasons of economic and socio-political disparity between Taiwan and the mainland. The standard of living and political institutions on Taiwan were so far superior to that on the mainland that reunification was impractical. Lee demanded, “Only when the mainland possesses freedom, democracy, and equal wealth can both sides of the Strait unify; or else the mutual differences are too great such that unification is impossible.”⁴⁹ Lee’s “pragmatic diplomacy” thus rested on the pretext of the disparity of economic and political development across the Strait.

Economic Pretext

Taiwan enjoyed a seemingly unassailable economic lead over the mainland when Lee was sworn in as the fifth president of the ROC in 1990. Its population enjoyed a per capita income six times that of its mainland counterpart (see Table 1). The gap in the standard of living between the mainland and Taiwan was significant and this was not lost on the many Taiwanese who had visited the mainland after the restrictions on travel were lifted in 1987. Lee was eager to reinforce this superficial impression of poverty and backwardness by pointing out the “serious inflation and the 120 million unemployed individuals on the mainland,” suggesting structural problems in the mainland economy.⁵⁰ Therefore, he insisted, “The conditions for reunification do not exist now, and the time is not right.” Playing on the Taiwan people’s lack of deeper understanding of the conditions on the mainland, he further warned them that it was impossible for the communists to improve the standard of living of the people with their commune system, when the communes had in fact already been abolished.⁵¹ Against the backdrop of wild speculations about the full extent of the cost of German reunification to West Germany prevailing then, the specter of the potential economic repercussions of reunification for

Table 1: Real GDP Per Capita at Current International Prices

Year	Taiwan	Mainland
1988	8327	1410
1989	8938	1495
1990	9303	1536

Source: Penn World

Taiwan must have appeared real to the ordinary Taiwanese.

Indeed, the communist regime on the mainland had less to offer its people than the Lee administration. Starting from a low base after decades of autarkic economic development, the PRC was also burdened by a large population when it finally opened its doors in 1978. After more than a decade of spectacular economic growth, it was still unable to catch up with the higher standard of living on Taiwan. Furthermore, it was reeling from the effects of the American-led international sanctions in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. If reunification meant that Taiwan’s economic success was going to be squandered on rebuilding the vast continental hinterland from the ravages of decades of communist rule, it was not surprising that Lee’s warnings found a willing audience.

However, political issues aside, economic opportunities were abundant for Taiwanese businessmen in the opening up of the mainland. Thus, the relaxation of the ban on travel to the mainland saw an explosion of cross-Strait trade as Taiwanese businessmen took advantage of the lower costs across the Strait and relocated production to the mainland, resulting in a steady increase in Taiwan’s level of dependency on the cross-Strait economic activities (see Table 2).

Deng’s development strategy was to create a series of “special economic zones” along the coast that would serve as the economic engine for the rest of the mainland provinces. As such, coastal cities such as Shanghai experienced phenomenal rates of growth that transformed them into world-

⁴⁹ Interview given on August 19, 1993. Reproduced in *Academia Historica, Documentary Collection Vol. II*, p. 38.

⁵⁰ Interview with Japanese writer on January 16, 1990. Reproduced in Lee, *Managing*, p. 326.

⁵¹ “Yao zhidao bu neng zengjia jingji fazhan, xiang yong chi daguo de fangshi, shi yongyuan mei you bianfa gaishan shenghuo de.” Speech given on August 8, 1991. Reproduced in Lee, *Managing*, p. 390.

Table 2: Taiwan's Trade Dependence on the Mainland (\$ billion)

Year	Total Mainland Trade (a)	World Trade Total (b)	Dependent Rate (a / b)
1988	2.72	110.34	2.47%
1989	3.92	118.57	3.31%
1990	5.17	121.93	4.23%

Source: Zhao Suisheng, "Economic Interdependence and Political Divergence" in Zhao Suisheng, ed., *Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995-1996 Crisis*. (NY: Routledge, 1999) p. 28.

class cities worthy of their names. Businessmen brought news of Shanghai's success back to Taiwan, and the images of the modern skyline of Shanghai made a favorable impression on the Taiwanese. Even as the rest of the mainland remained poor, the standard of living in the coastal cities was fast approaching international standards. Furthermore, the lure of the lucrative Chinese market proved irresistible to the Taiwanese businessmen as they channeled 33 percent of all their foreign investment to the mainland in 1993.⁵²

Economic growth on the mainland did not stall in spite of its "serious inflation." The mainland economy continued to grow at an average rate of 12.3 percent annually, compared to 6.72 percent for the Taiwan economy in the same period.⁵³ And the Taiwanese began to look at the mainland in a different light – maybe the mainland was not as backward as they had thought. Furthermore, the burgeoning capital outflow to the mainland raised fears of a "hollowing out" of the Taiwan economy. Taiwanese funds were fueling the economic development of the mainland and unraveling the economic component of Lee's "pragmatic diplomacy."

In an attempt to reverse the trend, the Lee administration announced what came to be

known as the "go south" policy in 1993. It was an attempt to divert Taiwanese investment away from the mainland and towards Southeast Asia by encouraging its businessmen to invest there and imposing restrictions on capital flow towards the mainland. However, the "go south" policy failed to achieve its goal.⁵⁴ Taiwanese investments on the mainland did not slow down. Instead, the mainland component of Taiwan's foreign investment increased to 43.9 percent between 1994 and 1997, when the Southeast Asian economies collapsed in the Asian financial crisis that resulted in crippling losses for Taiwanese investors.⁵⁵

The failure of the "go south" policy in diverting Taiwanese funds away from the mainland resulted in the promulgation of an even harsher "go slow" policy that was formally announced by Lee on August 14, 1996, in a desperate attempt to stop Taiwanese investors from contributing to the economic development of the mainland. A proposed \$3.3 billion project to build a power plant in Fujian province by Taiwan's Formosa Plastics Group was shelved under government pressure. On July 1, 1997, the Lee administration imposed a ceiling of \$50 million on any investment project on the mainland. Furthermore, an outright ban was imposed on infrastructure projects that were important to developing economies like that of the mainland.⁵⁶

The "go slow" policy proved to be effective in reducing the volume of Taiwanese investments in the mainland from \$5.141 billion in 1996 to \$2.982 billion in 1998. Unfortunately, Taiwanese funds were no longer an important driving force behind the growth of the mainland economy, as Taiwan's share of foreign direct investment in the mainland fell to a paltry 5.72 percent

⁵² Cumulative data since 1987 adapted from Table 6 in Lin Zujia, "The Economic Development and Industrial Restructuring of Taiwan in the Ten Years of the Lee Teng-hui Era," in Zhou Yangshan, *Li denghui zhi zheng shi nian (Ten Years in the Lee Teng-hui Era)* (Taipei: Fengyun Luntan, 1998) p. 69.

⁵³ Average annual growth rate of gross domestic product of the mainland from 1990 to 1996. Figures from World Bank. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/data/archive/wdi/pdf/tab4_1.pdf. Taiwan's figures from the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, ROC. Available at <http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas03/bs8/look/looky.htm>.

⁵⁴ Sheng Lijun. *China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue* (NY: I. B. Tauris & Co. 2001) pp. 102-103.

⁵⁵ Table 7 in Lin, "Economic Development," in Zhou, *Ten Years*, p. 70.

⁵⁶ Sheng, p. 138.

in 1998 (see Table 3). The mainland economy continued to grow at breakneck speeds, unaffected by the slowdown in Taiwanese investment. Even the Asian financial crisis of 1997 did not have significant effects on the growth of the mainland economy. It was a matter of time before the mainland would be able to close the economic gap with Taiwan, even as the coastal cities were already enjoying a comparable standard of living.

By 1999, Lee had to admit, albeit grudgingly, “The mainland has indeed improved its economic productivity, but politically speaking, the one-party dictatorship of the CCP has not changed.”⁵⁷ Lee finally conceded the invalidity of his economic argument against reunification.

Political Pretext

Lee had every reason to be proud of the vibrant democracy he had helped establish on Taiwan and indeed he rarely missed a chance to contrast the political freedom enjoyed by the Taiwanese with the “one-party dictatorship of the CCP” on the mainland. On Taiwan, the highest political office was open to direct election. Elections were free, regular, fair and valid. They reflected the will of the people and conferred political power on the winners. As he proudly admitted, “Different and opposing views are heard everyday in the news media, including harsh criticism of the president.”⁵⁸ Indeed, even secessionist views could be freely aired without fears of persecution, as evident from the fact that the Taiwan Independence Party was a registered political party. In contrast, the CCP maintained a monopoly on power on the mainland. Direct elections were limited to the village governments. Political dissidents languished behind bars in labor camps and the media were tightly controlled by the state. Workers could not organize outside of state-sponsored unions and the only political parties permitted outside of the CCP were the eight “democratic partners” of the CCP.

Table 3: Foreign Direct Investment in the Mainland (\$ billion)

Year	Taiwan's Investment in Mainland	Total FDI in Mainland	Taiwan's Share of Total FDI
1991	1.39	11.98	11.59%
1992	5.54	58.12	9.54%
1993	9.96	111.44	8.94%
1994	5.39	82.68	6.52%
1995	5.85	91.28	6.41%
1996	5.14	73.28	7.02%
1997	2.81	51.00	5.52%
1998	2.98	52.10	5.72%

Source: China Foreign Direct Investment website. Available at <http://www.chinafdi.org.cn/english/O1/f/23/4.asp>.

Although he led Taiwan down a different path of democratization than what Chiang had in mind when the latter initiated the process of political liberalization, it is only fair to credit Lee with the consolidation of the institutions of democracy on the island. However, democracy was not the only goal Lee had in mind. As described earlier, Lee chose a path of democratization that reduced the ROC from a claimant to all of China to being the government of only Taiwan – the self-proclaimed “Republic of China on Taiwan” (ROCT). Lee also played up the democratic achievements of the ROCT as an excuse for resisting reunification with the mainland, even as he continued to pay lip service to the “one China” principle.

It is a fact that two diametrically different socio-political systems are practiced on the two sides of the Strait. Chiang recognized this, but he sincerely believed that the Communist regime would one day implode and the “three people’s principles” would return to the mainland. Unfortunately, the Communist regime proved its resilience in face of the demise of the East European bloc. However, Lee’s priorities meant that he did not care about political developments on the mainland and

⁵⁷ “Dalu zai jingji shang de shengchanli shi tisheng le, raner zai zhengzhi shang, zhongguo gongchangdang yi dang ducai de tizhi rengan mei you gaibian.” See Lee, *With the People*, p. 152.

⁵⁸ Lee alluded to the democratic credentials of the ROCT before his audience in Cornell in 1995. Speech reproduced in Lee, *Peace*, p. 38.

placed what he thought was in the best interests of Taiwan before everything else – including reunification. The onus was on the mainland to change its conditions so that it would suit Taiwan’s requirements.

Therefore, Lee believed, “Only under the precondition of liberal democracy is there a basis for reunification.”⁵⁹ There was to be no reunification unless the mainland practiced democracy. Since the CCP had demonstrated its staying power by weathering the crisis of 1989, the only way for democracy to occur on the mainland and for Lee to accept reunification was for the CCP to embark on political reforms like the KMT did. However, Lee charged, “The CCP has no wish to change completely its political system,” even though he conceded that the mainland economy had made tremendous progress.⁶⁰ By this line of reasoning, democracy could never take root on the mainland, and therefore Lee rejected reunification. He began to plot what Chiang would never have even contemplated – breaking Taiwan free of its Sinic orbit.

It is now widely believed that “with respect to the effects of economic development on democracy, the analysis shows that improvements in the standard of living substantially raise the probability that political institutions will become more democratic over time.”⁶¹ One did not even need to look too far to find a practical application of the hypothesis. In fact, as Lee himself admitted, “For the ROCT, economic reforms clearly led the way while political reforms just fell into place when the time and conditions were right.”⁶² However,

Lee did not elaborate on the reasons for his belief that the CCP could prevent the realization of the predictions of the hypothesis on the mainland. Indeed, the great pains Lee took to demonstrate the inapplicability of the concept of democracy on the mainland lead one to suspect that perhaps he simply did not think reunification should occur at all.

A State in Waiting

By 1994, Lee felt strong enough domestically to break free of straitjacket of adherence to the “one China” principle imposed upon him by Chiang. On April 14, Lee publicly questioned the existence of “one China” and stressed, “We should forget terms like ‘one China’ and ‘two Chinas’ as much as possible.” Instead, he attempted to justify his idea of the existence of a “Republic of China on Taiwan” and a “PRC on the Chinese mainland,” in what was probably the earliest expression of his “two states theory.”⁶³ Lee had christened

“ALTHOUGH [LEE] LED TAIWAN DOWN A DIFFERENT PATH OF DEMOCRATIZATION THAN WHAT CHIANG HAD IN MIND . . . IT IS ONLY FAIR TO CREDIT LEE WITH THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY ON THE ISLAND.”

what was to become his administration’s preferred term of reference for his realm. In fact, Lee had been trying to “win international support for the ROC [on Taiwan] as a state independent of the PRC and outside the orbit of One China.”⁶⁴ Lee’s strategy was to adopt a “proactive and pragmatic approach to expand the international living space” of the ROCT.⁶⁵ This was an attempt to “let the international community pay attention to the fact of the existence of the ROCT and to let the world understand the importance of the existence of the ROCT.”⁶⁶ In fact, “pragmatic diplomacy” was but an expression of the

⁵⁹ “Zhi you zai ziyou minzhu de qiantu xia, cai you tongyi de jichu.” Speech delivered on August 8, 1991. Reproduced in Lee, *Managing*, p. 390.

⁶⁰ Lee, *With the People*, p. 152-153.

⁶¹ Essay entitled “The Contributions of Economic Growth to Democracy.” Available at the Freedom House website, <http://freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/essay3d.htm>.

⁶² Speech to “International Conference on Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies” on August 25, 1995. Reproduced in Lee, *Peace*, p. 22.

⁶³ “Zhonghua minguo zai taiwan.” Interview with Liberty Times on April 14, 1994. Reproduced in Academia Historica, *Documentary Collection* Vol. II, p. 57.

⁶⁴ Chao and Myers, p. 29.

⁶⁵ “Yi geng zhudong wushi de jinshen, tuozhan guoji huodong kongjian.” Inaugural address of eighth president of the ROC delivered on May 20, 1990. Reproduced in part in Academia Historica, *Documentary Collection* Vol. I, p. 485.

⁶⁶ “Rang guoji shehui zhongshi zhonghua minguo zai Taiwan cun zai de shishi, rang shiren liaojie ‘zhonghua minguo zai taiwan’ de cun zai de zhongyao xing.” Interview with Liberty Times on April 14, 1994. Reproduced in Lee, *Managing*, p. 452.

socio-political component of his overall approach, as Lee sought international understanding of the ROCT's unique position as an aspiring democratic state being pressured by its larger communist neighbor into an unwanted *Anschluss*.

The ROCT rested its claim to statehood upon its democratic credentials, which contrasted with the communist institutions of the PRC. Lee played on the fact that the PRC was the only major country that still professed a Marxist-Leninist ideology in spite of the triumph of democracy over communism in the Cold War. By trumpeting the democratic achievements of the ROCT, Lee played on the lingering fears among the Western democracies of the last communist stronghold in the world. Hoping to revive the ideological antagonisms of the Cold War by rallying the Western camp to come to the rescue of its democratic brethren on Taiwan, Lee ultimately wanted the international community to accept ROCT into its ranks.

Since 1993, Lee had been seeking admission for the ROCT, rather than advocating the readmission of the ROC, into the UN – without demanding the parallel expulsion of the PRC.⁶⁷ This was an obvious contravention of the “one China” principle, which stated that there was only one China and that Taiwan was part of China. Since it was internationally recognized that only one China existed, there could only be one seat in the UN for China. Since Taiwan was part of China, the authorities on Taiwan could only compete with the PRC for the single seat of China in the UN. However, we note that the ROCT had conceded the contest to represent China in 1991, and yet it sought separate admission into the UN. The only

possible consequence of this course of action would lead to a situation of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” It was clear that the ROCT did not subscribe to the “one China” principle. Indeed, since “one China” was only a cultural concept in Lee’s opinion, he had no reservations in seeking to create what would have been condemned as “two Chinas” in the Chiang era. It is difficult to find justification for Lee’s insistence that he was merely trying to expand Taiwan’s diplomatic space under the “one China” principle.⁶⁸

Moreover, in his enthusiasm for expanding the diplomatic relations of the ROCT, Lee was not averse to dual recognition, which carried with it the connotations of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” When Saudi Arabia established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1990, Taipei did not sever relations with Riyadh, as it would have done in the Chiang era. Instead, it was Riyadh that broke ties with Taipei under pressure from the PRC.⁶⁹ So long as the ROCT was able to expand its diplomatic ties, Lee was willing to disregard any adverse implications for the “one China” principle. Such was the pragmatism in the practice of “pragmatic diplomacy.”

Lee was even willing to accept reduced levels of diplomatic protocol so as to secure visits to countries that continued to abide by the “one China” principle. These countries recognized Beijing as the legitimate government of China and had no diplomatic relations with Taipei. Nonetheless, Lee made unofficial visits to the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand in February 1994, in what came to be known as “vacation diplomacy.” Lee was willing to suffer the ignominy of a

⁶⁷ Since 1993, a handful of the ROCT’s diplomatic allies have sponsored annually a resolution calling for the inclusion in the agenda of the UN General Assembly, the “Need to examine the exceptional international situation pertaining to the Republic of China on Taiwan, to ensure that the fundamental right of its twenty-three million people to participate in the work and activities of the United Nations is fully respected.” See Clough, p. 76. Actual text of the Memorandum presented to the 55th Session of the General Assembly is available at <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/un/unlete2000.htm>.

⁶⁸ “Women zai yi ge zhongguo de qian ti xia kai zhan dui wai guanxi.” Inaugural address of eighth president of the ROC. Reproduced in part in Academia Historica, *Documentary Collection* Vol. II, p. 13.

⁶⁹ Zhao Suisheng, “Economic Interdependence and Political Divergence: A Background Analysis of the Taiwan Strait Crisis,” in Zhao, ed., *Across the Taiwan Strait*, p. 32.

private visit in order to undermine the international consensus on the “one China” principle, and his efforts were finally rewarded when Thai King Bhumibol hosted a reception in Lee’s honor, a gesture that implied a state visit.⁷⁰

Another motivation behind Lee’s eagerness to visit even countries without diplomatic ties was to demonstrate the ROCT’s solidarity with the democratic camp. His mission was to remind the world that a democracy existed on Taiwan that should not be reunified with the mainland because the latter had a totalitarian regime that was allegedly immutable. His

speeches to foreign dignitaries rarely failed to dwell at some length on the democratic achievements of the ROCT. These speeches were even translated and compiled into a handy little book entitled *Peace Through Democratic Reforms* to reach out to the English-speaking world. Today, US lawmakers regularly attack the PRC for its human rights record and other non-democratic practices, while holding Taiwan up as the shining star of liberal democracies, thereby demonstrating Lee’s success in projecting the “image of a tiny democracy being bullied by a communist dictatorship.”⁷¹

However, as one PRC scholar argues, the difference in socio-political systems is irrelevant to the impasse between the two regimes. The crux of the problem is the issue of sovereignty as encapsulated in the “one China” principle – there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China. He further points out, “According to international law,

a nation’s social system is irrelevant to the nation’s sovereignty.”⁷² Indeed, issues of sovereignty are legal matters that transcend socio-political arguments.

Although Chiang also emphasized the ideological struggle between the two regimes, he pursued his goal of a democratic China in the context of the “one China” principle. To Chiang, ideology was subordinate to sovereignty. In contrast, Lee cloaked his attempt at consolidating separation under the veneer of an ideological struggle by strutting the democratic credentials of the ROCT as a justification for

resisting reunification and creating a new nation-state. Riding on the crest of the global triumph of democracy over communism, Lee found a willing audience in some of the democratic – and most powerful – nations in the world, and became

emboldened as to declare cross-Strait relations as one between two sovereign states.⁷³ In defending Lee’s “two states” theory, one ROCT scholar even goes so far as to assert that because Taiwan has a democracy, it deserves to be a state, in a display of democratic chauvinism.⁷⁴

While the democratic achievements on Taiwan deserve to be lauded, they do not constitute a justification for the division of the sovereignty of a state. The UN, the membership of which confers upon the holder international recognition as a nation-state, seats communist states as well as democratic nations, without favor or prejudice. No state is excluded because it adheres to communism, just as no warring faction in a

“ALTHOUGH CHIANG ALSO EMPHASIZED THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE TWO REGIMES, HE PURSUED HIS GOAL OF A DEMOCRATIC CHINA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE “ONE CHINA” PRINCIPLE. TO CHIANG, IDEOLOGY WAS SUBORDINATE TO SOVEREIGNTY.”

⁷⁰ Michael Leifer, “Taiwan and Southeast Asia: The Limits to Pragmatic Diplomacy,” in Edmonds and Goldstein, eds., *Taiwan in the Twentieth Century*, p. 179.

⁷¹ See records of statements on China by members of Congress available at the State Department website, <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/chngst.htm>. See also Chao and Myers, p. 43.

⁷² Zhao Gan Cheng, “The Two-State Theory: Myth or Reality?” in Gong, ed., *Taiwan Strait Dilemmas*, p. 71.

⁷³ Interview with *Deutsche Welle* on July 9, 1999. Reproduced in “President Lee: Cross-Strait Issue,” *Central Daily News*, July 10, 1999, p. 3.

⁷⁴ Yang proposes what he terms the “Democratic Sovereignty” of the ROCT as evidence of its statehood. See Philip Yang, “Taiwan’s Legal Status,” in Gong, ed., *Taiwan Strait Dilemmas*, p. 80.

⁷⁵ Article 2(7) of UN Charter. Available at <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

China civil war is supported because it professes to uphold democratic principles. Democracy is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for statehood. The UN respects the sovereign rights of all member states regardless of their socio-political systems and explicitly refrains from intervening in “matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” of its member states.⁷⁵ The creation of a new international title and division of the sovereignty of an existing member state to accommodate a warring faction of a civil war based on ideological arguments has no precedent in the history of the UN. There was no international title of “Germany” in the UN prior to the simultaneous admission of communist East Germany and democratic West Germany as two distinct members on September 18, 1973. Similarly, the two Koreas took their seats in the UN only in 1991.⁷⁶ The international community does not and indeed cannot intervene in domestic disputes within the recognized borders of a member state on the sheer basis of ideology.

Challenging the Impossible

Ironically, it was to take a demonstration of international solidarity on the “one China” principle to prove the futility of Lee’s approach. The true motives behind Lee’s machinations were not lost on the PRC, which showed remarkable restraint nonetheless. This was in part because the PRC was able to thwart all of Lee’s attempts at consolidating Taiwan’s state of separation by raising the international awareness of the ROCT. As a permanent member of the Security Council, the PRC had the power to veto the entry of new members.⁷⁷ “Vacation diplomacy” remained just as that – an

unofficial visit by Lee in his personal capacity. No country broke with the “one China” principle to upgrade relations with the ROCT as a result of Lee’s visits. Swaine contends, “For many Chinese leaders (including Jiang Zemin) the confirmation of Lee’s separatist intentions came in 1994.” In particular, Lee’s interview with prominent Japanese writer Ryotaro Shiba in April that year confirmed, in the minds of the Chinese leadership, his support for “an independent Taiwan with a pro-Western and pro-Japan diplomatic policy.”⁷⁸

The last straw came with Lee’s high-profile visit to Cornell University in 1995. On January 30, Jiang issued his “Eight Points to Promote the Peaceful Reunification of the Motherland.” Described by Swaine as a “conciliatory approach,” Jiang’s “eight points” met Lee’s demands for a meeting of equals and reiterated, “Under the “one China” principle, anything can be discussed.”⁷⁹ Jiang stressed the domestic nature of the cross-Strait impasse and condemned attempts at creating “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” under the guise of “expanding [Taiwan’s] international living space.”⁸⁰ Lee responded by demanding the PRC drop its sovereign right to the use of force to reunify China and counter-proposing a meeting of leaders from both sides in an international setting.⁸¹ This reply was “viewed by most Chinese leaders as an outright rejection and a slap in the face.”⁸²

The bombshell came on May 22, when the Clinton administration announced Lee would be granted a visa to visit Cornell University. As Klintworth notes, this would be the first time a president of the ROC had

⁷⁶ Dates from UN website. <http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html>.

⁷⁷ Clough, p. 76.

⁷⁸ Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979 – 2000,” in David M. Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001) p. 315. Sheng also identifies this interview as a turning point. See also Sheng, p. 97.

⁷⁹ Swaine, “Decision-making,” in Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese*, p. 318.

⁸⁰ “Zaori jinxing pingdeng shangtan.” Full text of the Jiang “eight points” is available in Chinese at <http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/channel1/14/20000522/72538.html>.

⁸¹ Lee’s “six points” were announced on April 8. Reproduced in Academia Historica, *Documentary Collection* Vol. II, p. 79.

⁸² Swaine, “Decision-making,” in Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese*, p. 319.

ever set foot on American soil.⁸³ It now appeared to the PRC leadership that Lee's "pragmatic diplomacy" was succeeding in securing American acquiescence for Taiwanese separatism. The US Congress had passed a resolution with a near unanimous vote calling on President Clinton to allow the visit on the grounds of democratic solidarity.⁸⁴ Although the resolution was non-binding on the administration, President Clinton nonetheless succumbed to congressional pressure. Furthermore, the resolution referred to Lee as the "President of the Republic of China on Taiwan" even though the United States did not recognize the existence of the ROCT, praised Taiwan as a "model emerging democracy, with a free press, free elections, stable democratic institutions, and human rights protections," and spoke of the "democratic aspirations of the people of Taiwan."⁸⁵

Even so, the PRC initially adopted a cautious approach to the crisis, hoping that Lee would at least refrain from making provocative statements once in the United States.⁸⁶ However, Lee made full use of the publicity generated by his unprecedented visit to sell the ROCT as a friend of democracy that was willing to "challenge the impossible."⁸⁷ The PRC paid particular

attention to Lee's frequent use of the term "Republic of China on Taiwan" in his speech as a sign of his assertion of a separate political identity for Taiwan before an international audience.⁸⁸ There was not a doubt that Lee's Cornell visit was a crowning glory in his quest for international recognition of the ROCT based on ideological arguments.

Not surprisingly, the PRC now felt compelled to respond to this "clear indication of Washington's support for Lee's strategy of 'creeping independence.'"⁸⁹ In early July, Jiang directed the "PLA to develop and be prepared to implement in short order, plans for a military display directed at Taiwan."⁹⁰ These plans were swiftly drawn up and implemented in a series of missile tests and amphibious exercises conducted over a period from July 21 to March 15,

1996. The last round of tests saw missiles splashing only 22 miles off the coast of Taiwan.⁹¹ Although there was no real risk of all-out war at any time during the exercises, it was clear that Lee's machinations had completely shredded the symmetry on the "one China" principle that had existed between the two regimes during the period of peaceful ideological struggle and caused a retrogression in cross-Strait relations back to the "confrontational" phase

“ AT THE REQUEST OF THE PRC, ALL COUNTRIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN, REAFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE "ONE CHINA" PRINCIPLE. SEVERAL COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THAILAND AND INDONESIA, EVEN WENT ONE STEP FURTHER AND EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE TAIWAN ISSUE WAS PRIMARILY AN INTERNAL CHINESE MATTER THAT OUGHT TO BE RESOLVED BY BOTH SIDES OF THE STRAIT WITHOUT FOREIGN INTERFERENCE. ”

⁸³ Even Chiang Ching-kuo visited the US only in his capacity as Defense Minister of the ROC. See Gary Klintonworth, *Crisis Management: China, Taiwan and the United States – the 1995-96 Crisis and its Aftermath*. (Sydney: Commonwealth of Australia, 1997) p. 4. It must also be noted that Lee had a chance earlier to step foot on the United States, when his plane was in transit in Hawaii from Taiwan to Central America in 1994. However, he refused to get off the plane to protest against the American refusal to permit him to stay for a few days in Hawaii. Related by Winston Lord in Tucker, p. 478.

⁸⁴ The House of Representatives voted 396 to 0 and the Senate 97 to 1. See Tucker, p. 479.

⁸⁵ Full text of resolution available at <http://www.fas.org/news/taiwan/1995/950405-taiwan-usia.htm>.

⁸⁶ Swaine, "Decision-making," in Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese*, p. 323.

⁸⁷ Speech reproduced in Lee, *Peace*, p. 38.

⁸⁸ Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord counted 27 references to the term in that address. See Tucker, p. 481.

⁸⁹ Swaine, "Decision-making," in Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese*, p. 319.

⁹⁰ Swaine, "Decision-making," in Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese*, p. 323.

⁹¹ Sheng, p. 29.

of the past – with ballistic missiles taking the place of the conventional artillery shells of the earlier Taiwan Strait crises.⁹²

Although the exercises failed to influence domestic opinion on Taiwan against Lee, who subsequently won the 1996 presidential elections with a comfortable margin, the diplomatic success of the tests for the PRC was not inconsiderable. At the request of the PRC, all countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including the United States, Australia and Japan, reaffirmed their support for the “one China” principle. Several countries, including Thailand and Indonesia, even went one step further and expressed the view that the Taiwan issue was primarily an internal Chinese matter that ought to be resolved by both sides of the Strait without foreign interference.⁹³ This was a setback for Lee, as even countries he had visited as part of his “vacation diplomacy” failed to offer even moral support for the democratic damsel in distress. In fact, President Clinton reportedly sent a secret letter to Jiang in August 1995 after the PRC missile tests, laying down the foundation for the “three no’s” principle that was finally announced in 1997.⁹⁴ Clinton categorically denied American support for ROCT participation in any organization that required statehood, dealing a fatal blow to Lee’s aspirations for a distinct political identity for the ROCT. Even the most powerful proponent of democracy acknowledged the subordinate role of ideology to issues of sovereignty.

Two Chinas

However, Lee remained undeterred by the obvious lack of international support for the ROCT. Conscious of the fact that his second and final term in office was coming to an end, Lee decided to cast off his façade of adherence to the “one China” principle and make clear his true intentions for the political future of Taiwan.

The occasion was provided by an interview with the German broadcasting station *Deutsche Welle* on July 9, 1999. Tracing the constitutional changes he had imposed upon the ROC since 1991, Lee described how he limited the ROC’s power of jurisdiction to Taiwan, recognized the legality of the PRC’s rule over the mainland, and restricted the electorate of the ROC to the population on Taiwan such that the source of legitimacy of the

“ IN [LEE’S] OPINION, THE CROSS-STRAIT IMPASSE WAS NO LONGER A CIVIL WAR BETWEEN TWO CLAIMANTS TO BE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA BUT AN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO EQUAL AND SOVEREIGN STATES THAT COULD ONLY CLAIM A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP THROUGH A COMMON CULTURAL HERITAGE. ”

highest elected offices of the ROC no longer came from the people on the mainland, thereby destroying the national structure of the ROC. Based on this account, Lee finally acknowledged that he had since 1991 defined cross-Strait relations at a level of “state-to-state, or at least special state-to-state, relationship, and *not* one between a legal government and a rebel organization, or one between a central government and a local government in a *domestic relationship within ‘one China.’*”⁹⁵

Lee’s reference of the Beijing regime by its official name of the “People’s Republic of China” was significant. In 1991, Lee had

⁹² Klintworth contends that the incident was mere “posturing not war.” See Klintworth, *Crisis Management*, p. 12.

⁹³ Klintworth, *Crisis Management*, p. 18.

⁹⁴ Chief Spokesperson of the Department of State James Rubin enunciated the “three no’s” Principle at a press briefing on October 31, 1997. In summary, the United States does not support “two Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan,” Taiwanese independence or Taiwanese membership in organizations that require statehood. See Kan, p. 35.

⁹⁵ Interview reproduced in “President Lee: Cross-Strait Issue,” *Central Daily News*, July 10, 1999, p. 3.

merely recognized the legality of the “Chinese communists,” and fell short of acknowledging the existence of the PRC.⁹⁶ Now, Lee was explicitly advocating the existence of “two Chinas” – the PRC and the ROCT.⁹⁷ Indeed, Lee was openly refuting the concept of “one China,” and denying that the cross-Strait impasse was a domestic dispute within the state of “China.” In his opinion, the cross-Strait impasse was no longer a civil war between two claimants to be the legitimate government of China but an international dispute between two equal and sovereign states that could only claim a special relationship through a common cultural heritage. Whereas the NUC had defined the two regimes on each side of the Strait as merely two “political entities” within one China, Lee now simply overturned the recommendations of the NUC, which was a mere consultative body with no legislative powers anyway.⁹⁸ He also revealed his repugnance towards reunification by claiming, “In the future, only when the two sides *separately* practice freedom and democracy can the peace and security of Asia be really guaranteed.” This implied that even if democracy were to evolve on the mainland, Lee would still not advocate reunification – further proof of his use of democracy as an excuse to prevent reunification.

In fact, Lee had even come up with a nomenclature for the citizens of this new state. In his book *With the People Always in My Heart* published in May 1999, two months before the interview, Lee proposed that the people of the ROCT should be called “New Taiwanese” to distinguish them from the “Chinese” who lived across the Strait.

This new national identity would transcend the ethnic antagonisms between the mainlanders and native Taiwanese as both groups buried their differences to work for the good of their common homeland – Taiwan.⁹⁹

Lee had finally come clean.

When Lee inherited Chiang’s legacy of political liberalization, he was faced with a choice between two approaches to achieve the same end of democratization on Taiwan. Lee understood perfectly that democratization was a double-edged sword that could be used either to unravel the “one China” principle or to strengthen the democratic institutions of the ROC through the democratization of Taiwan province while retaining representation for the mainland constituencies. He chose to localize the ROC and codify Taiwan’s state of separation from China into law under the pretext of democratization. To justify his negative attitude towards reunification, Lee advanced arguments of economic and socio-political incompatibility between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. By 1994, Lee was openly calling for the admission of a ROCT into the community of nations.

However, his economic reasoning was rendered invalid by the phenomenal growth of the mainland economy, and his argument of statehood for the ROCT based on its democratic credentials had no precedent in the history of the UN. Finally, his flamboyant approach to consolidating separation provoked a military response from the PRC in 1996 that revealed an international consensus on the “one China” principle and the subordinate role of ideology to sovereignty in international affairs. Lee

⁹⁶ “Women chang ta wei dalu dangju huo zhonggong dangju.” Press conference clarifying the political definition of the Beijing regime after the Termination of the Provisional Articles April 30, 1991. Reproduced in Academia Historica, *Documentary Collection* Vol. II, p. 16.

⁹⁷ Shaw, professor at National Chengchi University, ROC, simply referred to Lee’s “state-to-state” theory as the “two Chinas” theory and held Lee responsible for the consequences of using the lives and property of the Taiwanese as his personal political betting chip. See Shaw Chong-hai, “Liang guo guanxi lundian zhongqi tongdu zhengyi (Two States Argument Reopens Reunification-Independence Debate),” *China Times*, July 11, 1999.

⁹⁸ The NUC passed the resolution “Concerning the Meaning of ‘One China’” on August 1, 1992. Reproduced in Academia Historica, *Documentary Collection* Vol. II, p. 34.

⁹⁹ The Chinese title of the book is more accurately translated as Taiwan’s Volition, although Lee’s choice of the English title probably goes down better with the Western audience. See also Lee, *With the People*, p. 262.

China remained undeterred by the lack of international support for the ROCT and defined cross-Strait relation as one between two states, and not between two geographical regions of a single nation to which he had previously paid lip service, in his final act of defiance against the “one China” principle in office.

By the time Lee left office, the political status of Taiwan as a part of China was no longer certain. A decade of efforts by the government in consolidating Taiwan’s state of separation from China had raised doubts among the people of Taiwan about their identity. This contributed in no small way to the election of the secessionist-minded

Chen Shui-bian to the presidency in 2000. Today, free of the political constraints previously inhibiting him as the President of the ROC, Lee is now an open advocate of a Taiwanese nation, to the extent of setting a deadline for the establishment of a Taiwanese republic by 2008. Domestic politics may not be the more important determinant of the political status of Taiwan than the attitudes of Beijing and Washington. However, domestic politics may yet prove to have a catalytic effect on the final resolution of the Taiwan question, and Lee may yet live to witness the fruits (or the consequences) of his decade of consolidating separation.

The Need for Liberalization in China: Electoral Reform and The People's Congress System

Jessica Chen Weiss

Economic reforms in China over the past twenty-five years have increased the population's standard of living, literacy, and level of personal freedom. At the same time, reforms have generated regional inequality, corruption, and unemployment. Together, these reform-induced trends have increased popular interest in Party affairs and have heightened expectations of the government. Unless the Party center sanctions a venue through which the Chinese people may effectively pursue this growing interest in political participation, the government will find itself increasingly pressed to suppress popular unrest. In order to maintain social stability as it continues to direct the country's economic transformation, the government must foster a set of strong, flexible institutions that will not only smooth the friction between state and society but also direct the political heat into productive channels. I take as my primary example the National People's Congress (NPC), the legislature that began as a "rubber-stamp" for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) but that has become an increasingly autonomous and influential body. Due to the rising demand for popular political participation and the increasing need for popular accountability, the Party ought to grant more power to a liberalized people's congress system.

Strains of Economic Reform

Since the inauguration of the reform era under Deng Xiaoping, the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party has been based less upon ideological "correctness" than upon

economic performance. When Deng ended the policy of upholding "whatever" Mao said and did, he replaced it with the imperative of economic growth: to "catch mice," regardless of the stripe and color of reform. Twenty-five years later, these reforms have been responsible for China's rapid development, particularly in rural areas. But the gains of liberalization have not come without costs to stability and the Party's own legitimacy. Despite the fact that the majority continues to support the central government and its reform strategy, a large minority remains dissatisfied with its impact. Andrew J. Nathan writes that "according to a survey carried out by the State Economic Structure Reform Commission in 1997, some 83.9 percent of urban residents approved of the reforms, although only 65.9 percent were satisfied with their results."¹ Deng-era reforms have eroded the egalitarian distribution of wealth and created new divisions of "winners" and "losers" among China's population. Rural inequality, mass layoffs in state-owned enterprises, urban migrants, and the corruption of government officials at most levels of the state bureaucracy are just a few of the factors which continue to feed social discontent. Now that the reforms have begun to affect not only the fringes but also the core of the planned economy, the social costs of adjustment have become more acute and widespread.

Of the reform-induced developments which threaten social stability, unemployment, rural inequality, urban migrants, and corruption are among the most prominent. The restructuring in the late 1990s of state-owned enterprises in grossly inefficient industries, which had been obliged to support excessive numbers of workers,

¹ Burns, John P. "The People's Republic of China at 50: National Political Reform," in *The PRC After 50 Years*, ed. Richard Louis Edmonds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 22.

new revenues to make up for the decline in funds from collective farming and a tightened budget constraint. In villages where collective enterprises have met financial difficulties, local officials have often saddled peasants with exorbitant informal taxes in order to raise funds for their salaries and administrative purposes.²

The unhappiness caused by these additional burdens has led to an erosion of the Party's legitimacy in many villages.³ On occasion, peasant discontent has broken out into open protest, ranging from small and peaceful demonstrations to large and violent riots, such as those in Renshou county, Sichuan, which involved between ten and fifteen thousand people.⁴ Although peasants have become more politicized than workers, their shows of opposition have been scattered and thus have not presented a major threat to the Center's control. At the same time, however, their exigencies have been considered important enough for the government to respond by allowing village-level elections, widely considered to be a reform adopted to allow peasants to vent their anger.⁵

A third challenge to social stability has been the growth of peasant migrant communities in China's cities, known as the "floating population" that numbers approximately 80 million.⁶ As the household responsibility system freed peasants from working the land, and as agriculture declined as an attractive source of income, ever larger numbers of peasants journeyed to China's cities in search of higher returns to labor. Initially, the growth of markets allowed immigrants without an urban *hukou* to purchase food and other goods necessary to their survival in China's cities. Recently,

reforms of the *hukou* residence system have given some of these sojourners access to basic social services. Nevertheless, many continue to exist at the margins of city life, forming native-place associations and gangs among themselves. Their presence indicates the erosion of horizontal divisions that Mao designed to limit the ability of regions, sectors, and occupations to mount opposition to Party leadership.⁷ By crossing boundaries and defying the government's ability to "mold society into rigid, contradictory categories,"⁸ China's "floating population" is a tangible sign of the government's decreasing ability "to encompass—or even to regulate" – the lives of its citizens.⁹

However destabilizing these effects of reform have been, perhaps the most consequential and adverse impact of the post-Mao reforms has been endemic corruption. Elizabeth J. Perry writes that "in the fall of 1993, Deputy Procurator-General Lian Guoqing acknowledged that corruption was 'worse than at any other period since New China was

PERHAPS THE MOST CONSEQUENTIAL AND ADVERSE IMPACT OF THE POST-MAO REFORMS HAS BEEN ENDEMIC CORRUPTION"

founded in 1949. It has spread into the Party, government, administration and every part of society, including politics, economy, ideology and culture."¹⁰ Most scholars explain the sharp increase in corruption by citing the corrosive effect of having political connections in a partially-reformed planned economy. State officials become corrupt either directly by exploiting the resources available to them, "attempting to convert their power into control over economic assets, transforming political into economic capital" -- for instance, the usurpation of peasant income by local cadres—or indirectly by cutting deals with private entrepreneurs, exchanging bureaucratic favors for profit shares.¹¹

² Schoenhals, Michael. "Political Movements, Change and Stability," in *The PRC After 50 Years*, ed. Richard Louis Emonds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 41.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Oi, Jean. "Rural Reform in China," in *The PRC After 50 Years*, ed. Richard Louis Emonds, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 64.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Burns, John P. "The People's Republic of China at 50: National Political Reform," in *The PRC After 50 Years*, ed. Richard Louis Emonds, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 22.

⁷ Lieberthal, Kenneth. *Governing China*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 120.

⁸ Solinger, Dorothy. "China's Floating Population," in *The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms*, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 239.

⁹ Ibid., 232.

¹⁰ Perry, Elizabeth. "Crime, Corruption, and Contention," in *The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms*, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 313.

¹¹ White, Gordon. "Corruption and Market Reform in China," *IDS Bulletin: Liberalization and the New Corruption* 27.2 (1996): 40-47, quoted in Perry, 313.

New Pressures from Below

While giving rise to these new sources of discontent, the reform era has also brought China's populace new resources and capabilities, some of which have been used to circumvent and challenge the government. The end of "class struggle" and political campaigns, marking what Kenneth Lieberthal labels the "decline of ideology," have contributed to a relatively more open climate of opinion. Although the government has granted virtually no freedom of expression, in practice a limited space has opened up periodically for political and social forces to operate independently. Nathan Gardels, writing in the *New Perspectives Quarterly*, has noted that "intellectuals [he knows] have more freedom today to speak their mind among their colleagues and friends than people they know in Singapore and Malaysia – as long as they don't put anything in writing."¹²

Whether the political atmosphere has become more open or not, Tianjian Shi notes an overall increase in political participation, which he correlates with China's rapid economic growth. Referring to modernization theory, Shi writes that "economic development not only increased the contact between individuals and the state but also made certain resources at the individual level, especially education, more important in motivating people to participate in politics."¹³ In post-Mao China, rising education levels, increasing per capita income, exposure to foreign ideas, and greater transparency in government procedures have all fostered political activism. China's citizens have increasingly "gone to trade unions, people's congress delegates, higher governmental organizations, and complaint bureaus to express their opinions."¹⁴

Growing political interest and participation has meant greater demands upon the government at all levels, evidenced by everything from rural peasant riots to the protests of 1989. The numerous occasions on which these woes of

economic adjustment have spilled over into overt demonstrations should signal to the government that new and more successful prosperity schemes will likely be insufficient to reverse the politicization of social unrest. Nathan quotes one intellectual involved in the Tiananmen protests as having said before the June crackdown, "no one is afraid of anyone any more."¹⁵

Not only have citizens' demands grown in number, breadth, and decibel, but Shi finds that the efficacy of government repression has diminished. He writes, "Given the fact that the regime became more repressive after June 4, 1989, the increase in strikes is surprising. It tells us that the authorities failed to prevent people from getting involved in highly forbidden activities even though the regime increased its efforts to suppress unauthorized political expression."¹⁶ Thus, despite government efforts to maintain its control over the political atmosphere in China, its authority continues to fray around the edges. Given the CCP's monopoly on military power, there is little reason to fear that China's leaders will lose control over the country in the near future, except in the event of a sustained economic downturn. Nevertheless, the last two decades of economic reform have generated substantial adjustment costs and swelled the ranks of people interested in, and increasingly capable of, challenging the government's authority.

Toward Political Reform

If the Party desires to maintain greater social stability as it moves ahead with economic reform, avoiding the demoralizing and disruptive cycle of liberalization and retrenchment, it must develop a regularized mechanism with which to respond to the growing demands of the Chinese people. Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko write that "given the existence of substantial reform-induced social stresses—rising crime rates, massive rural emigration, rampant corruption, widening polarization of wealth, and so on — an

¹² Gardels, Nathan. "China: Between a Hard Line and the Hard Rock Café: Rule of Law in China," *New Perspectives Quarterly* 14.3 (1997).

¹³ Shi, Tianjian. "Mass Political Behavior in Beijing," in *The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms*, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 159.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 156.

¹⁵ Nathan, Andrew J. "Chinese Democracy in 1989: Continuity and Change," *Problems of Communism*, Sept-Oct. 1989, 21.

¹⁶ Shi, 156.

institutionalized capacity for flexible response may be essential to prevent centrifugal forces from overtaking the system's adaptive capacity."¹⁷ At present, the ability of the Center to consult the people is largely limited to extra-institutional or irregular venues. The most effective way for peasants to gain the government's attention is to disobey.

As reforms create more reason for citizens to complain, while increasing their own personal interest and ability to challenge the government, the Party will face increasing pressure to pursue one of two responses, neither of which is particularly attractive. On the one hand, the government can give in, setting a precedent of weakness and stimulating complaints from other groups. On the other hand, the government can take a hard-line, conservative stance, alienating the protesters and detracting from its popular image. Rather than forcing China's citizens into a "zero-sum winner-take-all confrontation between state and society,"¹⁸ the Party needs to develop a consistent, even institutional, method of incorporating popular opinions into official policy.

Like economic liberalization, political liberalization is a dicey matter in which China's top leaders have demonstrated a strong preference for gradualism. Thus, I do not advocate a "big bang" of democratization but rather a strategy of state-society "entwinement"¹⁹ -- of mutual accommodation and empowerment. As a first step, the government must recognize that it is steadily losing ground in the political arena -- it can have control or legitimacy, but not both -- as I have attempted to show in my discussion of the impact of economic reform. The Party must understand that only by co-opting and responding to citizen demands will it be able to cement its political moorings in the flood of economic change.

The "entwinement" principle behind this strategy may be best pursued through the

strengthening and liberalization of the people's congress system. At present, it is a legislative system that nominally represents the entire population, its influence extending from the local to the national level. Under Mao, it was a "rubber stamp" for central dictates, routinely generating unanimous consent for laws drafted by the Politburo and the State Council. During the reform era, it has begun to acquire greater policymaking influence and autonomy, but liberalization has not moved forward since Deng's first and last electoral reform in 1979, which initiated direct elections at the county level and below. The selection of higher-level deputies is still determined by indirect election, through a consensus of deputies at the next lower level, and even that process is influenced by party membership and standing.

As attractive as an enfeebled legislature may look to top leaders, the gradual liberalization of the people's congress system may hold a key to the Party's long-run success in fostering social stability. Holding government officials accountable to popular vote is the surest way to clean up the corruption endemic to the party and revive its legitimacy. In analyzing why Deng and other top leaders pursued electoral reform in 1979, Murray Scot Tanner writes that one major goal was "to revive the party's deeply wounded legitimacy by granting citizens greater electoral participation and a slightly enhanced choice of candidates."²⁰ In 1979, the wound to the party's legitimacy was the result of the Cultural Revolution. Now, the party suffers from being "perceived as hopelessly corrupt and morally bankrupt"²¹ from the village level all the way to the upper echelons of the CCP. As has taken place in local village elections, however, incremental democratization will combat corruption by promoting popular accountability. In the words of Kevin O'Brien, "offering redress may help placate the discontented and reduce the likelihood of unrest while improving policy implementation and cadre oversight."²² Liberalization of the electorate will allow this process of accommodation to occur more regularly and

¹⁷ Baum, Richard and Alexei Shevchenko. "The 'State of the State,'" in *The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms*, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 360.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 358.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Tanner, Murray Scot. "The National People's Congress," in *The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms*, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 120.

²¹ Schoenhals, 41.

²² O'Brien, Kevin. "Rightful Resistance," *World Politics* 49.1 (1996): 45.

smoothly, providing a built-in mechanism that will diffuse any social tensions generated by new economic reforms.

The destabilizing ramifications of premature liberalization have been formalized in Samuel Huntington's claim that "when social mobilization exceeds political institutionalization, disorder and praetorianism may result."²³ Unlike the Soviet Union, however, China's form of government has always been relatively decentralized and has become more so with the fiscal decentralization necessary for market reform. The result of granting more power and autonomy to lower levels of the state hierarchy has been the increasing ability of local cadres to evade the reach of central policy directives, as evidenced by widespread corruption. "Concomitantly, the local government has surpassed the central government in its influence over citizens' lives, as Shi has noted.²⁴

This decentralization of political authority may actually allow central planners to engineer a gradual political liberalization wherein the first impact of democratic accountability falls upon local government cadres—which would bolster the position of the Center in its tug-of-war with local state government. My claim that popular accountability may help the top leadership restore party discipline at the lower levels and solidify the Center's popular influence is supported by an extension of Kevin O'Brien's conception of "rightful resistance," defined within the context of center-local relations as "a form of popular contention...[that] employs the rhetoric and commitments of the powerful [party center] to curb [local governments'] political or economic power."²⁵

O'Brien's analysis shows how villagers have employed central policy mandates to chide local officials, even absent an institutionalized avenue for political redress. He writes that when local cadres evade the letter of the law handed down by central authorities, "eagle-eyed villagers are quick to step

in and to accuse them of engaging in prohibited behavior." He cites villagers as saying, "Central policy says that after farmers fulfill their contractual obligations, we can sell our grain freely on the market; why don't you obey? If you don't listen to the Center, then we won't listen to you....Why do you always oppose the Center? Why do you always oppose us? Are you cadres of the Communist Party?"²⁶ This confrontation illustrates how peasant protest has actually enhanced the legitimacy of central policy by holding it up to lesser officials as if it were, in effect, the law of the land.

Although O'Brien's fieldwork primarily addresses the actions of discontented villagers, the strategy of rightful resistance and its legitimizing influence upon official symbolism may apply to all marginalized groups seeking redress. The protests of the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation in May 1989 also placed their criticism within a Communist framework: "The gnawed bones they [the officials] throw out are the compensation that we, the working class, get. In today's socialist society, can we the working class

WITH ELECTORAL REFORM ... THE CENTER CAN ENHANCE ITS OWN POPULAR IMAGE WHILE STRENGTHENING THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AS A WHOLE IF IT GRANTS CITIZENS A CENTRALLY-SANCTIONED MANDATE TO CURB LOCAL CADRE CORRUPTION.

allow them to treat us this way?"²⁷ This symbolic exchange represents the larger accommodation envisioned by the strategy of "entwinement." By invoking officially-approved Marxist ideology, the workers benefit because they enhance the legitimacy of their goals, while the state benefits from renewed popular belief in its ideology. Extending this logic to the electoral reform of the people's congress system, the Center can enhance its own popular image while strengthening the political system as a whole if it grants citizens a centrally-sanctioned mandate to curb local cadre corruption.

The only parameter for this positive-sum condition is that the actors share a common conception of the symbolic instrument at hand. Terms such as "socialist" and "democratic" can become obstacles to mutual accommodation if political leaders and popular demagogues hold

²³Tanner, 127.

²⁴Shi, pp. 149-50.

²⁵O'Brien, 33.

²⁶O'Brien, 37.

²⁷Perry, 317.

China conflicting definitions, as was true of party leaders and student protesters during the Tiananmen protests. For students, democracy at the very least meant regular “dialogue” and freedom of press. For Deng Xiaoping, democracy was an “instrument of mobilization whose function is to strengthen the links of citizens to the state, rather than a set of procedures for limiting state power.”²⁸ So long as each side maintained these conflicting definitions of democracy, neither benefited from stalemate—indeed, the discord served to empower extremists within both camps.

Fortunately, electoral reform is not inconsistent with this particular definition of democracy, which Deng supported, if we consider that through the principle of “rightful resistance” the links between citizens and the Center will indeed be strengthened, even at the expense of local cadres’ power. After the liberalization of the people’s congress system, other conflicts of symbolic import may then be solved through the regular debate and compromise characteristic of an institutional setting.

Several specific reforms will serve to liberalize the people’s congress system. The Election Law should be revised to extend direct elections to higher-level people’s congresses, beginning with the provinces. New strategies for assigning delegate quotas should begin to accommodate marginalized sectors of the population. Restraints on campaigning should be loosened to allow candidates who do not enjoy the favor of local cadres to stand a chance for office. Furthermore, central leaders can begin to formalize the process of popular “consultation” at the county level and below. By sanctioning official avenues through which citizens can communicate with their elected delegates, the Center can steer local politics away from the bribes and favors of patrimonialism, which currently pervades delegate-constituent relationships at the grass-roots level.²⁹

Concomitantly, electoral reform must be accompanied by the protection of the legislature’s growing institutional power. The political ideas and strategies of NPC Standing Committee leaders have been instrumental so far in expanding the role of the people’s congress system, achieving more

influence for the National People’s Congress over the policymaking agenda, the content of draft laws, and bureaucratic oversight. As liberalization begins to move forward, however, the NPC leaders will have to focus their energies upon protecting the legislature’s institutional power from leaders within the Politburo and the State Council, who might “threaten to use their executive and coercive power, à la Yeltsin, to close down the NPC if they feel threatened by it.”³⁰ Absent a significant restructuring of national political power, NPC leaders will continue to confront a lopsided institutional environment in which executive leaders reign supreme.

Conclusion

The economic reforms begun under Deng Xiaoping have unleashed new social and political forces that the central government would do well to accommodate if it wishes to preserve social stability and its own legitimacy. Deng Xiaoping launched a kite that is flying high, but the winds of economic change blow now more strongly than ever, straining the ties which bind the Party to society. To keep the kite in the sky and allow it to fly higher, the Center must let more line out, feeding the reforms with continued liberalization. The longer the line grows, however, the stronger must be the ties that allow the party to direct the country’s progress. As the government adopts reforms that push the country’s market transition closer to completion, it must prepare for the social strains that these adjustments will inevitably produce. The reform of China’s institutions thus becomes essential, both to cushion the costs of economic adjustment and to channel the social and political fallout of reform away from the Center. Electoral reform presents the swiftest path to cleaning up cadre corruption by promoting popular accountability. Given China’s unique configuration of central-local power, top party leaders may be able to control the dynamics of democratization in order to solidify their own authority while simultaneously rooting out corruption from below.

²⁸ Nathan, 18.

²⁹ Tanner, 124.

³⁰ Tanner, 127-8.

The Great Leap Backward:

The Chinese Government's Response to the Growing AIDS Epidemic in Rural China

Ian Carmichael

Introduction: The Rise of HIV/AIDS in Rural China

In 1985, China's first known AIDS victim died in a government hospital. Subsequent to the patient's death, hospital officials burned both the man's clothing and furniture.¹ Although less than 20 years have elapsed since this first reported incident of AIDS in the country, startling reports from China's government in June of 2001 reveal that the country has upwards of 600,000 people infected with the virus. Even worse, some Chinese AIDS experts place the number of people infected with the virus much higher. The United Nations believes that there are an estimated one million people infected with the virus living in China's Henan Province alone.² The international community was shocked at the sudden announcement because China had never reported any significant problem with the disease until 2001. Additionally, while the problem of AIDS evolves differently in every nation, the transmission of the disease has taken on a particularly unique form in China. While most countries worry about AIDS being spread through drug use or sexual intercourse, the majority of people now afflicted with the disease in China are rural villagers—most of whom live in Henan—and many of them contracted AIDS through unsanitary methods of blood collection.

Due to unsafe blood collection centers, infection rates in Henan are among the highest in the world, with estimates as high as 65 percent in some villages.³ As a result of the country's rural AIDS epidemic, the Chinese government has responded within the past decade, and in particular over the past year, with policies specific to the rise of AIDS in the country's rural provinces. These policies—which range from educational programs to new treatment clinics—however, have been slow in coming and currently lack the monetary support from the government to effectively curb the spread of the disease.

A "Western Disease": The Chinese Government's Slow Response to AIDS

In the early 1980s China's leader Deng Xiaoping instituted broad economic reforms that caused China's economy to transition from a centrally planned Maoist state to a more modern market economy. While Deng's reforms brought growth to both cities and rural villages, the benefits of economic reform have been highly variable, and China's interior provinces—with less human capital and natural resources—have actually often witnessed increased poverty.⁴ Consequently, Deng's economic reforms have left some 35 million Chinese—mostly rural villagers in the interior—to fall below the poverty line.

¹ *Newsweek*, "Out Into the Open: Long a taboo topic in China, AIDS is finally being discussed publicly. The faces of victims and the struggle against the plague." *Newsweek* 4 Dec. 2000. pp.1-3. On-line. California Digital Library, <<http://www.cdlib.org>> (20 Feb. 2002.).

² Rosenthal, Elisabeth. "Spread of AIDS in Rural China Ignites Protests." *The New York Times* 11 Dec. 2001, late edition. pp.1-5. On-line. Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>> (23 Feb. 2002).

³ Pomfret, John. "China Blocks Trip to U.S. By AIDS Award Honoree." *The Washington Post*. 30 May 2001, pp.1-3. <<http://www.washingtonpost.com>> (23 Feb. 2002).

⁴ Saich, Tony. *Governance and Politics of China*. New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001.

Faced in the early 1990s with this increasing poverty, many rural villagers found another source of income by donating blood at local collection centers. Regrettably, these centers have proven to be the largest source of AIDS transmission in China, especially in the interior province of Henan. Large numbers of peasants, and oftentimes whole villages, would each donate a pint of blood at a collection center, where it was spun with the blood of other peasants of the same blood type. When a specific company's desired blood element—often plasma—was collected, the remaining red blood cells were then divided up and transfused back into the peasants. Consequently, this practice left peasants sharing the blood of anywhere between six to twelve other villagers. The high levels of poverty also caused many farmers to go more than once a month to donate blood.⁵ The fact that peasants donated blood at such a high frequency may in part explain why the disease was able to take hold over such a large part of the population. The problem was only further inflamed by the presence of so-called “blood heads” (*xietou*), criminal gangs that illegally collected blood for profit, and often used unclean needles in collecting blood. These gangs also rose out of the economic vacuum created by Deng's reforms because villagers with paltry incomes saw that both the government and foreign companies were willing to pay for blood used in medicines and research. Thus, a black-market structure parallel to the government's blood collection centers created another venue by which peasants could contract AIDS.

After recognizing that thousands of people were becoming infected with AIDS during the 1990s, the Chinese government began to take policy measures — often toothless — to deal with the spread of AIDS in Henan. China's polices (or lack thereof) with regard to the

spread of AIDS in rural Henan have fallen into three categories: the government's attempts to crack down on unsanitary methods used at blood collection centers and by illegal “blood heads,” the establishment of educational and prevention programs informing villagers of the nature of HIV/AIDS and how it is spread, and the institution of treatment programs for those rural villagers already infected with the disease.

Although the unsafe collection of blood in Henan appears to be the largest contributor to the spread of AIDS in China, the Chinese government's corrective policies towards the blood centers have been both slow and ineffective. Reports suggest that prior to 1995, China's Health Ministry and provincial authorities embraced and actually ran the for-profit blood drive.⁶ In 1997 when reports of mysterious illnesses began to appear in Henan and large numbers of people began to die of pneumonia, local health officials suddenly urged villagers to stop giving blood. These vocalizations from local leaders, however, are the only clear efforts made by the Chinese government during the 1990s to attempt to curb the spread of AIDS.⁷ Indeed, the Chinese government even denied the existence of AIDS in the countryside, and continually reported small numbers of cases until June 2001.⁸ Because of the lack of government-provided information, reports are unclear as to what extent the government has been able to improve upon its practices of blood collection, besides simply telling peasants not to donate. While the Chinese government has repeatedly banned the *illegal* collection of blood in order to stop the spread of AIDS, money allocated by the government for rural healthcare during the 1990's was extremely low, and the ban was never fully implemented.⁹

In May of 2001, China attempted to take bolder measures to try to combat unsafe blood

⁵ Rosenthal, 11 Dec 2001, *Ibid*

⁶ Pomfret, *Ibid*

⁷ Rosenthal, 11 Dec 2001, *Ibid*

⁸ Gill, Bates, and Sarah Palmer. “The Coming AIDS Crisis in China.” *The New York Times* 16 July. 2001, late edition. pp.1-3. <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>> (23 Feb. 2002).

⁹ “China Stops Denying AIDS Epidemic,” CNN.com. 9 Aug. 2001. pp.1-2, <<http://www.cnn.com>> (22 Feb. 2002).

collection and the growing AIDS crisis by issuing a “China Action Plan for HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control.” In this document, the government allocated \$117 million towards the purpose of ensuring “the safety of blood and blood products.”¹⁰ The action plan specifically suggested that sanitary measures should be taken when collecting blood and that all blood should be tested for the presence of HIV/AIDS before being used in products. Furthermore, the plan allowed for a “reporting mechanism” through the Health and Public Security Ministries to lead the battle against illegal blood collection.¹¹ Because of its recent implementation though, reports are unclear about the efficacy of the plan in cleaning up the blood collection process.

Prior to its new action plan, the Chinese government had likewise been both apathetic and repressive in its efforts to educate people and prevent the spread of AIDS. AIDS appeared to be on the rise most notably in Henan province, but government officials did little to inform rural villagers about the nature of the disease or how it is spread.¹² China’s Deputy Health Minister Yin Dakui announced this previous August that increased educational and preventative measures were not taken because “leaders and the general public have not fully realized the hidden dangers of a large-scale,” epidemic.¹³ Whether or not the government was actually ignorant of the growing AIDS problem, reports from villagers suggest that many knew very little about the disease. In 2001, China’s State Family Planning Commission conducted the largest national survey concerning AIDS, and results showed that a full 20 percent of Chinese in twelve counties had never even heard of the disease. In Henan’s Shangcai County, results show that 40 percent of the county’s residents did not know how AIDS could be prevented. As a result,

one can see that strong educational measures were not taken by the government during the 1990s, with a corresponding lack of improvement in knowledge about the nature of AIDS over those years.

China appears to be evolving away from its policies of the 1990s by addressing measures in its “China Action Plan” that would increase the amount of money spent on educational programs with regard to AIDS prevention and blood transfusion safety. The government has specifically allocated \$12 million for AIDS education. The government hopes to bring programs, bulletin boards and educational materials not only to rural villagers but to the population at large.¹⁴ To what extent the Chinese government will actually follow through on these policies is yet to be seen. In the same month that the action plan was released, the Chinese government forbade Dr. Gao Yaojie—a retired Chinese physician who has explored the link between AIDS and blood transfusions in Henan—to travel to the United States to accept the Jonathan Mann Award for Global Health. In addition, the Chinese government has confiscated AIDS educational pamphlets made by Gao, and she has been warned not to speak to the press.¹⁵

Besides analyzing policies that seek to crackdown on the for-profit blood industry and increase educational standards concerning the spread of AIDS in the countryside, one must also examine policies that China has taken in the countryside with regard to individuals already infected with the AIDS virus. While the government’s policies have been borderline negligent with regard to preventing the disease, they have been almost nonexistent concerning treatment. For example, the government currently offers little medical assistance to

¹⁰ China State Council. *China Action Plan for HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control (2001-2005)*. trans. 25 May 2001

¹¹ China State Council, *Ibid*

¹² Rosenthal, 11 Dec 2001, *Ibid*

¹³ Rosenthal, Elisabeth. “China Now Facing an AIDS Epidemic, A Top Aide Admits.” *The New York Times*, 24 Aug. 2001, pp.1-5, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>> (23 Feb. 2002).

¹⁴ China State Council, *Ibid*

¹⁵ Pomfret, John. “China Blocks Trip to U.S. By AIDS Award Honoree.” *The Washington Post*. 30 May 2001, pp.1-3, <www.washingtonpost.com> (23 Feb. 2002).

those infected with AIDS. At this time, the Western anti-AIDS drug mixture known as the “cocktail” costs anywhere between \$10,000 and \$30,000 for a yearly prescription in China, and the government refuses to manufacture the drugs domestically. Nor does the government help patients pay for the drugs through subsidy programs. Currently, only 74 people nationwide are taking the drug.¹⁶ Furthermore, while China manufactures generic forms of other Western anti-AIDS drugs, licensing in the country only allows these drugs to be exported to such countries as Brazil and they cannot, at this time, be used for domestic treatments.¹⁷ Consequently, older and cheaper drugs that are used to control the symptoms of AIDS are not widely available in infected regions such as Henan.

The lack of effective drugs is compounded by the fact that most doctors in China, especially rural ones, lack sufficient training in diagnosing and treating AIDS. Indeed, because many Chinese doctors lack training and medications, local clinics often charge villagers for worthless saline solutions and anti-diarrhea medications that ultimately do not help. The central government has been largely unresponsive to villagers’ sufferings. When infected villagers have attempted to go to Beijing for treatment in the past, they have often been turned away, accused of illegally leaving their towns, and pressured to leave.¹⁸ Consequently, many sufferers’ lives are cut short, ending in severe pain because they receive no medical attention from any level of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, China’s action plan from May

2001 outlines few specific measures for those patients already suffering from AIDS, and calls upon “traditional Chinese” medicine to help those already afflicted.¹⁹

Government Culpability, Social Taboos and Economic Incentives: China’s Difficulty in Dealing with AIDS

China’s apathy towards, suppression of, and only recent interest concerning the AIDS problem in the countryside is a result of the

social, political and economic constraints that have been placed on the Chinese government during the past decade.

A host of social and political constraints caused China’s government to react slowly in establishing better standards for blood donation and cracking down on “blood heads.” For example, even

though China had its first recorded incidence of AIDS in 1985, many of the country’s leaders often categorized the disease as a Western problem that would not encroach upon the Chinese population. Because of this cultural misconception concerning AIDS, the government continued to look upon local blood collection centers as a viable means for peasants to obtain money, and not as a source of possible AIDS infection.²⁰ Officials also hoped that by increasing peasant incomes, some of the negative attention would be deflected away from the post-Mao economic reforms that left some villages economically weakened and angry at the government. Furthermore, China had nearly eradicated most sexually transmitted diseases under the Mao era, so concern over the spread of AIDS through blood transfusions was not monitored as

“ THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN LARGELY UNRESPONSIVE TO VILLAGERS’ SUFFERINGS. WHEN INFECTED VILLAGERS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO GO TO BEIJING FOR TREATMENT IN THE PAST, THEY HAVE OFTEN BEEN TURNED AWAY, ACCUSED OF ILLEGALLY LEAVING THEIR TOWNS, AND PRESSURED TO LEAVE. ”

¹⁶ *Newsweek*, 4 Dec. 2000, *Ibid*.

¹⁷ Rosenthal, Elisabeth. “AIDS Patients in China Lack Effective Treatment.” *The New York Times* 12 Nov. 2001, pp.1-6. <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>> (23 Feb. 2002).

¹⁸ Rosenthal, 12 Nov 2001, *Ibid*.

¹⁹ China State Council, *Ibid*

²⁰ Gill, Bates, and Sarah Palmer, 16 July 2001, *Ibid*

closely as it should have been. During the late 1990s, the government additionally attempted to crack down on “blood heads” with harsher penalties for those caught, but reductions in rural healthcare made plans for implementation unrealistic.²¹ The most obvious constraint to China’s policies regarding the cleaning up of blood collection centers is possibly the government’s own culpability in spreading the virus. In Henan, reports now suggest that provincial officials were responsible for and involved in the for-profit blood drives, and consequently helped to spread the disease further into the population. Owing up to this mistake—the infection of possibly over one million people with AIDS—could seriously tarnish the reputation of the Chinese Communist Party. Indeed, in an August 2001 interview, Deputy Health Minister Yin offered increased information regarding the AIDS crisis in rural regions including Henan, but stressed that Health Ministry officials were not responsible for the spread of AIDS in the countryside, and stated that “it is not appropriate to blame the Chinese government.”²² Thus, the need to retain power and reputation, despite the loss of millions of lives, has compromised the government’s ability to act as an agent of change in a situation that it contributed to.

Traditional societal constraints and international pressure also hindered the government’s ability to quickly implement educational and prevention programs dealing with AIDS in rural provinces. Indeed, China is still a sexually conservative society, and misconceptions and taboos continue to pervade the culture with regard to sex and AIDS. The government, fearful of more liberal discussions concerning sexual activity, has thwarted programs that would

educate people about safe sex. Commercials and billboards promoting condom use during the late 1990s were quickly retracted, and consequently, frank assessments and effective preventative measures concerning AIDS have been difficult for the government to implement.²³ China was also unwilling to implement mass educational and preventative programs in villages in the late 1990s simply because it did not want to draw negative attention from the foreign press during its bid for the 2008 summer Olympics. If the international community had discovered that the Chinese government had been responsible for the exponential rise of AIDS in the countryside, questions concerning China’s treatment of its people’s basic human rights could have been brought to the forefront. Marred with a record of ignoring human rights—particularly since the Tiananmen Square massacre—the Chinese government knew that the human rights issue could have proved pivotal in the final voting for the games, and, in turn, did not want to create a media situation in which the country could lose the games to rival bidder France.²⁴

In the realm of treatment, economic and political issues overshadowed AIDS sufferers’ needs. For example, with the economic reforms of the 1980s, healthcare, especially in rural areas, has taken a backseat to industrial growth. Although the government initially allowed localities to keep a proportion of revenues from local industries, the government has slowly decreased the availability of healthcare for peasants.²⁵ Consequently, medications and training for doctors has not been a focal point of investment for the Chinese government.²⁶ Additionally, access to medications has been limited by China’s inability to manufacture

²¹ Gill and Palmer, 16 July 2001, *Ibid*

²² Rosenthal, 24 Aug. 2001, *Ibid*

²³ Rosenthal, Elisabeth. “China Seems Uncertain About Dealing Openly With AIDS.” *The New York Times* 14 Nov. 2001, pp.1-3, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>> (23 Feb. 2002).

²⁴ “Mixed Reaction to Beijing 2008 Win,” CNN.com, 14 July 2001, pp.1-4, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>> (23 Feb. 2002).

²⁵ Saich, *Ibid*

²⁶ Saich, *Ibid*

China its own drugs. Because China is a new member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the country does not want to break international laws concerning patent rights. In a report dated November 2001, Zhao Enli, a spokesman for the newly established Chinese AIDS Prevention and Control Center explained that it would not produce and sell generic versions of anti-AIDS drugs because of WTO restrictions on international patents. Manufacturing drugs illegally would further damage China's reputation as well because the country is notoriously known for making bad duplicates of goods such as name-brand clothes and videocassettes. Consequently, the government is now instead seeking to bargain with drug manufacturers to bring down the exorbitantly high costs of imported drugs. Officials have announced that this process may be successful "within two years."²⁷

A Banquet of Consequences: The Effects of China's Stagnant AIDS Policy

Because the Chinese government failed to realize and deal with the immediacy of the AIDS problem in rural China, the country's leaders must now face a banquet of consequences—some positive, but most negative—that will undoubtedly influence the shape of the country in proceeding years.

By not implementing swift policy maneuvers in rural areas, China has benefited from certain short-term gains in both politics and economic standing. For instance, because the government did not crack down on blood collection centers and the blood heads, it was able to temporarily deflect attention away from the problem of AIDS. Whether officials actually believed that the AIDS situation would go away is unclear. The government did not want to attract any negative attention to itself by implementing policies aimed at the blood

centers or AIDS.²⁸ Additionally, by using policies of indifference during the late 1990s, the Chinese government was not only able to maintain its political reputation domestically, but was also able to obtain international economic rewards that might not have come if the international community had known the full extent of China's AIDS situation. Throughout the 1990's China sought entrance into the World Trade Organization. One must question China's policies during the government's courtship of the World Trade Organization because the country did not reveal its problems concerning AIDS with the world community until June 2001.²⁹ This announcement of an AIDS problem occurred long after the government seemed to realize in 1997 that blood collection centers were infecting a large portion of the rural population with the virus. Furthermore, the announcement came after the United States dropped its social and labor demands concerning China's entrance into the trade organization. The United States, which has questioned China's human rights policies since the crackdown of student and worker dissidents in Tiananmen Square in 1989, could have vocalized stronger pleas for basic human rights reform in China before the country could be allowed into the World Trade Organization.³⁰ If such an injustice to China's domestic population had been revealed earlier, consequently, China's entrance into the World Trade organization could have taken longer or been halted altogether. In addition, during the same time China was competing to win a bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, and may have not wanted to jeopardize its chances. If the International Olympic Committee had discovered that not only were a large number of peasants infected with AIDS, but that many of them were beginning to protest in Beijing, China may have lost the bid to host the games—

²⁷ Rosenthal, 11 Nov. 2001, Ibid

²⁸ Pomfret, 30 May 2001, Ibid

²⁹ Rosenthal, 12 Nov. 2001, Ibid

³⁰ Rosenthal, Elisabeth. "Thorny Rights Disputes Await Bush in China." *The New York Times* 14 Feb. 2002, pp.1-6, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>> (23 Feb. 2002).

a fact that China's leadership is no doubt acutely aware of. Consequently, because China was able to keep the growing AIDS problem muted, the World Trade Organization and the International Olympic Committee provided China with political and economic opportunities, both of which could have been threatened by the knowledge of an impending AIDS crisis.³¹

Although the temporary financial rewards have been large due to China's avoidance of the growing rural AIDS problem, China could ultimately face dramatic and negative consequences for its failure to deal with the disease. In truth, while the Chinese Communist Party may have been able to retain its reputation with the rural population by not cracking down on blood collection centers, the government may have ultimately caused the disease to spread further. Infection rates in some villages of Henan, near 65 percent, are among the highest in the world.³² In addition, although the problem has become most obvious in Henan, other provinces such as Shanxi also took part in blood selling practices.³³ Because AIDS can take years to incubate, it is unclear what the magnitude of the situation in Shanxi and others provinces. Furthermore, by not implementing policies to educate people about the nature of the disease, the government may have compounded the problem even further. Because a large portion of Chinese people do not even know what AIDS is, let alone how it is spread, much of the population could be unknowingly spreading the disease now through sexual intercourse, or intravenous drug use. This current state of ignorance concerning AIDS is frightening when put in the context of the effects of China's recent economic reforms. Many farmers are now leaving their villages to

search for work in cities at state owned enterprises or in villages that are more prosperous.³⁴ Consequently, nearly 100 million itinerant workers—referred to as the floating population—may be bringing the disease to different economic levels of society as well as other geographic regions. There are an estimated 3 million of these people living in Beijing alone, and the odds that many of them are AIDS infected villagers from Henan is quite high.³⁵ Because intravenous drug use, prostitution, premarital sex, and the practice of having multiple sexual partners are all on the rise in China, the population at large is increasingly endangered.³⁶

China also faces consequences in the spheres of international and domestic politics. The United Nations was shocked at China's announcement in spring 2001 concerning its sudden increase in AIDS cases. Furthermore, reports in newspapers and discussions in international organizations have placed increasing pressure on China to adopt policies to better handle the spread of the disease.³⁷ Domestically, the government has also had to contend with increasing protests, both at local levels and in Beijing. Poor farmers at the peak of desperation are now making their way from places such as Henan to seek treatment, protest and speak out. The Chinese government media, in November of 2001, also began to report more on these protests. While the government has been successful thus far in putting down the protests and sending many villagers back to the countryside, the reservoir of peasant despair appears deep.³⁸ Unlike many of the protests in industrialized villages and cities that are often isolated incidents directed at corporations or corrupt managers, most of the protests coming from rural Henan are focused directly at the

³¹ Rosenthal, 14 Feb. 2002, *Ibid*

³² Pomfret, 30 May 2001, *Ibid*

³³ Rosenthal, 11 Dec. 2001, *Ibid*

³⁴ Saich, *Ibid*

³⁵ Saich, *Ibid*

³⁶ Gill and Palmer, 16 July 2001, *Ibid*

³⁷ The World Bank Group "China: Preventing the Problem Before it Starts – Programs aim to curb spread of HIV." 10 Dec. 1999, pp.1-15, <<http://www.worldbank.org/developmentnews/archives>> (22 Feb. 2002).

³⁸ Gill and Palmer, 16 July 2001, *Ibid*

China Chinese Communist Party, and increasing in frequency. In December alone, protests had to be put down by villagers in Chenglao and Wenlou, two villages in Henan.³⁹ Consequently, public protest over AIDS may become a larger thorn in the side of the Chinese Communist Party as it tries to deal with the issue.

The most obvious, and eventually the most devastating consequence of China's inability to deal with the AIDS epidemic in a quick and open fashion is the massive loss of life it may see in future years. A United Nations report estimates that "China is on the verge of a catastrophe that could result in unimaginable human suffering, economic loss and social devastation."⁴⁰ In a rare and open move, Health Minister Dakui announced that HIV infections in China rose 67.4 percent in the first six months of 2001 in comparison with the same period in 2000. These statistics, coupled with the fact that millions of people in rural China are already infected with the virus, could lead to the loss of millions of lives in the countryside. As mentioned, though, the problem has a high probability of moving into other provinces and larger cities. The impact of such a large loss of human life at this point is incalculable, but it will no doubt have both political and economic ramifications as China loses lives in its labor force and is forced to confront the political consequences of not properly informing its people about the epidemic.

Avoiding an Epidemic: China's Policy Failures and the Need for Further Reform

The "China Action Plan for HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control," will allocate \$117 million dollars for monitoring the practices of blood collection centers and \$12 million for educational programs related to AIDS.⁴¹

Last November, China also opened its first national conference on AIDS, taking another step towards a more open policy regarding the disease. The conference, despite the presence of kiosks promoting condoms and safe sex, was largely government run, and those people infected with AIDS were never allowed to speak to the foreign press. Rather, they appeared on stage with their faces hidden.⁴² The conference highlighted China's still lingering inability to openly face a possible AIDS epidemic. Although China is taking measured steps towards a more effective AIDS policy, its efforts are simply not enough. In order to combat the disease effectively, the Chinese government needs to make the issue of AIDS—with regard to healthcare and AIDS education—one of the nation's top priorities or it may find itself in a disastrous situation in coming years.

Although the government is allocating a combined total of \$129 million dollars for cleaning up blood centers and for AIDS education, this figure pales in comparison to the amount of money spent on AIDS in other countries. The United States, with a population a fraction the size of China's, allocates \$744 million every year to AIDS prevention programs, which does not include additional funds allocated for the nation's blood collection process.⁴³ Furthermore, the World Bank estimates that China's gross domestic product doubled between 1993 and 2001, but the amount of money spent on healthcare has declined as a percentage of the government budget.⁴⁴ Thus, an effective policy stance for the government to take would be to dramatically increase spending on rural healthcare, and to target the spread of AIDS specifically. An increased budget for rural healthcare should cover both the blood

³⁹ Saich, *Ibid*, and Gill and Palmer, 16 July 2001, *Ibid*

⁴⁰ Rosenthal, Elisabeth. "With Ignorance as the Fuel, AIDS Speeds Across China." *The New York Times* 30 Dec. 2001, pp.1-5, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>> (23 Feb. 2002).

⁴¹ Rosenthal, 24 August 2001, *Ibid*

⁴² Wired News, "AIDS Conference in China: A First," *Wired News*. 13 Nov. 2001. pp.1-3 <<http://www.wired.com/news>> (22 Feb 2002).

⁴³ Rosenthal, 24 August 2001, *Ibid*

⁴⁴ The World Bank Group, "Press Release: 1997 Annual Meetings Program of Seminars: Financing Health Care in China," *The World Bank Group*. 22 Sept. 1997, pp. 1-2. <<http://www.worldbank.org>> (22 Feb 2002).

collection centers as well as AIDS education and prevention programs. A majority of the population still appears to be uninformed or misinformed regarding the nature of the disease and the safety methods needed for blood transfusion. Consequently, China should follow the lead of countries such as Thailand, which faced a similar outbreak of AIDS during the 1990s, and has already allocated hundreds of millions of dollars to curb the spread of the disease.⁴⁵ The government

needs to design programs that focus on every level of education.

Pamphlets, billboards and educational programs need to inform peasants about the nature of AIDS and how it can be spread through bodily fluids, and also about the importance of clean and safe procedures in blood collection. This last aspect—the sanitary

collection of blood—may prove crucial to the livelihood of villagers because if illegal blood trade continues in the future, more informed peasants may be deterred away from donating blood.

With regard to treatment, the government's efforts have failed to bring about significant change. Although the government opened an AIDS treatment clinic this July in Wenlou—one of the hardest hit villages in Henan—Dr. Gao criticized the clinic as a cosmetic gesture for the foreign press, because no substantial services are offered at the clinic. In truth, the clinic does not even offer AIDS drugs that treat common symptoms of HIV, such as pneumonias, fungal infections of the digestive tract, or epidermal herpes.⁴⁶ Therefore, despite China's action plan for HIV/AIDS, peasants are not obtaining viable medications and

solutions to the AIDS problem. The Chinese government, accordingly, needs to use money in an increased rural healthcare budget to establish better monitoring and treatment centers where people can find help for AIDS. This money should also go towards programs that train doctors to better recognize and treat AIDS, as well as the host of symptoms that can accompany it. In addition, the Chinese government should consider

invoking World Trade Organization rules that allow the off-patent production of materials and goods in certain emergencies. Just recently, Canada used the clause to begin manufacturing Ciproflaxin, an antibiotic that was used widely during the post September 11th anthrax scare.⁴⁷ If the government produces off-patent AIDS drugs, it may be able to more effectively treat the disease

for those already infected.

The international consequences of invoking the crisis clause at this point are uncertain. No doubt China wants to become a more significant player in the world economy, but the question becomes at what cost to its population? If the Chinese government and the Health Ministry fail to make AIDS one of the nation's top priorities, the consequences to China's human capital may be the most devastating to the nation since the Great Leap Forward, when an estimated 20 million people died of starvation. No doubt the road to effective AIDS policies will be difficult. An AIDS campaign requires massive amounts of money to be infused into prevention, education and treatment programs. The Chinese Communist Party, however, has a history of implementing large social

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⁴⁵ The World Bank Group, 10 Dec 1999, Ibid

⁴⁶ CNN.com, 9 August 2001, Ibid

⁴⁷ Rosenthal, 12 Nov 2001, Ibid

China programs, and they should pursue an AIDS policy program with the same vigor of initiatives such as the one-child policy. Likewise, although Chinese culture comes from a conservative social order, barriers concerning sex need to be broken in order to spare lives. What may be the most difficult subject, however, for the Chinese Communist Party to face is its own guilt in spreading the disease in Henan. The government is responsible on many levels for the spread of AIDS in Henan—from the blood collection centers, to the poverty that forced people to donate blood, and to the lack of healthcare causing thousands to now die. And finally, the problem is spreading. Because rural blood collection was undertaken in provinces other than Henan, one Chinese AIDS expert says that the current situation is “just the tip of the iceberg.”⁴⁸ Consequently, if the Chinese Communist Party refuses to face itself and effectively deal with the burgeoning AIDS problem, it may lose in the future more than just reputation and economic rewards, but also millions of lives.

⁴⁸ Rosenthal, 11 Dec 2001, *Ibid*

The Tragic and the Chinese Subject

Alexander Huang

Introduction: The Question of Genre

*Such welcome and unwelcome things at once,
'Tis hard to reconcile.*

—*Macbeth*¹

The comic and the tragic moods in Classical Chinese drama in the Yuan (1271-1368) and Ming (1368-1644) dynasties are indeed hard to reconcile. The issues considered in this article concern the essence of genre, the vicissitudes of *the tragic*, and the possibility of a cross-cultural definition of *the tragic*.² In order to conceive of a cross-cultural definition of *the tragic*, this paper traces the development of the notion of *the tragic* from its ancient Greek context through its reception in German Idealism and Romanticism to its unknown form in ancient China, hoping to reconsider the possibility of the universality of literary experiences, as proposed by Goethe, and to address issues such as genres in cross-cultural, and specifically East Asian, contexts. Instead of pity, fear, or torment, isolation of the tragic character is the core of the tragic in classic Chinese drama. It is the isolation of a redefined self and the isolation from the inescapable web of interpersonal relationship that define the Chinese sensibility for the tragic.

At stake is the definition of genre. The central problem is that the term “genre,” as pointed out by T.V.F. Brogan and Frederick Garber, is often used “interchangeably with type, kind, and form.”³ Rather than family resemblance of kinds or types of literature, the modes and moods, a la Northrop Frye, should be taken as the foundation for genre and literary classification. Following Frye with some revision, Hernadi distinguishes between modes of discourse (dramatic, narrative, or lyric) and moods (tragic, comic, tragicomic).⁴ Indeed, apart from some strictly definable genres such as Greek epic, Greek tragedy, Gothic novel, and German *Trauerspiel*, etc., it is hard to lay clear-cut lines between genres, and Hernadi’s distinction merits a candid baseline between subgenres such as farce / comedy and melodrama / tragedy. Tragedy and comedy can be taken as fully developed versions of melodrama and farce, and they are vehicles of the tragic and the comic moods. However, there is still a need for precise terminology in a cross-cultural definition of *the tragic*. If tragedy is a privileged form of artistic expression belonging to the Classical era in the West, Classical Chinese tragic drama, lacking an apposite term, is a genre that lies somewhere between high tragedy and German Baroque tragedy (*Trauerspiel*).⁵

¹ Macduff to Malcolm in *Macbeth* (4.3.136-139). All quotations of Shakespeare, if not otherwise noted, are from William Shakespeare, *The Riverside Shakespeare*, ed. G. Blakemore Evans et al. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974).

² Vicissitudes, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, means “alternation, mutual or reciprocal succession, of things,” which is especially illuminating in the case of the development of the tragic in the Baroque German, Elizabethan, and the Classical Chinese contexts, where each period saw the development of a special orientation and a characteristic style of the tragic theatre.

³ Alex Preminger and T.V.F. Brogan ed., *The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 456.

⁴ Paul Hernadi, *Beyond Genre: New Directions in Literary Classification* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).

⁵ *Das Trauerspiel* is a peculiar stage-form of royal martyr dramas in Germany. The word in colloquial and figurative language also means sorry affair, which gives it a twist toward modern popular soap opera. This is more of an ideal than a reality in the 18th- and 19th-century German theatre. For example, Schiller’s experimental plays “Die Braut von Messina” and “Demetrius” (fragments), Schlegel’s “Die Amazonen,” as well as Heinrich von Kleist’s “Penthesilea”, through their employment of updated, modern chorus and attempts to mirror the ancient Greek models, invite a judgment within the perspectives of tragedy and *Trauerspiel* at once. Noble attempts and worthy failures of these experimental plays characterize the kind of breach between theory and practice in the German reinvention of the bourgeois tragic through a seeming return to the Greek Antiquity.

Why does the genre matter? It matters because it is crucial to the question of the universality of literary experiences. As Dubrow effectively argues, “the medium is indeed the message.”⁶ Genres do not merely provide a means of classification.⁷ Genres are functional in literary communication. They shape the literary work and form the experience of the work. If the reader sees *Tamburlaine* as a tragedy, his response will differ radically from seeing it as a farce. Similarly, we cannot but read the lines “Arma virumque cano,”⁸ “Le donne, I cavallier, l’arme, gli amori, / le cortesie, l’audaci imprese io canto,”⁹ “Canto l’arme pietose e l’ capitano,”¹⁰ and “fierce wars and faithful loves shall moralize my song”¹¹ with an acute awareness of their cross references within the European epic tradition. The hallmark of Pierre Corneille’s French Classical tragedies, *Le Cid*, would be another example. How are we to grasp at the reconciliation that concludes the play? In what sense will we call it a tragedy? Would not reading *Le Cid* against its predecessor, a comedy, *Las Mocedades del Cid* by Guillen de Castro, change the interpretation of it? The particular slant a reader takes, tragic, comic, or tragicomic, toward this play decisively formulates his experience with it. Least but not last, would not the genre, a modern satire or a realistic novel, of David Lodge’s *Small World: An Academic Romance* occupy a decisive position in its reader’s understanding of it?

We live in an age when multiculturalism seems to be the easier option. However, acknowledging the sheer differences is not enough. Stephen Booth shares the anxiety of many

of us in the literary profession when coming to terms with definitions of literary genres, especially of tragedy. Any attempt to define tragedy can be frustrated by the very same reasons that motivate such an attempt: the multiplicity and the vicissitude of *the tragic* within specific theatric forms ranging from the ritual foundation in Greek theatre to the brutality in the Senecan tragic cosmos, and from the isolation of Man in Shakespearean tragedies to the institutionalized isolation in classic Chinese tragedies. The search for a definition of tragedy has been “the most persistent and widespread of all nonreligious quests for definition,”¹² as observed by Booth. However, it is only within the domain of Western literature that such quests prevail. While tragedy has epitomized an interesting array of definitions and perceptions throughout the history of dramatic literature in the European tradition, the question as to whether or not the Chinese stage since the 14th

“WHILE TRAGEDY HAS EPITOMIZED AN INTERESTING ARRAY OF DEFINITIONS AND PERCEPTIONS THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF A DRAMATIC LITERATURE IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION, THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE CHINESE STAGE SINCE THE 14TH CENTURY EVER NOURISHED SUCH A GENRE REMAINS CONTROVERSIAL AND IS SELDOM TAKEN UP WITH EQUAL PASSION AS THAT OF THE QUESTS FOR DEFINITION IN THE WEST AS BOOTH OBSERVED.”

century ever nourished such a genre remains controversial and is seldom taken up with equal passion as that of the quests for definition in the West as Booth observed.

The form unknown, the Chinese tragedy, deserves due critical attention. An examination of the vicissitudes of *the tragic* in Greek and Classical Chinese drama, which are distant and exotic enough, will yield new evidences and redefine a genre that was arguably lost in China. I do not propose that Classical Chinese tragedies should be measured against the Aristotelian criteria and expectations for tragic plots, diction,

⁶ Heather Dubrow, *Genre* (London: Methuen, 1982), 11.

⁷ “A venerable error” was the term Fowler used when referring to the notion that genres merely provide “a means of classification” for literature. Alastair Fowler, *Kinds of Literature: An Introduction to the Theory of Genres and Modes* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 37.

⁸ “I sing of warfare and a man at war.” (I.i) Virgil, *The Aeneid*, trans. Robert Fitzgerald (New York: Random House, 1981), 3.

⁹ “Of ladies, cavaliers, of love and war, / Of courtesies and of brave deeds I sing.” (Orlando Furioso, I. i) Ludovico Ariosto, *The Frenzy of Orlando: Part One*, trans. Barbara Reynolds (London: Penguin, 1973), 117.

¹⁰ “I sing the reverent armies and the captain.” (Gerusalemme liberata, I.i) Torquato Tasso, *Jerusalem Delivered: An English Prose Version*, trans. Ralph Nash (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987), 5.

¹¹ Edmund Spenser, *Faerie Queene* (I. Proem, l. 9).

¹² Stephen Booth, *King Lear, Macbeth, Indefinition, and Tragedy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 81.

and characters. Rather, the tragic mode, which Alastair Fowler and Northrop Frye ventured to distinguish in their subtle analysis,¹³ is more useful than the tragic form, which Aristotle and many of his followers have championed. Exoticism in this scheme of comparison of tragedy East and West merits more than a diary entry of an early cultural-anthropologist whose travelogue and ethnographical writings describe not the distant culture but his “home.”¹⁴

Is there a Chinese tragedy? If yes, of what sort? If not, has Chinese literature nourished a different set of plays such as comedy, tragicomedy, high comedy, farce, etc., or is there indeed a kind of Chinese tragedy but called by some other names or never named? By asking whether or not Chinese literature has ever known some forms of tragedy, we are questioning the ways in which a genre can or should be defined. We are also questioning what Goethe referred to as *Weltliteratur*, the notion of the universality of literary experiences, among “diverse national or regional literatures”¹⁵ and, I would add, in cross-cultural exchanges.

Conjunctions and Disjunctions: Comedy, Tragedy, and Something In Between

Tragedy was born in Greece when myth was endowed with the dimension of a civil society. Shakespearean tragedy was bred out of the spirit of negation and the isolation of Man, in the Renaissance Humanist terms. German Baroque tragedy (*Trauerspiel*) was created out of a shift from myth to history, and from the transcendental ritual to the counter-transcendental “play,” or game, as the word *Trauerspiel* (mourning play) denotes it. But when was the Chinese tragedy born? After Stephen Greenblatt and New Historicism, it is almost a blasphemy to speak of a collective mentality of a certain nation during a certain period, in approaches like the now-tarnished “world picture”¹⁶ approach that “read complex literary works against a supposedly stable, coherent, and transparent ‘historical background’ that enshrined the political and social orthodoxies of the age.”¹⁷ However, I would still venture to launch an inquiry into the Chinese mindset and the Chinese aesthetics for the tragic narrative embedded in a theatrical expression that appears to be harmonic, or even

¹³ See Northrop Frye’s distinction of “mode” and genre in “The Mythos of Autumn: Tragedy” and “Tragic Fictional Modes,” *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 206-223 and 35-43; Paul Hernadi’s notion of mood in *Beyond Genre: New Directions in Literary Classification* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); as well as Alastair Fowler’s concept of kind in “Concepts of Genre,” *Kinds of Literature: An Introduction to the Theory of Genres and Modes* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 37-53.

¹⁴ Three examples that immediately spring to mind are, though set apart by some 380 years in between, Claude L’Jvi-Strauss’ “Le Hon d’écriture,” *Tristes Tropiques* (Paris: Union Generale d’editions, 1962), Léry’s travelogue, and Raleigh’s famous account of the lost Guyana. Being accused of forgery, Sir Walter Raleigh indicates that his story is “an abstract taken out of certain Spanyardes letters concerning Guiana and the countries lying upon the great river Orenoque... taken at sea by Captain George Popham.” Sir Walter Raleigh (1552?-1618), *The Discoverie of the Large, Rich and Bevvtiful Empire of Guiana*, (London: Robert Robinson, 1596), 102. Jean de Léry (1534-1611) published in 1580 his anthropological account of his journey into the Bay of Rio between 1556 and 1558. Through eroticised speech, he emphasizes in the preface that the tale is extrapolated from “memoirs... written in Brazilian ink and in America itself.” Liry travelled to Brazil only to find his Geneva. See Jean de Léry, *Histoire d’un voyage fait en la terre du Bresil, autrement dite Amerique* Edition de Frank Lestringant (Montpellier: M. Chaleil, 1992).

¹⁵ Antoine Berman, *L’Ipreuve de l’Jtranger*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1984). English translation quoted is from Antoine Berman, *The Experience of the Foreign: Culture and Translation in Romantic Germany*, trans. S. Heyvaert (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 55.

¹⁶ E.M.W. Tillyard’s seminal work, *Elizabethan World Picture: A Study of the Idea of Order in the Age of Shakespeare, Donne, and Milton* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1943), characterizes a renewed interest in questions of “history” and marks the turn of literary studies from “always aestheticizing” and “always theorizing” to “always historicizing.” Tillyard’s take on the issue of history and “Elizabethan mindset” in Shakespeare’s England as a collective entity, though brilliant and innovative in its own right, smacks of the entry of a cultural-anthropologist’s diary entry. A grotesque vision of history and a seemingly fragmentary treatment of history have been taken up by New Historicist writings including Hayden White’s *Metahistory* and Stephen Greenblatt’s *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*. For a summary of New Historicist’s take on the study of tragedy, please refer to James Cunningham, “New Historicism,” *Shakespeare’s Tragedies and Modern Critical Theory* (London: Associated University Press, 1997), 64-80.

¹⁷ Louis Adrian Montrose, “The Elizabethan Subject and the Spenserian Text,” in *Literary Theory / Renaissance Texts*, ed. Patricia Parker and David Quint (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 304.

comic. I am not offering a generalized reading of Classical Chinese drama against that supposedly stable and transparent “Chinese mentality.” Rather, I propose to reconstruct *the tragic* in the world of these dramas and ask questions such as: Was there ever a Chinese mentality or sensibility, between the 14th and the 17th century, for *the tragic*? Why was Classical Chinese drama deprived of the title of tragedy by scholars like Karl Jaspers and Yao Yiwei?¹⁸ The question as to whether or not China, between the 13th and 18th centuries, ever produced some kind of tragic drama remains controversial ever since its first inception in the late 19th century.

In line with many critics from the early Renaissance to the present, George Steiner’s view on the construction of tragedy is representative: “I believe that any realistic notion of tragic drama must start from the fact of catastrophe. Tragedies end badly.”¹⁹ Concerns about the mingling of happy ending, humor, and the tragic mood in Chinese tragedies have developed and expressed in similar manners. For the Greeks, as well as for the Chinese, catastrophe is more a technical device that does not necessarily have to conclude a tragedy. Aristotle also preferred a more fortunate ending. Some tragedies, for example *Eumenides*, *Oedipus at Colonus*, *The Orphan of Zhao*, and the more controversial *Le Cid*, do have a slant toward a “happy ending.” These examples show how interpretations can vary even within the same cultural heritage and framework. In this regard, critics’ concerns about the essential formal features of Chinese tragedy are understandable, but the impetus behind these concerns worth a closer examination.

Yao holds that the characters in the Homeric underworld are true shadows while figures in the Chinese hell are utterly human and real. They suffer when they are tortured and they bear the

mark of their good and evil deeds during their lifetime. Since China knows a non-Homeric and stricter set of rules governing the underworld in which the virtuous is always rewarded and the wicked always punished, it follows that ancient Chinese stage never produces the kind of tragedy as Athens or Elizabethan England knew it. However, Yao concedes that “the tragic sense of life” and the tragic do exist in Classical Chinese plays—if tragedy is understood as more than a particular form of artistic expression peculiar to a certain period of culture. Jaspers, on the other hand, totally denies the existence of the genre of tragedy in China. When commenting on pre-Buddhist China, he concludes that the tragic cannot come into being “wherever man succeeds both in achieving a harmonious interpretation of the universe and in actually living in accord with it.”²⁰ He goes on to distinguish the differences between the ancient Chinese and the European cultures:

Terror and horror are part of experience and are as familiar to this civilization as to those civilizations awakened to an awareness of the tragic. Yet serenity remains the dominant mood of life; there is no struggle, no defiance. ... The relaxed and serene face of the Chinese still contrasts with the tense and self-conscious expression of Western man.²¹

There are, of course, pitfalls awaiting any one attempting such a study of East-West literary relations including the Saidian reflective “orientalism”²² and the kind of generalization of the “relaxed and serene face of the Chinese” and the “self-conscious expression of Western man”

¹⁸ Yao, Yiwei, “Yuan zaju zhong de beiju guan chutan (A preliminary attempt at the tragic consciousness in the zaju of the Yuan Dynasty),” *Xiju yu wenxue (Drama and Literature)*, Lienjing Pinglun 8 (Lienjing Critical Series Vol. 8) (Taipei: Lienjing Publishing, 1989), 13.

¹⁹ George Steiner, *The Death of Tragedy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 8.

²⁰ Karl Jaspers, *Von der Wahrheit, Philosophische Logik, 1*, (Band. Mhchen: R. Piper, 1947). Sections translated and titled *Tragedy is not Enough*, trans. Harald A. T. Reiche, Harry T. Moore, and Karl W. Deutsch (Archon Books, 1969), 32-33.

²¹ Karl Jaspers, *Von der Wahrheit, Philosophische Logik, 1*, (Band. Mhchen: R. Piper, 1947).

²² By this I am referring to the irony in furnishing an image of the exact opposite of the West as if the cultural boundary is a mirror.

Another aspect of this irony lies in the act to contradict that image with a kind of reflective orientalism, not the “original” Orient. For example, if the West conceives of China as A, the self-orientalizing attitude assumes that it must be wrong and B, on the opposite, is championed. See Zhang Longxi’s *Mighty Opposites: From Dichotomies to Differences in the Comparative Study of China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) and Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

in the passage above, but is it true that there is no indictment, no horror, and no rejection but only lament in Chinese drama? Instead of lament, pity, fear, or torment, isolation of the tragic character is the core of the tragic in drama. Tragic isolation in classic Chinese drama does not result from the pursuit of individual achievement. The kind of isolation for Chinese tragedy lies in the redefined self and in the interpersonal relationships. Due to the tradition of stylized performance, the Chinese theatrical actions are beautiful, even in the occasion of death and on the scale of unimaginable brutality. However, it does not follow that in the Chinese Buddhist context, characters are never torn in desperation. Misery and evil are not merely temporary disturbances in the karma or a circle in the retribution system. Tragic characters are exiled by Time and Space and often seek comfort in Time, as there is a continuum between past and present in the past-present dynamic in the tragedies of Yuan and Ming Dynasties. This suggests nonetheless a tragic sense of life. What is common between the Elizabethan and Yuan tragedies is that the tragic characters' names are restored only belatedly. What is unique in the Chinese plays is that they are avenged only by the generations to come. For example, in the *Orphan of Zhao*, a play of vengeance, it takes twenty years and toll of three lives to nail the villain, Tu Anqu. In the *Snow in Midsummer*, the unjustly executed lady, Dou E, sees her triple prophecies by her death realized one by one. Her ghost then haunts the stage until poetic justice is restored.

The Tragic and the *Trauerspiel*

Aristotle defines tragedy by its *telos* and therefore focuses on plot that constitutes tragic actions. Tragedy is "an imitation of an action... performed by actors... effecting through pity and fear the purification (*catharsis*) of such

emotions."²³ The actions on stage also ritualize the actions to be taken in the moral and civic community at large. It dramatizes the ritual of finding out the filthy "thing-in-itself" and getting rid of it. This search-and-discard is the essence of *catharsis*, or purification process in the collective consciousness.²⁴ Tragedy, then, is a representation of actions, and the tragic has to do with the nature of these actions represented, the essence of which is life. The shortcoming of the Aristotelian system is the conception of a tragic hero who has to be morally and socially nobler than the audience who forms the surrounding civic and moral community, both in the form of tragic chorus on-stage and in the form of spectator off-stage. To the essence of tragic characters and to the nature of *the tragic*, Classical Chinese tragedians, Shakespeare, and the German Romantics offer a different answer.

Peter Szondi opened his seminal work, *Versuch über das Tragische*, with a remark on the German reception of tragedy and the German invention of *the tragic*. A poetics of tragedy has existed since Aristotle, but a philosophy of *the tragic* only after Schelling.²⁵ *The tragic* is the mode of conflicts of forces embodied a dramatic narrative,²⁶ and it differs from the tragedy in that the latter is a dramatic form while the former advises a sense of sublime and an empirical mysticism in man's conditions. Aristotle outlined a poetics of tragedy and its necessary foundation in forms, but Schelling complicated the notion of tragedy, though also in light of its *telos* and *Zweck* (purpose), by engendering a philosophy of the tragic, which is a negative proof of man's free will. The assertion of free will is only possible through willingly taking the blame and enduring the punishment for transgression. The transgression is precisely that knowing the doomed result but nevertheless taking the lead to rise up and struggle with Fate, or Nature.

²³ Aristotle, *Poetics*, trans. Malcolm Heath (London: Penguin, 1996), 10.

²⁴ The issue of *katharsis* is controversial in the translations of Aristotle's *De Arte Poetica Liber*, and its interpretations range from the moralism of neo-classicists, the "affective fallacy" of the New Critics, to the mental experiences in communal terms suggested by psychoanalysis.

²⁵ "Seit Aristoteles gibt es eine Poetik der Trag`die, seit Schelling erst eine Philosophie des Tragischen." See Peter Szondi, *Versuch über das Tragische* (Frankfurt/Main: Insel-Verlag, 1961), 7.

²⁶ Even the idea of the tragic is controversial, and it is not surprising to find that the entry "das Tragische" in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* starts with a reduction approach: "Unstreitig [...] ist nur die Zugehörigkeit der Trag`die zum Dionysos-Kult." (Author's translation: What remains indisputable is only the affiliation of tragedy to the Dionysus cult.) Joachim Ritter und Karlfried Grhnder hrsg. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie Band 10: St-T* (Basel: Schwabe & Co AG Verlag, 1998), 1334.

The end of tragedy, for Schiller, is not to purge the audience in the Aristotelian sense, but to offer a venue for *das absolute Ich* (the absolute I) to exercise the free will, which in turn creates a world around the subject with the projection of the subjectivity. This world is the tragic world in a tragic theatre.²⁷

“*It is we who are Hamlet.*”
– William Hazlitt²⁸

It is the spectator who is, or becomes, the ultimate tragic protagonist. The Aristotelian age of aristocratic and noble tragic heroes occupying high social status is bygone. Now it is the bourgeois spectator and the bourgeois character that occupy the theatre, where a series of bad circumstances plunge a bourgeois family or character into despair. Aristotle defies the possibility of having a bourgeois character as the tragic hero because such a character lacks the height from which to fall. However, for Lessing and Chinese tragic drama in the Yuan Dynasty, it is precisely because of the bourgeois status of the tragic character that education through the tragic can be effected in its audience. The audience is involved in a dual and reciprocal process of identification. He first relates conditions of life to the events on stage and finds the tragic character pitiable. This is how pity is possible in the first place. He further relates the conditions of the tragic character back to his own conditions as man and finds himself in the vicinity to such terrible and fearful symmetry of sin and misfortune. The audience takes pleasure, Schiller claims, in practicing reason in the tragic theatre, which is an assertion of free will and subjectivity. Aristotle championed the importance of plot and techniques, or tricks even, of tragedy and tragedians, but Schiller focuses on the sentimental education of the spectator of the

tragic spectacle.

The bourgeois-ness of the *bürgerliches Trauerspiel* (bourgeois tragedy) in Germany, which Lessing and his contemporaries promoted as part of their program for sentimental education, serves as the Western model to facilitate our understanding of Classical Chinese drama, since going to plays and acting were local practices in ancient China, with a civic dimension and communal dynamics. The word *Trauerspiel* literally means mourning play; it also compounds game and stage performance. There are cultural resonance between the Classical Chinese tragedy and the tragic consciousness in the German *Trauerspiel*, while the kind of heroic isolation in Shakespearean tragedies illustrates, through contrast, another important aspect of the Chinese tragic consciousness, the civilian isolation in the crowd.

To our purpose, Walter Benjamin’s distinction of *Tragödie* and *Trauerspiel* in terms of myth and history is useful.²⁹ To this two more crucial distinguishing elements should be added, i.e. the dimension of individual pursuit in tragedy, framed in the plot or character-centered stage representation, and the communal and collective tragic consciousness of *Trauerspiel*, framed in a spectator-centered theatrical experience. Tragedy and *Trauerspiel*, then, become the mighty opposites of myth and history, the hero and the citizen, the transcendental and the counter-transcendental, the divine and the worldly, as well as the individual and the community. Shakespearean tragedy is the ritualized representation of isolation as a result of the pursuit of individual achievement. Chinese tragedy, which is closer to *Trauerspiel*, is the festive tragedy by the audience and for the audience. It does not reach up to the heaven, like tragedy, for the “hidden god” as the viewer aimed at. Rather,

²⁷ F.W.J. Schelling, “Zehnter Brief (1795),” *Philosophische Briefe, Werke 3. Historisch-kritische Ausgabe*, ed. H. Buchner et al. (Stuttgart: Frommann-Helzboog, 1982), 106-112.

²⁸ William Hazlitt, “Characters of Shakespeare’s Plays” (1817), in *The Romantics on Shakespeare*, ed. Jonathan Bate (London: Penguin Books, 1986).

²⁹ Walter Benjamin, *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels*, Rev. Ausg. besorgt von Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1963).

it bends toward the earth and seeks communal memorabilia of grief and relief. Tragedy as a classical genre differs radically from the *Trauerspiel*. Tragedy takes its root in myth and acts out a rite of heroic sacrifice on verisimilitude of the community. *Trauerspiel*, on the other hand, rises from representation of history.

In his last letter on tragedy, Schelling has made clear his position on *the tragic* as the third way between criticism and dogmatism.³⁰ The end of tragedy is not to reaffirm the unfathomable Nature or World-in-Itself, nor to afford us with a crystal clear world of representation which is up for grabs by the subject. Schelling further argues that:

The essence of tragedy is a real conflict between freedom in the subject and objective necessity. This conflict does not end with one defeated by the other, but with the totally indifferent appearance of the two, the winner and the loser at the same time.³¹ [...] The conflict between freedom and necessity is only real where the necessity undermines the will and freedom is contested on its own ground.³²

This is a picture of the incommensurability of the world and the singular and potentially tragic human nature. A picture of a human nature “as having to determine itself to its truth, for good or evil and despite everything,” is a tragic picture, as Marchant understands the Shakespearean tragedies.³³ This not true of Classical Chinese tragedies in which many tragic characters have to conform to the moral community and whatever role endowed on them at every single moment of life. What we have in common to characterize *the tragic* in Shakespearean and Classical Chinese

drama is the isolation of characters, though in different terms, and the necessity and tyranny of Time. Readiness is all. The protagonist wills some actions and cannot avoid willing some others. The fact that he cannot avoid it is the picture being presented in tragedy. Some kind of understandable but inexplicable sense of despair in relation to Time characterizes *the tragic*, which is part of the audience’s recognition of the worldly picture of thing-in-itself. Hamlet’s comments on the ripe of time before the duellare especially illuminating. He says to his friend and loyal companion Horatio:

Not a whit, we defy augury. There is special providence in the fall of a sparrow. If it be [now], ‘tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be not now, yet it [will] come—the readiness is all.
—*Hamlet* (V.ii., 219-222)

The amoral Time, not the benevolent Heaven, in this sense, also characterizes the Chinese tragic. The Classical Chinese tragic character is ostracized by Time with an acute awareness of this exile, a reality he cannot avoid. A few remarks on the genre theory in ancient China is necessary before we explore further the defining characteristics of *the tragic* in the Classical Chinese drama.

The Tragic in Classical Chinese Drama

The genre theory takes a slightly different twist in the traditional Chinese critical idioms, in which drama was not categorized by its effect (audience’s response) or content (plot) into comedy, tragicomedy, melodrama, or tragedy. Birch points out in a beautiful metaphor that

³⁰ F.W.J. Schelling, “Zehnter Brief (1795),” *Philosophische Briefe. Werke 3*. Historisch-kritische Ausgabe. ed. H. Buchner et al. (Stuttgart: Frommann-Helzboog, 1982), 106-112.

³¹ “Das Wesentliche der Trag’ die ist [...] ein wirklicher Streit der Freiheit im Subjekt und der Notwendigkeit als objektiver, welcher Streit sich nicht damit endet, daß der eine oder der andere unterliegt, sondern daß beide sigend und besiegt zugleich in der vollkommenen Indifferenz erscheinen.” F.W.J. Schelling, *Philosophie der Kunst. Werke*. I. Abteilung, Band 5. Stuttgart: 1856-61, 693.

³² Translated by author. “Der Streit von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit [ist] wahrhaft nur da, wo diese den Willen selbst untergrübt, und die Freiheit auf ihrem eigenen Boden bekämpft wird.” F.W.J. Schelling, *Philosophie der Kunst*. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960), 696.

³³ Robert Marchant, “The Idea of the Tragic,” *A Picture of Shakespeare’s Tragedies* (Retford: Brynmill, 1984), 17.

“a literary genre is a comfortable saddle” for the “writer-rider” and the “reader-rider.”³⁴ Classic Chinese drama has uniquely been categorized into subgenres by 1) its thematic issues³⁵ such as “young scholar and the beauty” or “outcasts and *flâneur*”³⁶, 2) its form and style of performance such as *zaju*³⁷ or *chuangci*,³⁸ and 3) its regional variations, music, and dialects such as Peking opera, Cantonese opera, or Kunqu opera. This is another reason why “tragedy” is regarded to be non-existent in China. Chinese plays have traditionally been generically labeled as *zaju* of the Yuan Dynasty or *chuangci* of the Ming Dynasty after the style of performance the plays were set.³⁹ Terms such as comedy, tragedy, tragicomedy, and melodrama were not used to categorize classical Chinese plays. Hence the question of the existence of tragedy in ancient China is a confusion between kinds and modes before it becomes a question of definitions.⁴⁰

“WHILE TRAGEDY HAS EPITOMIZED AN INTERESTING ARRAY OF DEFINITIONS AND PERCEPTIONS THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF A DRAMATIC LITERATURE IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION, THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE CHINESE STAGE SINCE THE 14TH CENTURY EVER NOURISHED SUCH A GENRE REMAINS CONTROVERSIAL AND IS SELDOM TAKEN UP WITH EQUAL PASSION AS THAT OF THE QUESTS FOR DEFINITION IN THE WEST AS BOOTH OBSERVED.”

Now back to the question where we started. Does classic Chinese drama know tragedy, ritual or complex? Scholars and literati ancient and modern have attempted to answer it with various persuasions ranging from a total disavowal of the existence of tragedy in China based on formalistic observations of the performing formula, represented by Ch’ien Chungshu⁴¹ and Chu Kwangtsien⁴² to a petition of the genre of tragedy, a form unknown to early Chinese critics, based on the content of dramatic narrations, represented by Wang Guowei.⁴³ Contemporary dramaturgy and literary critic Yao Yiwei stands somewhere in between, as he takes the tragic sense of life as the tragic mode epitomized by Classical Chinese plays such as *Injustice Done to Dou E*. Tragedy does not only refer to a specific dramatic form in a specific historic period, such as the Hellenic world, and has undergone many revisions such as the

³⁴ Cyril Birch ed. *Studies in Chinese Literary Genres* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 1.

³⁵ The Ming prince and scholar Chu Quan (d. 1448) recorded 12 thematic categories of classic Chinese drama in the Yuan dynasty ranging from “nuns and fairies” to “exiled lords and orphans” and from “erotic love amongst flowers and under the moon” to “loyal lords and assassins”. See the chapter on “12 Categories of *Zaju*” in Chu Quan, *Taihe Zhengyin Pu* (Great Peace Tables for Correcting Sounds), 1398.

³⁶ *Robinhood* is an Anglophone equivalent to this archgenre.

³⁷ *Zaju* is a generic term for a style of drama in the Yuan Dynasty. It is a variety play with dance, song, monologue, balladry, and farcical skits set in four acts, each with a set of arias sung by the leading role. Spoken lines are inserted between the songs, and arias do not develop the plot but function to convey the emotions on stage and ambience of the particular scene. For a detailed study of the craft and formal characteristics of *zaju*, see James I. Crump, “The Conventions and Craft of Yuan Drama,” *Studies in Chinese Literary Genres*, ed. Cyril Birch (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 192-219.

³⁸ *Chuangci* is another generic term for a different style of drama in the Ming dynasty. The play is more of an epic spectacle that unrolls like a giant Chinese scroll painting that contains more than 30 scenes. Tang Xianzu’s love tragicomedy *Mudan Ting* (Peony Pavillion), staged in the complete 55-scene version in 3-day Marathon performance at the Lincoln Center in New York in 1999, is the most famous example of *chuangci* plays. For a detailed study of this genre, see Cyril Birch, “Some Concerns and Methods of the Ming *Chuangci* Drama,” *Studies in Chinese Literary Genres*, ed. Cyril Birch (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 220-258.

³⁹ There were *zaju* and *chuangci* in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, too. The Yuan and Ming were the respective periods when these genres first came into being and flourished.

⁴⁰ In terms of a cross-cultural definition of genre, the idea of mode is useful, though it remains still controversial. The debate between Derrida and Genette exemplifies modern disagreement on the idea of mode and genre. See Jacques Derrida, “La Loi du genre,” *Glyph: Textual Studies* 7 (1980): 176-201, Gérard Genette, *Théorie des genres* (Paris: Seuil, 1986), and Jacques Derrida, “The Law of Genre” Trans. Avital Ronell, *Critical Inquiry* 9.1 (1980): 55-81.

⁴¹ Ch’ien Chungshu, “Tragedy in Old Chinese Drama,” *T’ien Hsia Monthly* 11.1 (1935), reprinted in *Renditions* 9 (1978): 85-91.

⁴² Chu holds that “comedy” and “drama” are interchangeable in ancient China. Chu Kwangtsien, *Beiju Xinli Xuei* (*Psychology of Tragedy*) Trans. Longxi Zhang. (Beijing: Renmin Wenxuei Publishing, 1983), 218-219. Originally published in English as a dissertation submitted to l’Université de Strasbourg. See Chu Kwang-Tsien, *The Psychology of Tragedy: A Critical Study of Various Theories of Tragic Pleasure* (Strasbourg: Librairie Universitaire d’Alsace, 1933). Herbert Muller and Ralph Hallman share similar ideas. Herbert J. Muller, *The Spirit of Tragedy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 328-30. Ralph J. Hallman, *Psychology of Literature: A Study of Alienation and Tragedy* (New York: Philosophic Library, 1961), 47.

⁴³ Wang Guowei, “Yuanju zhi wenzhang (The Texture of the Yuan Drama),” *Songyuan Xiqu Kao* (*A Study of Song and Yuan Drama*), in *Wang Guowei Xiqu Luenwen Ji* (*Collected Essays on Drama by Wang Guowei*), (Taipei: Liren, 1993), 123-125.

Senecan rewrite and Shakespearean inventions, just to cite two examples.

The Chinese theatre knows violence, grief, and the stroke of natural or contrived disaster, within a cosmos interwoven with desires and complex interpersonal relationships. *The tragic* in Classical Chinese drama, such as *The Story of the Robe*⁴⁴ and the *Orphan of Zhao*,⁴⁵ is closer to what Aristotle described as *philos*: two friends instead of two enemies turning against each other out of a series of bad circumstances. Chinese tragedy is more Antagonistic— meaning irresolvable conflicts between Good and Good in the web of interpersonal relations, than Oedipal— concentrating on Providence and redemption.

The spiritual mood and depressed temper in the Renaissance English tragedies may be absent from Classical Chinese drama, but many defining features of tragedy are present in the Chinese plays. The extremely stylized performance in Chinese theatre tends to understate the violence of emotional impact. One of the major preoccupations of the Chinese dramatists is the suffering to which ordinary people (*shengdo xiaomin*) are subjected. Many of the Chinese tragedies have a suffering and often unjustly accused citizen from lower social classes as the central figure. Humble women and men often become the martyrs. Poetic justice is valued by some playwrights, perhaps more devotedly than by the European dramatists. The emphasis on death is paramount, though the fear of it never dominates the Chinese stage.

Snow in Midsummer (also known as the *Injustice to Dou E*) by Guan Hanqing stands out as a classical example of the Chinese “tragedy.” It comes “with a touch of

Dionysian extravagance and fervor”⁴⁶ and affords an interesting counterpart to *Macbeth* and *Hamlet*. At the age of three, the heroine, Dou E, suffered the death of her mother. At seventeen she was given to a well-to-do widow since her father could not afford to raise her. She loses her husband after two years of unhappy life in marriage. Her mother-in-law consents to a second marriage under threats of an odious bandit and his father. After failing to blackmail Dou E into a similar marriage, the young bandit contrives a plot to murder her mother-in-law. However, the poisoned cup accidentally reached the villain’s own father instead. This reminds us of the poisoned cup reaching the wrong lips by the end of *Hamlet*.

The heroine is given the choice of being accused of murder or of accepting a hateful marriage. She refuses the marriage and is executed by a judge bribed by the villain. She makes a triple prophesy before her execution: 1) if she is innocent, she declares that upon her decapitation her blood will rise to stain a white banner high in air; 2) if she is innocent, though it is midsummer, there will be snow falling to bury her body and the devouring earth; and 3) if she is innocent, the province where such injustice has been done will be without rain for three years. Heaven does intervene, but only as an overarching moral universe. Dou E becomes the symbol for filial piety and a hallmark for rationalism as she says to her mother-in-law in the court, “if I don’t (take the blame) and be executed, how can I save you!” There are indeed numerous tragic ways to kill a woman,⁴⁷ and there are ways to die. However, Dou E chooses to become the martyr for her filial piety. She was once a

⁴⁴ *Luoshan Ji* (*Story of the Robe*), a *Chuangci* play in 28 scenes from the Ming Dynasty, author anonymous. Such themes as the recognition of the villain in the adopted father and the intriguing relationships between biological father / imposter father and the son / adopted son have been recurrent in dramatic and fictional narratives such as *Hehan Shan* (*Reunion of the Robes*), a play in the genre of *Zaju* in four acts, by Zhang Guobin in the Yuan Dynasty.

⁴⁵ A detailed study of the background of the story can be found in Wu-chi Liu, “The Original Orphan of China,” *Comparative Literature* 3 (1953), 193-212, in Shou-yi Cheng, “The Chinese Orphan: a Yuan Play,” *Tien Hsia Monthly* (September 1936), and in Jung-en Liu, “Introduction,” *Six Yuan Plays*. Trans. Liu Jung-en (London: Penguin Books, 1972), 7-35.

⁴⁶ Henry Wells, *The Classical Drama of the Orient*. (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965), 53.

⁴⁷ Building on Nicole Loraux’s beautiful metaphor in *FaHons tragiques de tuer une femme* (Paris: Hachette, 1985). English translation available. Nicole Loraux, *Tragic Ways of Killing a Woman*. Trans. Anthony Forster (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

China philosopher and her concerns were the Truth: she did not murder the bandit's father. But now, at this very moment, Dou E is the filial daughter, and there is no space for a seeker for Truth. It is not about individual achievement and reputation, but the family at stake. As soon as the corrupted social institution and the torture instruments in the court close upon her and her mother-in-law, she surrenders to her role as a widow and a daughter. She has to save her mother-in-law. Dou E will die, and there is no way out. She could insist upon the Truth and die under the physical torture in the court, but that is not a choice for her, just as escaping Achilles' blow is an unimaginable choice to Hector, though in different circumstances. Dou E dies under forgery. To save her mother-in-law from being tortured to death in the court, she chooses to endorse the forged story about her "murdering" the bandit's father. She is found guilty and executed accordingly. Dou E's choice, or to be more precise, her having nothing from which to choose, characterizes the Chinese tragic in the communal sense. The free will per se is the free will of the community as a whole in the Chinese context, not that of an individual. At stake is the concern of becoming and being a citizen and a member in the moral community, which enacts the tragic isolation of the tragic character in the framework of her / his community.

A series of bad circumstances and tangles and knots in interpersonal relations, such as that of Dou E's heartily felt responsibility to her mother-in-law, characterize the tragic in Chinese drama. The tragic character cannot avoid making such choices due to his *position* in the interwoven web of interpersonal relationships. This "cannot" is the core of the tragic and is the cause for the tragic isolation.⁴⁸ The inevitable happens as it is, as a result of the character's positions in the web of

interpersonal relationships. Thus, "readiness is all," as Hamlet concludes.

Another aspect of the dilemma is the obligation to choose between sacrificing Truth or sacrificing the beloved, such as in Dou E's case. The replaceable submits to the irreplaceable when such sacrifice is at stake. The Truth for Dou E, in this case, is replaceable, even belatedly and after death, but her filial responsibility to her mother-in-law and the relationship between Dou E and her mother-in-law are irreplaceable; therefore, the irreplaceable duty has to be taken up, according to the decree of the society at that time. Mencius's answer, centuries earlier, to the hypothetical question posed by one of his students best illustrates such concerns within a moral community.⁴⁹ It is ask what would have happened if Blind Purblind (Shun's father) kills someone, when Shun is the emperor and Gao Yao is the justice minister. Mencius replies unequivocally that of course Gao Yao has to arrest Blind Purblind. The student follows on and wants to know whether or not Shun should have forbidden it. There is no way out for this potentially tragic situation since the two bodies of the king belong at once to the empire and the family. Mencius's solution epitomizes again the logic of the irreplaceable and the replaceable. Emperor Shun is confronted with difficult choices between allowing Gao Yao, the justice minister ordained by the emperor himself, to apprehend the murderer who happens to be the emperor's own father, and doing something in line with his duty as a son. Emperor Shun, Mencius says, should cast aside the empire as no more than "discarding a worn shoe." Having abandoned the crown, the emperor then secretly steals into the maximum-security prison and carries his father on his back and flees to the edge of the sea where no one can find them. He lives there happily with his

⁴⁸ Wang Guowei also takes this as the core of the tragic in his comments on *Honglo Meng*, which he thinks of as the "tragedy of tragedies." Following Schopenhauer, he outlines three kinds of tragedy: 1) the tragedy of the villain, 2) the tragedy of the blind Fate, and 3) the tragedy of the inevitable and contingency. Wang holds the last in the highest regards, since in such kind of tragedy things happen as they are, not as the result of the manipulation of a villain or the oblivion of the blind Fate. Wang Guowei, "Honglo Meng Pinglun (Critical Appraisal of *The Dream of Red Chamber*)," *Jingan Wenji (Collected Essays of Jingan)* (Riben Zhongguo Sixiang Shi Yijiu Hui 1957), 42-43.

⁴⁹ Mencius, "To Fathom the Mind: Book One," 35 *Mencius*. Trans. David Hinton (Washington, D.C.: Counterpoint, 1998), 248.

father, never giving a thought to the empire. This is a classical Chinese solution to a potentially tragic situation. For Dou E, it is quite different, since both polemics, the Truth and the filial duty, demand her devotion, and not one of them can be discarded by Dou E “like a worn shoe.” The tragic epitomized therein is the isolation between the two polemics and between the two worlds.

Time befriends me not and awaits me not.
—Chinese proverb

The return of the ghost of the unjustly executed Dou E signifies the Chinese sense of loneliness as being ostracized by Time and Space.

As a female repressed by her society and burdened with filial duties, she has nothing to resort to but Time. A continuum between past and present is shown in the belated “compensation” of the snow in the summer and the belated restoration of justice. Chinese

tragic characters are *homo political* and *homo historien*, as they resort to Time, the future, when seeking comfort for injustice done in the past and when seeking to restore their names. History and Time are conceived as cyclic instead of linear in the pre-Buddhist Chinese context, and Time comes into being only in concrete terms such as the elders, the bygone generation, or the life after death.⁵⁰ *The tragic* occurs in the “after life,” in the form of offspring or spirits, and a strong continuum between past and present can be found.

Such a continuum is most clearly exemplified in the recognition scene in *The Story of the Robe*. Shu Jizu, the orphan of the Shu family, finds out one day that his adopted father Shu Neng was once a bandit, and Shu Neng happens to have killed Shu Jizu’s family out of some complications of life. At this point,

Shu Neng comes to visit. Shu Jizu sets up a welcome banquet to celebrate his father’s visit, to thank his father for 18 years of labor raising him, and to celebrate his achievement in the imperial exam. However, the dinner is also a difficult confrontation between the imposter father, who is once the bandit but now a good person, and the adopted son, who is now a judge ordained by the emperor and an “enlightened” man who knows his real parentage. The continuum between past and present, in Classical Chinese drama, is embodied in the form of spirit, in Dou E’s case, and in the form of off springs, in Shu’s case. Upon realizing his real parentage, Shu Jizu has to switch to

his newly perceived self and has to act according to the duty of this new vision of self: avenge his biological father. We see a continuum between the biological father and the son. It is as if Shu Jizu’s biological father, whom he has never met, suddenly lives in

him. The story of the family is a fiction in the strictest sense, since Shu Jizu’s life is so detached from that bloody past. The person to whom he is thankful is his adopted father. However, the fiction becomes reality in this continuum in the tragic past-present dynamics. Shu Jizu is obliged to avenge his father and kill his adopted father. He is hesitating and tormented psychologically. The last scene is entitled “apprehending the father” without a forensic discourse. Rather, the son only approaches his adopted father with all kinds of detour and implied narrative of the past “sin.” Seeing this, Shu Neng hangs himself that very night to avoid putting his adopted son and himself in a difficult situation. Shu Jizu mourns his fate and the death of his imposter father.

The continuum between past and present is also evident in the recognition scene of *The*

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⁵⁰ The topic of the conception of Time is at once broad and intimidating. Classical Chinese fiction and drama provide us with many versions of understanding and multiplies it with infinite factors. No exhaustive treatment can be offered here given the constraint of space, but a comparative study of Aristotelian and pre-Buddhist Chinese conception of Time can be found in Christoph Harbsmeier’s “Some Notions of Time and of History in China and in the West: with a Digression on the Anthropology of Writing,” in *Time and Space in Chinese Culture*, ed. Huang Chhn-Chieh and Erik Zhrcher (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 49-71.

Orphan of Zhao where the orphan has learned of his real parentage and suddenly becomes ready to kill his adopted father, who has been in every aspect a loving and responsible father for the past twenty years. The debt cancels out everything and the bond to the biological father, which dictates the interpersonal relationships and ostracizes the orphan of Zhao in Time. The orphan is brought up by the greatest enemy of his family and is ignorant of his real ancestry. When Orphan Zhao reaches twenty, Cheng Ying, Zhao's tutor and guardian, manages to reveal to the orphan the whole story using a scroll on which the tragic history of the Zhao family is represented. Being struck by such a blow, Orphan Zhao faints. When being revived, he is "enlightened" and knows what to do. Orphan Zhao now realizes that his real name is neither Cheng Bo nor Tu Cheng, but Zhao. A crisis of traumatic proportions awaits Orphan Zhao. His adopted father Tu, whom he has referred to as the "able minister," turns out to be a man who butchered his whole family. Orphan Zhao has to kill his adopted father despite the fact that Tu has lavished on his adopted son the kind of protection and affection worthy of a real father for twenty years. Orphan Zhao's state of mind could have materialized into a Hamletian question had there been a tradition of monologue on the Chinese stage. He embraces his newly perceived vision of self and the new identity of a man "who has mistaken a villain for a father." It is as if his father and grandfather, who were killed by Tu, suddenly live in Orphan Zhao after that brief and symbolic moment of unconsciousness. He is placed at the Janus-faced gate between (his father's) past and (his own) present and between freedom and necessity.⁵¹ He looks upon both and is isolated from both.

Conclusion: *the Tragic in Cross-cultural Contexts*

*Claudius: But now, my cousin
Hamlet, and my son—*

*Hamlet: [Aside] A little more than
kin, and less than kind.*

—Hamlet (I.ii. 65)

Hamlet's response to this invitation from the imposter father is revealing of the tension between father and son and the anxiety between the authentic and the imposter. Similar tensions have been found in *Orphan of Zhao* and *The Story of the Robe*, when the protagonists find out that their "fathers" are imposters and merely adopted fathers. Even worse, these "fathers" are murderers, just like Claudius. The distant footsteps of the father, in the voice of "Adieu, adieu, adieu! Remember me,"⁵² does not sound across the corridor in the Classical Chinese drama dealing with father and son relationships. The Chinese fathers do not demand to be "remembered"; rather, they *live* in their offspring. This has to do with a different past-present dynamics and a self defined by duty and its place in the web of interpersonal relationships. The father's two bodies are hence the flesh in which he takes form and the body of his offspring to come. He lives and moves between these two bodies in the *Orphan of Zhao*, patiently seeking the moment for revenge. The son, now orphan Zhao, becomes his father by living out his father's will when he finally realizes his real parentage, because he takes up this new identity of the son to his biological father as smoothly as putting on a new gown. In the new identity, he has to get rid of the imposter—Tu, once the enemy to the Zhaos and now the loving adopted father. The immortality of the father is presented through the shift of identities in the son, the avenger.⁵³

⁵¹ Janus, the Greek and Roman god of beginnings, openings, and endings, after whom the month January is named. See also the gate of Janus in Virgil's *Aeneid* vii.

⁵² *Hamlet* I.v.91.

⁵³ An interesting parallel would be the Elizabethan fascination with the king's "two bodies," especially in the English legal theory. At royal funerals an effigy representing the king's Dignity is presented to show the immortality of the king. As some of Shakespeare's plays like *Richard II* and *King Lear* show, the king has both "anointed flesh" and the body of a "poor, bare, fork'd animal."

Orphan Zhao and Shu Jizu are male tragic characters, while Dou E is a female martyr. Their self is defined as Duty.⁵⁴ They all act in their capacity as son and adopted son, daughter and adopted daughter, to right the wrongs suffered by their fathers, grandfathers, or immediate family. This relates to the collective consciousness of the tragic in the world of Classical Chinese drama. Hence the isolation of the tragic character comes from without, the community, and not from within, from the individual Man, as in the cases of Shakespearean soul-searching tragic protagonists.

It is true that characters in Classical Chinese tragedies are seldom found in the process of soul-searching, but they are by no means stereotypes. The moral choices for the characters are few, and the ways in which positive characters can make such choices are further dictated by their roles and duties. The self is defined in terms of virtues and duties that often turn out to be mutually exclusive. The tragic mode is to be understood as an isolation of the protagonist in an interwoven web of interpersonal relations and irresolvable dilemma. The most common duties include being filial to one's parents, loyal to the ruler, and faithful to friends. There is an interesting parallel between the conception of personal shame and communal responsibility in the Greek Antiquity and in ancient China. The world of Homeric epic is a shame culture in which the heroes are motivated by shame to perform the acts that they do. Shaming, to different extents in Greek and Classical Chinese tragedies, is public disapproval of one's character and, in the Chinese context, moral integrity. Shame,

reputation, and honor are the incentives that motivate Greek epic characters.⁵⁵ Therefore, Achilles would rather die on the battlefield than follow Athena's advice and lead a peaceful life at home. Escaping the fate of dying at the hands of Achilles is an equally unimaginable choice to Hector. To extend this statement about epic characters to the case of Classical Chinese drama, duty would replace the Greek conception of shame, as the self is defined as duty in Chinese tragedies, hence the tragic mode is embodied in a web of propriety and duties, which is closer to what Aristotle termed as *philos*: two friends, instead of enemies, turning against each other due to forces beyond control.

“ CLASSICAL CHINESE DRAMA FASHIONS A WORLD OBSESSED WITH MORAL EXCELLENCE EMBODIED IN THE CHINESE VISION OF SELF. ”

Shaming requires a set of norms. These norms define the duty, which in turn defines the self for

Classical Chinese

characters. The behavioral norms or moral standards are set by one's position in the web of interpersonal relationships rather than by one's social position only, as is true for the Greek tragic heroes. Kings adhere to one set of standards, commoners to another, and women to yet another. Postulating one's position in the continuum of time and among the visions of self, then embarking on a tragic voyage into the isolated inner world, of oneself and of the community, is the *modus operandi* of dramatic tragic narratives in Classical Chinese literature.

The underlying structure to the tragic question and responsibility of choice is Time. The basis of the tragic vision is being in the flow of one-directional time, where everything happens once and for all. Death, in this regard, defines the tragic hero and shapes the tragic experience in the Greek and Shakespearean theatre. Hamlet's conclusion that "readiness is all" shall not be

⁵⁴ Joseph Lau shares similar views. Joseph S.M. Lau, "Duty, Reputation, and Selfhood in Traditional Chinese Narrative," *Expression of Self in Chinese Literature*. ed. Robert Hegel and Richard C. Hessney (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 372.

⁵⁵ I am indebted to Bernard Williams for the notion of shame as the impetus for tragic actions in the Homeric world. Bernard Williams, *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

China
 overseen, and death is indeed something inevitable that comes when it comes. However, the tragic irony lies in the fact that even the most thoroughly prepared tragic hero can be “surprised by death” when it befalls them.⁵⁶ The tragic moment, or the dénouement, in Shakespearean tragedy often arrives hand in hand with death, while the opposite operates in the Chinese tragic mood. It is the offspring, or the spirit, of the martyr who lives out the tragic isolation.

Classical Chinese drama fashions a world obsessed with moral excellence embodied in the Chinese vision of self. This

is most evident in *The Orphan of Chao*. After knowing that he has “mistaken the villain for a father” for more than twenty years, the sole heir of the Chao family resolves to avenge his father who is killed by the villain, now his adopted father. His newly perceived self as son of a murdered father dictates that he becomes an avenger to reaffirm the cosmic order. This supersedes the fact that the villain has been a loving father in every aspect. The Orphan Chao kills the villain without a slightest show of contemplation. *The tragic* is exemplified in the tragic vision of self, and the form unknown is hence revealed.

⁵⁶ For the argument on the role of death in tragedy, I acknowledge Frye’s influence. Northrop Frye, “My father as he slept: tragedy of order,” *Fools of Time: Studies in Shakespearean Tragedy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 3.

discovers her not long after discussing the merits of middle status woman—daughters of men of fourth or fifth rank—with his friends.⁴ Sama no Kami tells him, “Anyway, the really fascinating girl is the one of whom no one has ever heard, the strangely appealing one who lives by herself, hidden away in some ruinous, overgrown old house.”⁵ At this point, Genji is still relatively naïve and is greatly impressed by the thought that wonderful women might exist in a place he had never considered. By no coincidence, with this advice, Genji soon finds Yugao in an old house in the Fifth Ward. Only after her death does he discover that she actually was the daughter of a senior noble. Yugao appears to be of nobility, whereas her residence tells Genji otherwise. In the end, since he cannot assign her a class, Genji has to decide whether or not to love Yugao independently of the official hierarchy. Because of Yugao, Genji learns that unsanctioned romances can fill the emotional gap left by his loveless political marriage to Aoi.

Yugao, unafraid of the future, chooses when she has a lover. She has the courage to forsake a comfortable life with To no Chujo two years earlier, and runs away with their daughter, leaving Yugao without support from either parents or lover. When she believes To no Chujo has returned, Yugao violates proprieties of the time by sending the first letter.⁶ When she realizes her mistake, that To no Chujo is actually Genji, Yugao surrenders to Genji’s charm. The attraction becomes overwhelming: “She found him handsomer than her poem suggested, indeed frighteningly handsome, given the setting.”⁷ The situation is entirely surreal: Genji conceals both his name and rank; they meet by a case of mistaken identity; and, a courtier like Genji has no reason to stop by a middle-class house and fall deeply in love. Yugao, who controls the direction of her relationship with To no Chujo, can no longer maintain the upper hand in her relationship with Genji. Nevertheless, she plays the role of the wooer in this relationship,

and does not give thought to the long-term implications of the affair.⁸

Tragically, a murderous spirit cuts the relationship short. We never learn what might have happened to Yugao once passion receded from her relationship with Genji. Even so, there is reason to believe that she would have won treatment worthy of the finest women. After Genji sets up his Rokujo estate, “Ukon could only think with regret that if her own lady had lived she would now be honored with treatment similar at least to that accorded the Akashi lady.”⁹ Since Yugao is of higher birth than Lady Akashi, Ukon believes that Yugao would have been one of Genji’s principal wives. After all, even Hanachiru Sato, for whom Genji never feels strongly, lives in her own quarter of Rokujo-in and receives the east lodge at Nijo when Genji dies.¹⁰ It is significant that Genji assigns Ukon to serve Murasaki, his principal wife. Ukon is a living memento of Yugao. Genji’s principal wife would undoubtedly receive his favorite serving lady, indicating that Yugao remains dear to Genji even after her death.

Even though her entire story is enveloped by passion, Yugao establishes a promising future as well. Tamakazura, the daughter she leaves behind, is a legacy of which she can be proud. News of Tamakazura’s existence is enough to stop the flow of the novel and threatens the stability of both Rokujo-in and the court, since nearly every man becomes consumed by thoughts of her. Hence, the eight chapters that follow her discovery are commonly dubbed the “Tamakazura chapters.” Tamakazura ends up as the favorite wife of Higeuro, the third most powerful man in the country. She holds the position of Wardress of the Ladies’ Apartments, which is remarkable for someone who was nearly lost in Kyushu.¹¹

There is also reason to believe that Yugao was on the way to a life of religion. Genji Monogatari is full of parallels and strange coincidences. Not surprisingly, Yugao’s life

⁴ Ibid. 23.

⁵ Ibid. 24.

⁶ Doris G. Barga, *A Woman’s Weapon: Spirit Possession in the Tale of Genji* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997) 33, Seidensticker, *The Tale of Genji* 59.

⁷ Seidensticker, *The Tale of Genji* 70.

⁸ A portion of the above is from my essay on the portrayal of Yugao in Noh entitled “Yugao.”

⁹ Seidensticker, *The Tale of Genji* 387.

¹⁰ Ibid. 736.

¹¹ Ibid. 488. Spending a long period of time in a rural area such as Kyushu was believed to make someone boorish and unfit for the refinements of the capital.

could easily lead into that of Ukifune. In all likelihood, since few of Genji's affairs remain private, To no Chujo would have found out about Yugao. The resulting rivalry might have affected Yugao much as the Kaoru-Niou affair changed Ukifune. Also, before meeting Genji, Yugao attempts to separate herself from the world; according to Ukon, when Yugao flees To no Chujo's wife, she wants to run off to the hills and presumably take religious vows. We can only speculate as to what would have come of Yugao if she had lived, but the above is strong evidence that her life was more than a tragedy.

Thus, as the woman who teaches Genji about love free from social obligations, Yugao is arguably Genji's greatest affair before Murasaki becomes his unchallenged wife. During this time, Genji has numerous lovers. However, Yugao even manages to divert Genji's affections away from the immaculate Rokujo Lady, and makes him temporarily forget about Fujitsubo. Yugao is vital to the story because she causes Genji to associate lower-ranking women with true love. Evidence of this is that fact that his relationships with Lady Rokujo, Fujitsubo, Asagao, and Aoi are ultimately disastrous, yet Genji remembers Yugao fondly for the rest of his life. It may have seemed unrealistic to women of the Heian era, but Yugao does not worry about her economic security and follows her impulses. Reckless as her actions might seem, Yugao still bears a successful daughter and seems to have planned a retreat into religion if necessary. The only unattractive element of Yugao's relationship with Genji is that he does not officially recognize Yugao. In the end, however, Genji learns from Yugao to never again hide a woman because of her rank.

Lady Akashi as Aristocratic Wife and Mother

Lady Akashi exemplifies the Heian period gentlewoman. She excels at music, calligraphy, and poetry.¹² Although Lady Akashi is not

Genji's principal wife, she possesses artistic talents worthy of an imperial consort. As far as music is concerned, Genji compares her koto to that of Fujitsubo, who in his mind, is perfect beyond description.¹³ Having mastered more than one instrument, Lady Akashi's dominates the concert at Rokujo-in when playing the biwa. At the concert, "Once the instruments were tuned and the ladies were playing in concert, the biwa rang out with a marvelous skill, superb in touch and limpid in tone, that lifted its music above the rest."¹⁴ The other performers—Murasaki, Onna Sannomiya, and Genji's daughter—are also very good, but they had the benefit of being trained in the capital. On the other hand, Lady Akashi learned to play while in Akashi, and in light of the prejudice against the provinces, contemporary readers must have seen her talents as nothing short of a miracle.¹⁵

Parallels with Lady Rokujo, the paragon of the refined noblewoman, establish Lady Akashi's character. The first time Genji converses with her, he immediately recalls the bearing of Lady Rokujo.¹⁶ Moreover, Lady Rokujo and Lady Akashi are the only women with outstanding calligraphy. Murasaki initially resents Lady Akashi as an unworthy rival, but has no choice but to accept Lady Akashi after seeing her penmanship.¹⁷ In contrast to his behavior towards proud Lady Rokujo, Genji treats Lady Akashi in a manner befitting one of the highest birth. For example, this is how Genji attempts to appease Murasaki's jealousy of Lady Akashi:

"Then there is the lady off in the hills of whom you have such a low opinion. She is more sensitive and accomplished than one might expect from her rank. She demands rather special treatment and so I have chosen to overlook a tendency not to be as aware as she might of her place in the world."¹⁸

¹² Morris, *The World of the Shining Prince* 209.

¹³ Seidensticker, *The Tale of Genji* 266.

¹⁴ Tyler, *The Tale of Genji* 640.

¹⁵ Morris, *The World of the Shining Prince* 81.

¹⁶ Seidensticker, *The Tale of Genji* 263.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 278, 233.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 358. Royall Tyler's translation suggests that Genji speaks of Lady Akashi in a derogatory fashion. I have used Edward Seidensticker's translation here because I believe that Genji uses such language in his effort to convince Murasaki that she still comes first in his affection, not out of sincere disdain for Lady Akashi. Tyler, *The Tale of Genji* 374.

While Genji admits to originally thinking of Lady Akashi as no more than a diversion, he later learns that “on the surface she yields and seems mild, but within she has such imposing dignity that she can be quite forbidding.”¹⁹ Lady Akashi’s nature is such that she commands the highest respect even as the lowest-born woman at Rokujo-in. Therefore, from Genji’s intimate perspective, she strikingly resembles the fearsome Lady Rokujo.

Additionally, contrasts with Murasaki, Genji’s favorite woman, further develop Lady Akashi’s character. Murasaki is nearly the perfect wife aside from two major shortcomings—she sometimes becomes extremely jealous, and she is unable to bear children. Lady Akashi complements Murasaki’s imperfections in many ways. First of all, Lady Akashi is proud to a fault. Even if women of much higher birth covet a relationship with Genji, Lady Akashi refuses to admit it to him, afraid that he will take her lightly on the basis of her rank.²⁰ Genji himself exists both as one meant to “ascend to the highest place and be father to the nation” and as a man of non-imperial status.²¹ Murasaki is his wife for all practical purposes, but she is not quite the aristocrat that Genji’s pseudo-imperial “father to the nation” side demands. Lady Akashi, on the other hand, barely serves in the domestic capacity, but possesses talents that a royal husband requires. As a result of Genji’s dual identity, he needs two women to fulfill the role of his female counterpart. Thus, Lady Akashi wins the spot opposite Murasaki in Genji’s affections.

Lady Akashi’s greatest accomplishment is her daughter. A Heian woman’s child was her key to social and political power, especially in a polygamous marriage where competition between wives could be fierce.²² Although Murasaki resents Genji’s affection for Lady Akashi, once she adopts the Akashi girl, “[her] old bitterness had left her. She had the child, and the account was settled.”²³

Until then, Murasaki, in her inability to have children, had failed as a woman. To make matters worse, Genji needs children for the sake of his political future. After gaining possession of Lady Akashi’s child, Murasaki knows that she no longer needs to worry about being supplanted. Lady Akashi is naturally devastated by the loss of her daughter, but can console herself with the knowledge that she has restored the Akashi family’s status. While her grandfather had been a minister, the political failure of Lady Akashi’s father condemns Lady Akashi to a life in the provinces. Once her daughter becomes a consort, however, the social position of Lady Akashi’s progeny is secure, and her family can now successfully escape from the stigmatized class of provincial governors.

Although Lady Akashi primarily appears in the context of the accomplished woman and the mother, her life is not devoid of romantic desire or religion. In truth, she also plays a part in the courtship love story. When Genji leaves Akashi, “the lady did not want anyone to guess the intensity of her grief . . . His image remained before her, and she seemed capable only of weeping.”²⁴ Lady Akashi generally constrains her emotions because she knows that Genji is more than her status deserves, and wants to hide the fact that she is dependent on his charity. Nonetheless, during her moments of sorrow, we learn how deeply she loves Genji. Toward the end of her story, Lady Akashi unobtrusively withdraws from earthly affairs. This occurs partly because Genji becomes more dependent upon Murasaki as the years pass. Even so, once Lady Akashi knows that her daughter will become empress, she ceases to worry about her background and her daughter—her primary worldly concerns. After witnessing the birth of her imperial grandson, Lady Akashi listens to the advice of her father, now a monk: “Whatever pleasures this life offers, do not forget the life to come.”²⁵ With this advice in mind, Lady Akashi realizes that she has accomplished everything

¹⁹ Tyler, *The Tale of Genji* 646.

²⁰ Seidensticker, *The Tale of Genji* 259.

²¹ *Ibid.* 14.

²² Haruo Shirane, *The Bridge of Dreams: A Poetics of “the Tale of Genji”* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987) 54.

²³ Seidensticker, *The Tale of Genji* 335.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 268.

²⁵ Tyler, *The Tale of Genji* 611.

possible in her life, and turns her thoughts to the next world.²⁶ In accordance with her tendency to avoid ceremony, Lady Akashi does not become a nun. However, her intentions to pray for the next life are no different from the plans of the other nuns in the story.

Ukifune as the Archetypal Nun

Murasaki Shikibu's epic *Genji Monogatari* concludes with the tale of Ukifune. Ukifune, as a woman of no real consequence, holds the unprecedented position of causing a heated rivalry between Kaoru and Niou—the next-generation leaders of Japan. Since Kaoru is To no Chujo's grandson, and Niou is a descendant of Genji, the entire situation is strangely reminiscent of the Yugao affair. When her story begins, Ukifune's trust in herself parallels that of Yugao. Ukifune readily carries on a relationship with Kaoru until she suddenly falls victim to Niou's overpowering charm: "Used to Kaoru's quiet ways, she now found herself with a gentleman who proclaimed himself incapable of tolerating a moment's separation. This must be the sort of thing people meant when they spoke of love."²⁷ Perhaps Ukifune, like other young ladies of Heian Japan, yearns for romance, and equates Niou's poetic speech to love. However, Ukifune is not wholly blinded by her desire for passionate romance. She senses that Niou is more of a lover than a husband, and will one day tire of her. Yet, she is too attached to him to give him up.²⁸

The difference between Ukifune and Yugao is that the former feels personally responsible for her lovers' happiness. Yugao never torments herself over thoughts that her absence makes To no Chujo unhappy. Conversely, Ukifune loves Niou more than Kaoru, but "she could not bring herself to say her final farewells to the man who had so long been her chief source of strength."²⁹ She cannot bear to hurt Kaoru

since he assumes responsibility for her lifelong welfare when she has no one else to provide for her. However, Ukifune is not aware that Kaoru uses her as a substitute for his unattainable first love. Niou, notorious for his weakness for beautiful women, also becomes infatuated by her. All these problems—attractions to appearances, relationships based on passion, and matters of security—stem from worldly matters. In short, everything about her life has only served to make Ukifune unhappy.

Consequently, Ukifune for the first time begins to exercise decisiveness: she makes up her mind to sever all ties with the world through suicide. Although Ukifune fails to kill herself, her plunge into the Uji River dramatically symbolizes the death of the old Ukifune. When she is rescued, Ukifune refuses to allow anyone to announce that she is still alive because it would only defeat the purpose of her effort to escape the past. She instead feigns amnesia:

"I don't want to keep secrets from you," said the girl [to the nun], choking with tears. "But it is all so strange, that I am alive, that you found me where you did, everything. It is all like clinging to something in a dream. Like being born into a different world, I should think. If there are people who worry about me, I cannot remember who they are. I have only you."³⁰

Here, Ukifune lays the foundations for her new life. She dismisses her entire situation as a dream, which echoes the Buddhist doctrine of the impermanence of the world. Moreover, Ukifune vocally denies the existence of her mother, her ladies-in-waiting, and her lovers. In essence, Ukifune has been "born into a different world."

At this point Ukifune makes her second great decision: with a new, more mature outlook on life, she firmly resolves to take religious vows despite everyone's opposition.³¹ She proceeds to shut out

²⁶ Seidensticker, *The Tale of Genji* 580.

²⁷ Seidensticker, *The Tale of Genji* 982.

²⁸ *Ibid.* 996.

²⁹ *Ibid.* 1005.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 1056.

³¹ Haruo Shirane, "Denial of Romance," in *Ukifune: Love in the Tale of Genji*, ed. Andrew Pekarik (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 135.

the world to a greater degree than anyone else in the novel. As Ukifune further separates herself from worldly things, she becomes stronger and more resilient. To begin with, she declines the lesser pleasures of a possible suitor and brightly colored clothing.³² Then, more importantly, Ukifune steadfastly refuses to acknowledge her brother. Once again, she uses the excuse of a failed memory: “I may have known this boy when we were small—but please, I can’t make myself try to remember...I do not know whether my mother is still alive. If she is I might want to see her – but no one else.”³³ While Ukifune recognizes her brother immediately, she hopes that by constantly denying his existence, she will one day convince herself that her former life was not real. Finally, at the end of the *Monogatari*, Ukifune suggests that her mother may no longer be alive. Up until her attempted suicide, Ukifune had been completely dependent upon her mother. Ukifune’s attempted suicide may even be a response to her mother’s comment that she would disown Ukifune if she somehow causes a scandal in the capital.³⁴ Although Ukifune cannot bear to assign her mother to the grave, she does so nonetheless, severing her strongest tie to her old life.

Even though Ukifune does not have the chance to bear children, there is still evidence that she would have made a much better wife than her provincial status suggests. When Kaoru finally gains access to her rooms and decides to teach her to play the koto, he thinks, “Had she been the loud, garrulous sort of provincial, he would have had to give up all thought of making her a substitute for Oigimi.”³⁵ Kaoru imagines that he can shape her into a princess because she naturally has a graceful and quiet demeanor. To a member of the Heian upper nobility like Kaoru, people from the provinces were generally too coarse for city refinements. While it may seem cruel that Kaoru does not believe Ukifune is quite suitable to serve as his wife, it’s important to note

that he distinguishes between the provincial Ukifune and the royal Oigimi based on upbringing rather than on blood line. Within *Genji Monogatari*, Ukifune is another example of a woman who, if not for the uncontrollable factor of parentage, could have found herself at the pinnacle of society.

Conclusion

A young woman is born into a family of the middle rank and lives in an obscure locale. Possessing accomplishments worthy of any noblewoman, she attracts two courtiers of the highest rank and enjoys the ensuing affairs without concern for her own security. She soon bears a beautiful daughter to the better of the two men and moves into his home as one of his favorite ladies. This daughter eventually rises to become empress. With nothing left to accomplish in this life, the woman becomes a nun, immerses herself in the sutras, and attains a new level of inner peace. Thus flows the combined story of Yugao, Lady Akashi, and Ukifune.

All three of these women initially endure a degree suffering. Yugao has only her serving women to support her, while Lady Akashi has an eccentric father who plans to hide her in the provinces until he can make her an unrealistically good marriage. Ukifune is the least favorite daughter of an uncouth governor. Not surprisingly, when dealing with men of near royal standing, the greatest fear of each woman is to be taken lightly as a consequence of her social status. The power of Yugao, Lady Akashi, and Ukifune is that each gradually overcomes social disadvantage in a world that is dominated by members of the highest ranks. A combination of Yugao, Lady Akashi, and Ukifune—the perfect woman—would have seemed beyond the reach of any Heian girl of Murasaki Shikibu’s position. By dividing the ideal woman into three characters, Murasaki Shikibu creates a tale of glory and court romance accessible to the Heian women of middle rank.

³² Earl Miner, “The Heroine: Identity, Recurrence, Destiny,” in *Ukifune: Love in the Tale of Genji*, ed. Andrew Pekarik (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 77.

³³ Seidensticker, *The Tale of Genji* 1088.

³⁴ Ivan Morris and Andrew Pekarik, “Deception and Self-Deception,” in *Ukifune: Love in the Tale of Genji*, ed. Andrew Pekarik (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 147, Seidensticker, *The Tale of Genji* 998.

³⁵ Seidensticker, *The Tale of Genji* 970.

In Search of a New Radical Left:

The Rise and Fall of the *Anpo* Bund, 1955-1960

Kenji Hasegawa

An hour before midnight on May 19, 1960, 500 police officers entered Japan's Diet and physically removed protesting Socialists from the chamber. One hour and six minutes later, Kishi Nobusuke's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) convened a new plenary session and voted for the passage of the revised US-Japan security treaty. With this, the controversial security treaty was set for automatic approval thirty days later, at midnight on June 19. The biggest national crisis in postwar Japan followed this legislative coup. Thousands of outraged protestors continually surrounded the Diet building in protest against Kishi's "undemocratic" act. It is for these post-May 19 protests, where unprecedented numbers of citizens took to the streets to "protect democracy," that the 1960 *Anpo* is most often remembered.

However, for the Bund, a group in search of a new radical left independent of the Japanese Communist Party, the *Anpo* struggle began earlier. Bund leaders Shima Shigeo and Ikuta Koji were members of the radical student movement of the early 1950s. Generally regarded as a "lost generation" betrayed by false promises of an imminent revolution, many of these student radicals grew disillusioned and quit radical activities. Shima and Ikuta were exceptions, continuing to involve themselves in the student movement throughout the 1950s. They established the Bund in December 1958 and gained control over the national student organization *Zengakuren* by the summer of 1959. Soon thereafter in late 1959, the Bund-led *Zengakuren* burst onto the

national scene through their disruptive protests against the security treaty.

Conservative political leaders intent on passing the revised security treaty fearfully eyed these students who threatened to wreak havoc on their plans. The students also drew the ire of established leftist forces, which viewed them as a group of "infantile radicals" that undermined a united anti-*Anpo* campaign. But some were sympathetic to the students. The then-progressive intellectual Shimizu Ikutaro looked back on the *Anpo* protests in September 1960 and criticized the established leftist groups' tempered tactics. Only the *Zengakuren* students seemed sincerely intent on stopping *Anpo* through their radical protests. It thus seemed unfair to Shimizu that these students were being criticized for their feckless behavior. For Shimizu, they were the "unlucky heroes" of the failed *Anpo* struggle.¹

While the young radicals were pilloried by some and praised by others, it was beyond doubt that they mattered. 1960s *Anpo* was the apex of the radical student movement's influence in national politics. Their influence was great, but mixed. On the one hand, their disruptive protests against the security treaty from late 1959 served to attract attention to the issue, thereby laying the basis for the later mass protests that Kishi provoked. On the other hand, their radical tactics further divided an already fractured leftist coalition against the security treaty. In addition, their bloody clashes with the police struck fear in the hearts of many, likely contributing to the nation's eager embrace of political consensus after *Anpo*. While the Bund burst onto the national scene

¹ Shimizu Ikutaro, "Anpo senso no 'fuko na shuyaku'," *Chuo Koron*, September 1960, p.178-189.

in late 1959, they retreated just as abruptly in less than a year. As the *Anpo* struggle ended with automatic ratification on June 19, the Bund dissolved into conflicting factions and Shimizu's "unlucky heroes" quickly exited from the national political stage.

Why did the radical students establish the Bund? What did they hope to achieve? What defined the Bund and set it apart from other leftist groups? How and why did the Bund protest against *Anpo*? Why did it dissolve so quickly after the protests? The answers to these questions will help us situate the Bund in the postwar student movement, as well as in the 1960 *Anpo* protests.

Rokuzenkyo and Disillusionment with the Communist Party

In the immediate postwar era, the Japanese Communist Party attracted many youths distrustful of authority. They knew by observing the world around them that adults, especially teachers, could not be trusted. Growing up in the late 1940s, Ono Akio often went to the library and devoured books with wartime "not to be read" signs on them. This was how he learned about the Communist Party, a group whose members had been imprisoned during the war for being staunch opponents of the war. Ono discovered the Communist Party and actively sought them out. He joined the party on his eighteenth birthday and became a *Zengakuren* leader in the early 1950s.²

One sees a similar pattern with Bund leader Ikuta Koji. Ikuta started to become an active communist in high school. According to a friend, leftist thought replaced baseball as Ikuta's favorite topic of conversation in high school. He would lend friends revolutionary literature then later ask them, "How was it? Wasn't it good?" His enthusiasm for Nikolaj Ostrovskij's *How the Steel was Tempered* was especially well-known among his friends, and there were not few who were "pretty much forced to read it."³

By the time Ikuta entered high school in 1949, the reverse course of the American occupation was in full swing. The outbreak of the Korean War the following year became a topic of heated discussion among high school students, especially among members of the debating club that Ikuta joined his freshman year. A debater with a Communist older brother proposed that they look not only at "bourgeois newspapers" but also the Communists' opinion. The debating club members agreed and some of them visited the Communist Party office. This was Ikuta's first contact with the Communist Party. It did not take long for the debating club to conclude that the war was American aggression.⁴ In the course of debating the causes of the Korean War, the debating club started reading *The Communist Manifesto*, and later adopted Stalin's *The Basics of Leninism* as their textbook.

In October 1950, the main members of the debating club joined the Communist Party's youth group (*Minshu Seinendan*). Four months later, Ikuta joined the Communist Party along with debating club *senpai* Shiratori Kazuyoshi. Shiratori, determined to become a professional revolutionary, grew disillusioned with formal education and quit school his senior year. Ikuta, on the other hand, became senior class president. His father died in 1950, but his older brother took over the family business and assured him financial support for a national university. Ikuta thus scaled back his Party-related activities toward the end of his senior year and started studying intensively in order to get into Tokyo University (Todai). He graduated from Shizuoka Jonai High School as valedictorian and entered Todai in the spring of 1952. The morning after graduation, no longer under the threat of expulsion, Ikuta was handing out leftist pamphlets to younger students outside the school gate. Upon entering Todai, he became a leader of the Communist Party's military organization. These were physically trying times for Ikuta: friends remember him becoming emaciated and reeking from lack of nutrition and bathing.⁵ Ikuta participated in the

² Ono Akio. *Zengakuren*. Tokyo, 1969. 306.

³ Ikuta fusai tsuito kinen bunshu kankokai. *Ikuta fusai tsuito kinen bunshu*. Tokyo, 1967, 66.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.77.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p.472.

Communist Party's "Molotov cocktail struggles" of the early 1950s until the party abruptly abandoned its violent tactics in 1955.

On July 28, 1955, the Japanese Communist Party held the Sixth National Party Congress (*Rokuzenkyo*), where the party leadership conducted a self-criticism of the party's violent tactics. The party leaders saw their past tactics as "leftist adventurism," based on the mistaken assumption that Japan was ripe for revolution. On the contrary, they now thought that reactionary forces were firmly entrenched. The Communist party needed to stop alienating the majority of Japanese people through their violence and build a wider support base.⁶

Morita Minoru, the Communist Party's *Todai* cell representative, was charged with reporting the *Rokuzenkyo* decisions to *Todai* party members. Morita remembers that student activists were shocked when he reported the party's self-criticism. Many student party members had been expelled from school or even disowned from their families by devoting themselves to the party's extremist activities. Given their sacrifices, the students felt betrayed. The future Bund leader Shima Shigeo was incensed. "What have I been doing these past five years?" he shouted angrily. "Was my self-criticism for factionalism also a mistake? What is right?"⁷

Confusion and anomie reigned among Communist activists in the aftermath of the Sixth Party Congress. It was the end of the "dark valley" of the postwar student movement characterized by ascetic lifestyles, internal spy-hunting, and military preparations for an imminent revolution. *Rokuzenkyo* signified the bankruptcy of the armed struggle tactics of the early 1950s. For the Communist Party's military organizations, it was the inglorious end to a misguided and meaningless struggle. Similar to what happened on a national level after August 1945, the issue of responsibility

and victim consciousness came to the fore. "*Rokuzenkyo* novels" about the wasted youth of student Communists proliferated.⁸ One such novel was Shibata Sho's best-selling *Saredo wareraga hibi*. It portrays the aftermath of *Rokuzenkyo* in the following passage:

But there was no revolution. The following summer, the long confusion over party policy ended. The military organization was dismantled, and we returned to our schools.

In the midst of our confusion after the directive, the debates that outlasted the night over the not-to-be-criticized directive, the exhaustion and despair that followed, cloudy days, the smoke of burning documents from a small valley in the mountains, under the summer's sun, the smell of moist, shiny, newly dug up red soil, the old infantry rifles and *gobo ken* buried one after another in that soil, the various incidents that occurred among the humans there, the incidents that one never wishes to tell outsiders, in the midst of all this, I alone could not take any interest in anything but myself, and continued against my will to think, this is a happy thing, this is a happy thing.⁹

An anonymous opinion piece published in the *Todai* student newspaper conveys the sense of disillusionment and anger toward the Communist Party's mistreatment of its party members in the wake of *Rokuzenkyo*. Many people were driven to suicide as a result of the party's internal persecution. But this remained a neglected story. People, least of all the Communist Party leadership, did not seem to care about these tragic deaths. The author thus made a "proposal" in the form of the following poem:

Japanese Communist Party,
Conduct a body count

⁶ Scalapino, Robert. *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966*. Berkeley, 1967, p.88-96. Kobayashi Yoshiaki. *Sengo kakumei undo ronsoshi*. Tokyo, 1972, 109-116.

⁷ Shima Shigeo was forced to conduct a self-criticism because he entered the International Faction of the Communist Party in 1950. As a former International Faction member, he was subjected to discrimination as a former "factionalist" despite his self-criticism. This no doubt added to his disillusionment with the Communist Party leadership. Nishibe Susumu. *60 nen anpo senchimentaru jani*. Tokyo, 1986, 131.

⁸ Muto Kazuhiro, "Gakusei undo no 'chusei' to 'runessansu'," in Shiryō Sengo Gakusei Undo Geppo 3.

⁹ Cited in Ono Akio, *Zengakuren keppuroku*, Tokyo, 1967, 163.

And lay the dead to rest with care in a
communal grave
You can put politics aside for a while
Conduct a body count
Lay the dead to rest with care in a
communal grave
Central Committee,
District Committee,
With your own hands take a plow and dig
Dig a hole
Set up a grave-post
—If you cannot do this—
Non-communists
Us
For the dead
For us
Is it all right to be silent
They are idiotic
Is it all right to make this a sign of our
own idiocy¹⁰

As a result of *Rokuzenkyo*, the Communist Party's military organizations were dismantled, leaving many young activists abandoned. Student Communists found the party leadership's cavalier attitude in the wake of *Rokuzenkyo* unbearable. "Give me back my youth!" cried some devastated young radicals. But Ikuta was disgusted by those who ruefully mourned their wasted youth. "I don't have any regrets. I entered the Communist Party on my own volition!" he said. "I'm in no position to complain." But there was no doubt that *Rokuzenkyo* had a profound effect on Ikuta. With *Rokuzenkyo*, Ikuta's search for a new radical left independent of the Communist Party began.¹¹

The Post-*Rokuzenkyo* Student Movement: Affirming Radical Struggle

The post-*Rokuzenkyo* student movement shifted toward more "loveable" tactics. At the Seventh Central Conference, the *Zengakuren* leaders lamented that the student movement had lost touch with the students. Student leaders had

tried to use student demands and activities for political purposes, instead of "trying to realize student demands as they were."¹² Baseball and softball games, boat races, festivals, song and dance became important activities for building solidarity among students. As part of the *Zengakuren*'s new policy of deepening ties with other students, student activists were encouraged to attend classes and talk with non-activist students.¹³ Talking about "problems of love" was considered a mission: If a party member succeeded in making another student talk about such intimate matters, he had scored a victory toward gaining the trust of the student "masses."¹⁴ The Seventh Conference closed with the following exhortation:

However dark and painful our life today may be, we must strongly unite as one, help each other, deepen our friendship, overcome adversity and continue studying. For the enjoyment of culture and sports, for a more cheerful and rich life, and for peace without which they would not be possible, let us unite and continue trying.... Let us strongly hold hands and march forward!

Some student activists were critical of the shift toward "loveable" tactics. One sees this in Oshima Nagisa's 1960 film *Nihon no yoru to kiri*. In the film, disgruntled student activists question how dancing with girls could lead to revolution.¹⁵ Shima and Ikuta must have had similar doubts. As the following exchange in the *Zengakuren* Seventh Committee shows, their *Today* cell refused to embrace "festivalism."

Central Committee: [Today] student leaders are working hard, but they are unapproachable. I think that the basic problem is that student leaders need to stand on the same ground as students and think together with them.

Today Bungakubu: There is a problem in what you just said.... [You] are still talking about

¹⁰ Tokyo Daigaku Gakusei Shinbun, October 8, 1956, 1.

¹¹ Ikuta, 69, 472.

¹² Shiryō sengo gakusei undo, v.3, 474.

¹³ Shiryō sengo gakusei undo, v.3, 453.

¹⁴ Morita Minoru, *Sengo sayoku no himitsu*, Tokyo, 1980, 96.

¹⁵ In one scene, the folk dance party sponsored by the Communist Party ends and a Communist leader exhorts, "Let us fight energetically again tomorrow!" *Nihon no yoru to kiri* was released on October 9, 1960, then banned three days later when Socialist leader Asanuma Inejiro was assassinated. Oshima Nagisa, *Nihon no yoru to kiri*, Tokyo, 1966, 380.

how to make the student government closer to the students, or to stand on the same ground with the students. *The improvement of our activities is not a means of attracting everybody.*¹⁶

The choice between “loveable” tactics and a more confrontational style was a major point of contention in the post-*Rokuzenkyo* student movement. With protests over the university tuition raise in 1955 and over the Sunagawa land surveys the following year, the student movement moved away from “festivalism” and toward “radical struggle.”

In December 1955, the government proposed a national university tuition hike. Coming at a time when student leaders critical of “festivalism” were searching for ways to rebuild their movement, the tuition hike provocation was for them a welcome source of energy. The January 1, 1956 *Todai* cell newsletter published the rumor that the organization of private university managers announced, “If we are going to raise tuition, now, when the students are stagnant, is the right time.” According to the newsletter, the tuition hike was more than “simply an economic problem.” Rather, it was linked to changes in education policy and the reactionary trend in national politics.¹⁷ A fearful Ministry of Education opposed “unnecessary tuition hikes which may stimulate the student movement,” but to no avail. For Shima and Ikuta, the tuition hike issue was a gift: it was a well-timed, politically contentious issue that directly affected students. The protests succeeded, and student leaders critical of “festivalism” grew confident that they could overcome the party’s “backward” leadership and revive the student movement.

Another important event in the wake of *Rokuzenkyo* was the Sunagawa struggle. In mid-1955, the Japanese government began a land survey in Sunagawa, a small village bordering Tachikawa Air Base, an American air transport center. The purpose of the survey was to prepare

for the extension of the base’s runway. In autumn 1955, following an initial wave of protests, Socialist representative Kato Kanju and the LDP government agreed to cancel the *Sohyo*’s (General Council of Japanese Trade Unions) mass mobilization to Sunagawa in exchange for a temporary halt of the survey. The local opposition group felt betrayed by this deal. Eager to break their reliance on the Socialists and *Sohyo*, the local opposition group approached *Zengakuren* in the fall of 1956 when the Hatoyama cabinet announced plans to resume the surveys.¹⁸ The *Zengakuren* responded with alacrity. They set up a local struggle headquarters in Sunagawa, and from October 1, they mobilized from 700 to 2000 students each day. On October 12 and 13, students clashed physically with surveyors and police, leading to 500 injured and 4 arrests.¹⁹

The Sunagawa struggle anticipated the confrontational style of the *Anpo* protests. Like *Anpo*, Sunagawa also attracted widespread media attention, facilitating mass student mobilization. Timing and location helped too, as students had just finished the September exams and Sunagawa was easily accessible by bus. Morita Minoru, the *Zengakuren*’s peace group leader (*heiwa bucho*), led the student mobilization. He sent Sunagawa-bound buses to college campuses. On the way to Sunagawa, Morita spoke to the passengers through the bus guide microphone to harden their resolve. At thirty-minute intervals, the buses stopped and Morita changed buses for another agitation speech. He told the students that Sunagawa was going to become a nuclear base. The government had to be stopped at all costs: it was ignoring the constitution and trampling on the rights of local farmers.

Ikuta led one of the three groups of students that occupied strategic locations around the base. Many students spent the nights in local houses and schools, and Sunagawa came to resemble a communal boot camp. Students woke up to the *rajio taiso* (radio calisthenics) and prepared for physical clashes with the police during the day.

¹⁶ Shiryo sengo gakusei undo, v.3, 469.

¹⁷ Shiryo sengo gakusei undo, v.4, 3-8.

¹⁸ Morita, 130-132.

¹⁹ Koan chosacho, *Sengo gakusei undoshi*, March 1966, 65-66.

Like the *Anpo* protests, their style of confrontation was physical but mainly non-violent. Students wore a straw bag around their stomachs for protection against police batons, but most students did not wear helmets or carry weapons.

The first clash came on October 12. The police attacked the protesters, attempting to break up the crowd by removing each individual protester and physically pushing them away from the group through a tunnel lined by police officers. But some determined students returned to the rear of the crowd to be “tunneled” multiple times. On October 13, the police stepped up the assault, and the number of injured protestors mounted. In a much-romanticized episode, a chorus of “Akatonbo” arose from the protestors. According to Morita, students sang to keep their spirits up. At first they sang revolutionary songs, but not many students knew them. They thus switched to “Akatonbo,” which everybody knew. On October 14, the police and survey team did not come. The following day, the government announced its decision to cancel the surveys, giving rise to euphoric celebration by the protestors.²⁰

Sunagawa was a powerful experience for many participants. A student protestor from Ochanomizu Women’s University described her experience as follows:

For the half a year that I had been in college, everything was vague, I did not feel alive, I could not figure out what I was nor should be, and each day was stifling and frustrating.... “Sunagawa” was in the news almost every day. The student government was appealing, “The expansion of Sunagawa is the first step toward making Japan a base for atomic and hydrogen bombs, and will threaten Japan’s peace. We wish for peace. Let us go to Sunagawa to protect Japan’s peace...” I felt no resistance to this logic, and to participate seemed to me a very natural thing.

She did not participate as a member of her student government, but rather went to Sunagawa

with a friend from high school. There was “something casual” about her actions, but once in Sunagawa, she was overcome by intense anger.

The yam farms interspersed with old thatched-roofed houses ended with one metal fence. On the other side, a perfectly flat airfield extended itself with infinite vastness and arrogance... When I saw this for the first time... And when the American plane flew in low trying to disperse us, violently blowing up dust, I lay low in the ditch amidst the suffocating sandstorm and heard the student government flag snap. When I heard this, I felt for the first time an anger bordering on madness... piercing through me.²¹

Another protestor influenced by Sunagawa was Karoji Kentaro, president of the *Zengakuren* at the time of the *Anpo* protests. In 1956 he was a freshman at Hokkaido University working part-time in a factory. Karoji joined the Sunagawa protests with his co-workers, and later told Morita that he entered the student movement as a result of his experience there.²²

Breaking with the Communist Party, 1957-1958

Tension rose between Mainstream *Zengakuren* leaders and the Communist party in the aftermath of the Sunagawa protests. The faction loyal to the Communist Party, led by Waseda University’s Takano Hideo, downplayed the effectiveness of the protests. According to the Takano faction, the real reasons for the government’s cancellation of the Sunagawa expansion were not the protests, but rather the increasing conflict between Japanese monopoly capitalists and the U.S., the global trend toward peace, and domestic public opinion. They called for a turn toward “economic struggles” instead of “political struggles” like Sunagawa. Shima, Ikuta, and the mainstream *Zengakuren* leaders thought this was nonsense.

²⁰ Morita, 130-145.

²¹ Matsushita Minako, “‘Heiwa’ e no shiko wo kizamareta Sunagawa jiken,” *Asahi janaru*, December 20, 1959, 6-18.

²² Morita, 142.

The conflict between the Takano and mainstream factions erupted in the Tenth *Zengakuren* Central Conference held in January 1957. For the mainstream faction, the international situation called for urgent action, as imperialists were preparing for anti-revolutionary warfare in former colonies. Without a “vigorous class struggle” against the imperialists, lasting peace was not possible. By contrast, the Takano faction thought the imperialists were on the defensive. They should struggle for peace by “containing imperialism,” but above all they needed to gain the widespread support of the Japanese people. The Conference ended with the mainstream faction in control. As a result, the *Zengakuren*’s activities in 1957 were marked by active participation in protests against rearmament.²³

Toward the end of 1957, Ikuta was working toward the publication of the New Year’s issue of *Marukusu Lenin Shugi*, the *Todai* cell newsletter distributed independently from the Communist Party’s central leadership. The issue started with a New Year’s appeal by Ikuta, a forceful affirmation of the *Zengakuren*’s political activities of 1957. Ikuta applauded *Todai* student activists who had “fought valiantly without fear of suppression,” and stressed the importance of class struggle. “As a member of the organized vanguard of the working class,” he wrote, “our cell will fight...for the... forceful advancement of the student movement, and the struggle...against international imperialists and especially Japanese monopoly capital.”²⁴ This emphasis on the class struggle contrasted with the Communist Party’s focus on American imperialism. Although outright cooperation with the “big bourgeoisie” was out of the question, the Communist Party thought it was possible to “separate the big bourgeoisie dissatisfied with occupation policy from the pro-American, traitorous bourgeoisie, or to neutralize them.”²⁵

Another divergence from the Communist Party concerned the evaluation of the international

situation. For the Communist Party, the rise of revolutionary national independence movements and the relaxing of Cold War tensions called for more moderate tactics. Ikuta, by contrast, thought the world proletariat should follow the inexorable tide of history by defeating the imperialists and establishing a classless society. In order to protect peace, what was necessary above all was “to organize an uncompromising struggle, with the world’s proletariat at the center, against imperialists.” The party needed to overcome its mistaken moderation by conducting a “truly Bolshevik self-criticism” at the Seventh Party Congress. Ikuta’s closing statement included a phrase then prohibited by the Communist Party: “Long live the victory of proletariat world revolution!”²⁶

In the same issue of *Marukusu Lenin Shugi*, Yamaguchi Kazumasa wrote the influential essay “The Road of the October Revolution and Our Road.” In this essay, Yamaguchi denounced the Party’s pro-SCAP stance in the immediate postwar era. Even after the cancellation of the 1947 General Strike and the announcement of the Marshall Plan had revealed “the real intentions of American imperialists,” party leader Nosaka Sanzo stuck to moderate tactics. This diverted energy from “the class struggle whose showdown was approaching on the international level.” The same criticism was directed toward the party’s post-1950 policies. After an ineffectual period of guerilla tactics, the party leaders dissolved the proletariat’s vanguard forces under the “empty slogan of ‘the enemy is superior, we are inferior in strength’.” Yamaguchi concluded that a revival of Leninist international class struggle was necessary.²⁷

Student radicals intensified their theoretical offensive against the Communist Party. At the Eleventh *Zengakuren* Central Conference of May 1958, the final clash between the mainstream and Takano factions occurred, and the radical mainstream faction expelled Takano’s “right-wing opposition

²³ Koanchosacho, “Sengo gakusei undoshi,” 68-70.

²⁴ Ikuta, 352-354.

²⁵ Kobayashi, 111.

²⁶ Ikuta, 354-359.

²⁷ *Kisetsu henshu iinkai ed. Mikan no ishi*. Tokyo, 1985 133-162; Kurata Keisei, *Anpo zengakuren*, Tokyo, 1969, p.38; Kobayashi, 143-146.

faction” from the *Zengakuren*.²⁸ It was at this point that the Communist Party intervened to regain control over the student movement.

On June 1, the Party Headquarters convened a meeting between party leaders and the representatives of *Zengakuren*. The party intended to bring the students into line, but the students intended to rebel. A verbal confrontation between angry students and party leaders was followed by a physical scuffle. When *Akahata* later denounced the students, they grew even angrier. According to *Akahata*, the meeting was marked from the start by dissent. Students insisted that a student should chair the meeting but the party leaders refused. The students reacted violently, denouncing the leaders as class traitors and physically attacking a party leader. The meeting was adjourned, but the students prevented the party members from leaving the room and continued the meeting. They demanded that the meeting be officially recognized. They then shouted, “Student party members, join the *Zengakuren* Central Committee group,” and left the party building. All decisions made during the unfortunate meeting, *Akahata* announced, were void.²⁹ According to Morita, the students were angered by the Communist Party’s efforts to divide the *Zengakuren*. The meeting, moreover, was made official by Konno Yojiro, the top authority present. For this, Konno was severely chastised by party head Miyamoto Kenji and “banished” to Tohoku as punishment.³⁰

The June 1 Incident shocked Ikuta. A fellow activist who visited Ikuta following the incident remembered him repeating angrily, “There is no more hope for the Communist Party.” He was convinced that the students themselves needed to establish a new party. The skeptical activist told Ikuta that establishing a new party was unrealistic, but the undaunted Ikuta responded, “I don’t know

what you think, but I guarantee it. In five years there will be a revolution in Japan!”³¹

The final break with the Communist Party came after the Seventh Party Congress of July 1958. Shima and Ikuta attended the Congress for a final attempt to confront the Party leadership and force change from within. As they failed and the Congress ended with the party leadership “shamelessly unrepentant,” the two radicals gave up what little hope they had of the party’s “revolutionary revival.”³²

Shima and Ikuta quickly started to organize their new party. From September 1958, they started distributing the clandestine newsletter *Puroretaria tsushin*, calling on disgruntled student party members to join their faction. In his essay in the October 28 issue of the *Tsushin*, Shima emphasized that the “student movement’s turning point” was at hand.³³ But he thought two groups were preventing the student movement’s success. One of these groups was the Communist Party; the students needed to check the party’s divisive “nasty scheming.”³⁴ The other group was the theoretically minded student activists who occupied themselves with “empty revolutionary slogans.”³⁵ Clearly Shima’s break with the Communist Party was nearing; the break with “empty slogans” would come later in another factional conflict.

Just as Shima and Ikuta started moving toward independence from the Communist Party in the winter of 1958, mass protests erupted over Kishi’s attempt to revise the Police Bill.³⁶ This controversy occurred as the Kishi administration accelerated preparations for the revised security treaty and can be considered, in George Packard’s words, the “dress rehearsal” for the 1960 protests.³⁷ The protests were directed against the Kishi administration’s initiative to expand the

²⁸ Kurata, p.40; Kobayashi, 152.

²⁹ “Zengakuren taikai daigiin gurupu kaigi no fushoji ni tsuite.” *Akahata*, June 5, 1958.

³⁰ Morita, 180-183.

³¹ Ikuta, 106-107.

³² Ikuta, 201-202, 478.

³³ *Shiryō sengo gakusei undo*, v.4, 419.

³⁴ *Shiryō sengo gakusei undo*, v.4, 424.

³⁵ *Shiryō sengo gakusei undo*, v.4, 430.

³⁶ In another case of remarkable timing, Ikuta fell ill with an acute case of hemorrhoids and retreated to a hospital in Shizuoka, not to return to Tokyo until March 1959. He was thus removed from the Bund’s founding and its early development, but remained in contact with Shima.

³⁷ Packard, George, *Protest in Tokyo*. Princeton, 1966, 101.

prerogatives of the police. Widespread protests over what people viewed as “undemocratic” legislative maneuvers by Kishi were further fueled by memories of the wartime police state, of which Kishi himself had been a prime member. The younger generation with no direct experience of wartime repression also joined in protest against the bill which, as one popular weekly magazine warned, would “get in the way of dating.”³⁸

The protests forced Kishi to shelf the bill. The leftist opposition gained confidence in their ability to disrupt Kishi’s reactionary program. But Shima focused on the established leftist leadership’s incompetence that surfaced in the course of the protests. The Police Bill controversy, Shima explained in an interview in 1960, occurred when leftist forces were stagnant. But with Kishi’s move to revise the Police Bill, a storm of mass protests erupted. The peak of the protests came in early November, when Kishi unexpectedly extended the Diet session. At this crucial moment, Shima raged, the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and *Sohyo* failed to harness the mass’s energy, instead turning toward moderate tactics and playing into the conservatives’ hands. These established leftist groups were insufficiently radical “opportunists” and could not be considered the “working class’s party.”³⁹ As the Police Bill controversy subsided in late November, Shima and the radical students were finalizing preparations for the establishment of their own radical leftist party.

On December 10, 1958, forty-five students gathered in Kuromoncho, Tokyo, for the founding ceremony of their new organization. The ceremony opened with Shima’s speech, followed by a critique of the existing international

communist movement by the young Todai radical Aoki Masahiko (aka Himeoka Reiji). The proposal to establish a new organization was subsequently approved unanimously. The name of the group was, following Karl Marx’s first organization, the Communist League (*Kyosanshugisha domei*), or, in the pithier German version, the Bund. The ceremony did not end with mere formalities, as factional politics and conflicts over personnel quickly surfaced. In the preparatory meeting held the night before the ceremony, even the post of Chief Secretary seemed uncertain. One member commented that, of course, Shima should occupy the post, but Shima balked. Shima said he needed to first carefully consider accepting such heavy responsibility before accepting the post the following day.⁴⁰ “I still cannot forget that night’s heavy atmosphere,” wrote a Bund member present at the meeting.⁴¹

The real problem over personnel concerned *Kakukyodo* (Revolutionary Communist League), a Trotskyist group critical of the Communist Party uniting under the Fourth International. “Trotskyist” was the Communist Party’s vituperative label for factionalists. Despite the party’s move away from rigid Stalinism, Trotsky’s works remained taboo. But it was this very nature of Trotsky’s works that appealed to Bund leaders. In 1960, Shima explained in an interview that while the party denounced the Bund as “Trotskyists,” Bund members wore the label proudly.⁴²

While contrarian Trotskyist theories and *Kakukyodo* influence aided the Bund’s move away from the Communist Party, Bund leaders also increasingly distinguished themselves from the *Kakukyodo*’s “dogmatic” Trotskyism.⁴³ Ikuta

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³⁸ Kowada Jiro and Osawa Shinichiro, *Sokatsu Anpo hodo*, Tokyo, 1970, 18.

³⁹ “Torottsukiisto to iwaretemo,” *Chuo koron*. April 1960.

⁴⁰ Shima, *Bunto shishi*, 6-57.

⁴¹ Tomioka Masao, “Bunto kessei wo junbi shita mono,” *Shiryō sengo gakusei undo geppo* 4, 4.

⁴² “Torottsukisuto to iwaretemo.”

⁴³ Tomioka, 3.

advised Shima to dissolve the *Kakukyodo* faction. He wanted the Bund to be their own party and did not want to depend on the Fourth International. He thought the *Kakukyodo* members were untrustworthy and should be kept away from important posts.⁴⁴ At the Thirteenth *Zengakuren* Conference held three days after the Bund's founding ceremony, the older Bund leaders including Shima and Morita resigned their posts as student leaders. A struggle between the *Kakukyodo* and Shima's faction resulted in a compromise that left the *Kakukyodo* with substantial influence in the *Zengakuren*.⁴⁵ The conflict between *Kakukyodo* members intent on gaining control over the new organization, and those like Shima and Ikuta determined to expel them, began with the birth of the Bund and lasted until late 1959.

One of the sources of Shima's rebellion against the Communist Party had been its failure to take the students seriously. He did not repeat this mistake. In good *senpai* style, he opened his home to student activists who often came to work and talk late into the night. One of these activists was Karoji Kentaro. Karoji entered Hokkaido University in 1956 and became president of the student government the following year. It was to "seduce" Karoji into heading the *Zengakuren* that Shima traveled to Hokkaido in May 1959. Shima was impressed by Karoji's organizational skills. He was one of the reasons why Hokkaido had become a stronghold for the Bund.⁴⁶ Shima also thought that Karoji had the right looks: he was always smiling and had a rough, "bright sturdiness" about him.⁴⁷

With persistent pleading and some beer, Shima was able to persuade the reluctant activist to move to Tokyo and head the *Zengakuren*. At the Fourteenth Conference held in June 1959, the Bund gained control over the *Zengakuren* leadership. With the twenty-two year old Karoji as president, the executive leadership included

young Bund members like Aoki Masahiko and Shimizu Takeo. Their average age was under twenty-one, the youngest leadership since the founding of the *Zengakuren*.⁴⁸

Four Ideas that Defined the Bund

Factional struggles against the Communist Party and the *Kakukyodo* shaped the Bund. The Bund was also influenced by the rapid social changes of late 1950s Japan. What kind of organization resulted from these actions and circumstances? One can gain an understanding of the Bund through four ideas that defined it: "class struggle," "mass struggle," "antiauthority," and "brightness."

Class Struggle. On the theoretical level, the Bund distinguished itself from the Japanese Communist Party by embracing Marxism. The naming of the Bund, as well as their "borrowing" the original Bund's platform at the founding ceremony,⁴⁹ reflected their "back-to-Marxist-basics" approach. The emphasis on class struggle and the denunciation of "loveable" tactics derived from the radical students' critique of the Communist Party leadership. For example, in preparation for the Seventh Party Convention, Ikuta wrote that the Communist Party's nationalistic characterization of Japan as a nation dominated by the United States was wrong: "Today's Japan is clearly a divided, conflicted society, and there is no national interest that transcends class."⁵⁰ The established left's "betrayal" of class struggle became a recurring theme in Bund statements. Thus, while Shima would later claim that he attempted to create a revolutionary movement "freed from Marxism as a rigid monolithic ideology,"⁵¹ the Bund's thought remained heavily Marxist, even more so than the Communist Party. The Bund's understanding of the *Anpo* revision process was a case in point. While the Communist Party emphasized resistance against US imperialism, the Bund was

⁴⁴ Ikuta, 433.

⁴⁵ Shima, p.58. Kobayashi, 190.

⁴⁶ Shima, 83.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 173.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 84.

⁴⁹ Shima Shigeo. *Bunto shishi*. Tokyo, 2001, 63.

⁵⁰ Ikuta, 328.

wary of nationalistic ideologies that lost sight of the centrality of class struggle. They theorized that *Anpo* reflected the resurgence of Japanese monopoly capital and *Japanese imperialism*.

Mass Struggle. Whereas the Bund emphasized “class struggle” to distinguish itself from the Communist Party, it stressed “mass struggle” in its conflict against the *Kakukyodo*. Instead of focusing on the *Anpo* struggle, the *Kakukyodo* wanted to concentrate its energies on the Miike struggles given their stronger class nature.⁵² By contrast, Bund leaders saw in *Anpo* greater potential for radical mass protests and denounced the *Kakukyodo* as “Trotskyist dogmatists.”⁵³ Action in the form of “mass struggle” was the Bund’s *raison d’être*.

Above all, students were the “masses” in the Bund’s “mass struggle.” Shima did not want to downplay the student movement with a narrow conception of “class struggle.” Some radicals were critical of putting too much energy into the student movement, but Shima was wary of a “workers firstism” that undervalued the students. Although the proletariat and the working class remained “sacred” concepts in the Bund, Shima later explained, he knew that workers movements were not always revolutionary. Because of their freedom, students were in a position to readily conduct radical struggles.⁵⁴ Shima’s emphasis on capturing the student masses resembled the Communist Party’s “broad-basism.” But for the Bund, “mass struggle” needed to be based on radical “struggles.” They thus rejected both the *Kakukyodo*’s “leftist sectism” which failed to organize the student masses, as well as the Communist Party’s “opportunism” based on moderate tactics.⁵⁵

Antiauthority. Shima Shigeo explained in an interview with the sociologist Tsurumi Kazuko that he became disrespectful of his teachers in high school. After August 1945, he saw them quickly renounce militarism and embrace “democracy” and also saw them sell products from the school farm on the black market. His father was another authority figure that the disenchanting youngster rejected. Shima opposed the Red Purge as a form of rebellion against his father, who was executing the policy for the conservative government.⁵⁶

Shima was fourteen years old in 1945. Many youths of his generation grew up as patriotic young militarists. Like Shima, they saw their militaristic teachers do an abrupt about-face and learned the sad “truth” about the past war. Sakata Minoru comments that the early teens is a time in psychological development when rebellious tendencies are especially strong. For Shima’s generation, this life stage coincided with their

colossal disillusionment with authority after August 1945. Hence, argues Sakata, this generation lived the postwar era with an unusually strong hostility toward authority.⁵⁷

Shima considered antiauthority the “major rallying point in [the Bund’s] thought.”⁵⁸ The rebellion of radical student protestors in the *Anpo* protests was directed not only against the conservative establishment, but also against the established leftist forces. Ikuta wrote in the founding document of the Bund that they needed to “liberate the proletariat from all illusion concerning the established Communist leadership, construct an independent revolutionary left based on the revival of a truly revolutionary Marxism, and unite the

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⁵¹ Tsurumi Kazuko, *Social Change and the Individual*. Princeton, 1970, 332.

⁵² The strikes at the Miike coal mines occurred contemporaneously with the *Anpo* struggle.

⁵³ *Shiryō sengo gakusei undo*, v.5, p.127. Kobayashi, 202-203.

⁵⁴ Shima, p.82. See also Karoji Kentaro’s explanation in “*Zengakuren no ronri to kodo*,” *Asahi janaru*, 10 December 1959, 10.

⁵⁵ *Shiryō sengo gakusei undo*, v.4, 428-430.

⁵⁶ Tsurumi, 375.

⁵⁷ Sakata Minoru, “Sengo sedai ‘gentaikens’ no keifu,” *Asahi janaru*, October 1, 1980, 143.

⁵⁸ Tsurumi, 332.

revolutionary proletariat under it.”⁵⁹ Rejection of authority led the young Shima and Ikuta to the Communist Party. They subsequently came to regard the Communist Party as the tyrannical authority figure.

Brightness. One cannot capture the essence of the Bund through its theories alone. Its style of protest and the ambience of the organization go further in conveying what the Bund meant for its members. In his interview with Tsurumi Kazuko, Shima described the Bund as a “bright” organization:

At the time of the anti-*Anpo* campaign, the situation in Japan on the whole was not dark and oppressive as it was at the time of the Red Purge. The general atmosphere surrounding us was full of light, and we also felt full of light within ourselves. Our primary motivation was to revive our own humanity. We had been reading Marx’s earlier writings and came to realize that our basic problem was self-renewal, for we had been alienated to such an extent under the capitalist system as to become part of the machine, completely losing our humanity. We feel there is a clear line of demarcation between ourselves and the communists of the prewar days. Their primary motivation was the spirit of martyrdom. They said they were sacrificing themselves for the sake of the proletariat. In contrast, emancipation of ourselves as human beings has become our primary concern since the time of the anti-*Anpo* campaign.⁶⁰

For Shima, much of the “brightness” of the Bund derived from finally breaking with the Japanese Communist Party. From age nineteen to twenty-six, Shima wrote, his life was dark. During this time, his father died, he struggled to survive economically, and he often fell ill. But above all, the Communist Party was the source of his

unhappiness. When they became Bund leaders, Shima and Ikuta could finally criticize all establishment forces without holding back. In contrast to the dark, stifling Communist Party, the Bund was “bright, full of life, and completely free.”⁶¹

Another aspect of the Bund’s “brightness” was the refecation of the times: 1950 and 1960 were different worlds. By the late 1950s, the era of high growth was starting. The spread of popular weekly magazines and compact paperback books, the launching of electric household appliances, and the feverish spread of hoola-hoops and *dakkochan* dolls signaled the arrival of a “consumption revolution.”⁶² Although material affluence was just as much, if not even more, linked to the resurgence of “Japanese monopoly capitalism” as Kishi’s initiative to revise the security treaty, the Bund’s theorists did not reject this new “brightness.” The Bund did not subscribe to a theory of middle-class alienation like some western New Left groups. Late 1950s Japan likely retained sufficient vestiges of widespread poverty to discourage the spread of anti-consumerist ideologies. It is quite possible that the Bund attracted students who tended to embrace wholeheartedly the new “bright” consumer culture. Some critics called Bund radicals “red *kaminarizoku*” and “red *taiyozoku*,”⁶³ epithets suggestive of the convergence of consumerism, counterculture, and the student movement.

As the high growth era started, a new generation of youth was coming of age. Too young to remember August 1945 and educated fully under the “6-3” democratic education system instituted by SCAP in 1947, they can be considered the first purely postwar generation. When the Bund was established, this new generation was entering college. During and after the *Anpo* protests, scholars and government officials showed remarkable concern about this new generation. Was Japan going to be overrun by a new generation of student revolutionaries?

⁵⁹ *Mikan no ishi*, 21.

⁶⁰ Tsurumi, 376.

⁶¹ Shima, p.65; Ikuta, 202.

⁶² This term appeared in the 1959 White Paper on Citizen Life (*Kokumin seikatsu hakusho*). Kishimoto Eitaro ed., *Gendai no howaito kara*, Kyoto, 1963, 60.

⁶³ *Kaminarizoku* (biker gangs) and *Taiyozoku* (materialistic playboys based on Ishihara Shintaro’s widely read novel *Taiyo no kisetsu*) were two major models of delinquent youths of this period.

The surveys showed that there was no such danger. A survey conducted in Todai's Komaba campus in the wake of the *Anpo* protests revealed that even there, widely considered the center of the radical student movement, a vast majority of students were not sympathetic to *Zengakuren* leaders.⁶⁴ Another 1960 survey in Hosei University vividly showed a new trend in the students' temperament. Asked about how they wished to live their lives, the students' answers were the following:

1. 42.0% Live according to my interests without thinking about money or honor.
2. 20.0% Live each day cheerfully and without worry.
3. 9.7% Overcome the injustices of the world and live justly.
4. 5.0% Devote self fully to the public without thinking about self.
5. 4.2% Work hard and become rich.⁶⁵

Only a few years earlier, the majority of students had chosen number 4 as their answer. Public mindedness was on the decline, *petit bourgeois* mentality on the rise. Other surveys gave a similar picture.⁶⁶ This was clearly not a recipe for a violent student-led revolution.

"Living according to one's interests" did not preclude participation in the Bund-led student movement. According to Eda Satsuki, a member of the purely postwar generation who entered Todai in 1960, participating in student protests left him with ample free time to enjoy fun activities such as *gohai* (co-ed hiking trips) with Tokyo Women's University students.⁶⁷ The Bund was an "open" organization that welcomed the participation of part-time activists like Eda. The "brightness" of the Bund tended to attract students with an outgoing and rowdy temperament. Ozaki Moriteru, a student counselor at Todai, noted the contrasting styles of the two *Zengakuren* meetings

held on July 2, 1960. The Bund-led mainstream faction's meeting was often filled with loud laughter, and he could feel the "young passion" of the students. Guest speakers were invited with the warning that they would be heckled, and indeed, they were subject to a chorus of the then-fashionable "*nansensu!*" and various other jeers. By contrast, the anti-mainstream faction's meeting resembled an academic seminar. The audience was quiet and polite, with many students taking notes. Ozaki also noticed that women students dressed differently. While those attending the mainstream meeting tended to wear stylish one-piece dresses and large straw hats, the dress of those attending the anti-mainstream meeting was more subdued.⁶⁸

"Class struggle," "mass struggle," "antiauthority," and "brightness" defined the Bund, but they hardly constituted a political vision. For this, they needed a platform, which Bund leaders began to draft in June 1959. "There is no vanguard party without a platform," Shima told Bund members.⁶⁹ Ikuta drafted the platform and Bund leaders discussed it for three days. But despite these initial efforts, the platform was never completed.

The Bund was fraught with numerous contradictions that had accumulated in the course of Shima and Ikuta's search for a new radical left. How could the Bund prioritize "class struggle" and world revolution while gaining the support of non-radical student "masses"? How could they maintain their hopes for revolution amidst an incipient "bright" culture of mass consumption that they themselves could not reject? No party platform could have resolved these contradictions. The platform was abandoned because Bund leaders had little to gain and much to lose by obsessing over such irresolvable dilemmas. Theory was subordinate to action for the Bund, and as Kishi pushed ahead with preparations for the security treaty revision in late 1959, the time

⁶⁴ 93.6% of those surveyed answered that they felt either "very distant" or "somewhat distant" from the student leaders. Naikaku kanbo naikaku chosashitsu, *Gendai gakusei no seikatsu to ishiki*, July 1961, 69.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p.45-46.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.38-50.

⁶⁷ Eda Satsuki, *Shuppatsu no tameno memorandum*, Tokyo, 1997, Chapter 3.

⁶⁸ Ozaki Moriteru, *Daisan no sedai*. Kyoto, 1960, 126-127.

⁶⁹ Nagasaki Hiroshi, *Nihon no kagekiha*. Tokyo, 1988, 25.

for action was nearing. In October 1959, Shima gave a stirring speech to Bund members exhorting them to fight the *Anpo* struggle with all their strength.⁷⁰ Within a year of its founding, the contradiction-filled Bund marched headlong into the *Anpo* struggle.

The Bund and the *Anpo* struggle

On a clear late-autumn day, the Bund manufactured the first explosion of the *Anpo* struggle. November 27 was the day of the People's Council's⁷¹ Eighth United Action, a massive petition march on the Diet. On this day, the demonstrations did not end, as previous "united actions" had, with an orderly display of opposition. Already in early November, the Bund leaders had decided to use the November 27 United Action to storm the Diet. On November 16, the *Zengakuren* leadership called on students to "exert [themselves] fully to enter the Diet and pull Kishi out in front of the workers and students."⁷² On the day of the United Action, Bund "action troops" entered the Diet compound and opened the Diet's front gate as the demonstrators approached. Another group led the demonstrators into the Diet compound as if it were the natural course of the march.⁷³ The Bund's plan succeeded. Students and laborers stormed the Diet for the third time since the end of World War II, euphorically snake dancing, rhythmically shouting "*Anpo hantai, Anpo funsai,*" urinating on the Diet wall, and generally savoring the breakthrough moment.

The ensuing Ninth United Action on December 10 was a disappointment for the Bund. The People's Council cancelled their march on the Diet and left the radical students with no opportunities to wreak havoc. Not to be denied, the Bund set its sights on January 16, when Kishi was to fly to Washington for the signing of the revised security treaty. The Kishi administration almost thwarted the Bund's plan by sneaking the Prime Minister out of the country early in the morning before *Zengakuren* demonstrations started. At the last minute,

“ AT THE LAST MINUTE ... THE ZENGAKUREN HASTILY MOBILIZED STUDENTS TO OCCUPY THE HANEDA AIRPORT TERMINAL BUILDING. THE STUDENTS BARRICADED THEMSELVES INSIDE THE BUILDING BUT WERE EVENTUALLY EXPELLED BY POLICE. KISHI DEPARTED FLUSTERED BUT UNHARMED. BUND LEADERS KAROJI, AOKI, IKUTA, AND OVER SEVENTY OTHER STUDENT ACTIVISTS INCLUDING KANBA MICHIKO WERE ARRESTED... ”

however, word leaked of Kishi's early departure time, and the *Zengakuren* hastily mobilized students to occupy the Haneda Airport terminal building. The students barricaded themselves inside the building but were eventually expelled by police. Kishi departed flustered but unharmed. Bund leaders Karoji, Aoki, Ikuta, and over seventy other student

activists including Kanba Michiko were arrested at Haneda. With the majority of its leaders imprisoned, some speculated that the Bund would dissolve. But the *Anpo* issue was starting to attract widespread interest. The Bund stepped up its campaign to "ride the wave" and take the offensive.⁷⁴

By April, the activists arrested at Haneda returned to the Bund. They found that the anti-*Anpo* movement was gaining momentum, as a remarkable range of people began to voice their opposition to *Anpo*. They also drew inspiration from developments in Korea, where on April 19, student demonstrators overthrew the authoritarian President Syngman Rhee. The Bund set its

⁷⁰ Shima, 90-93.

⁷¹ The People's Council (People's Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty) was a *Sohyo*-led coalition of leftist forces.

⁷² Naikaku kanbo naikaku chosashitsu, *Anpo kaitei mondai no kiroku*, December 1961, 493.

⁷³ Morita, 235.

⁷⁴ Packard, p.173-178. Morita, p.248-250. Shima, 99-104.

sights on April 26, the last day that the LDP could force the treaty through the Lower House for automatic ratification by the Upper House. While the People's Council organized a petition drive, the Bund ridiculed their "oshoko demo"⁷⁵ and planned to storm the Diet. The swelling of the *Anpo* wave corresponded with the entrance of a new cohort of impressionable freshmen into universities in early April, and approximately 30,000 students joined the April 26 demonstrations. This was the largest number of student demonstrators since the start of the anti-*Anpo* campaign.⁷⁶

The anti-mainstream *Zengakuren* students marched separately. This division was not new, but tensions were also starting to surface within the Bund. Today Bund members did not want to abruptly plunge young freshmen into radical demonstrations. Convinced that the time was ripe for another explosion, Shima overruled the dissenting Today Bund students and went ahead with plans to storm the Diet. Seeing that the Today members refused to accept his plan, Shima discussed tactics with Karoji and other loyal activists until the dawn of April 26. They decided to urge students on the spot to follow the leaders over the police trucks and into the Diet. As planned, exuberant demonstrators followed student Bund leaders over the barricade into Diet compounds. Shima was so moved by this sight that he "could not hold back tears."⁷⁷ But it was clear that the Bund was beginning to unravel. Disgruntled Today Bund members were determined "not to be arrested in the name of those losers" who were heading the Bund. As Bund leaders scaled the barricade, Today Bund members called on students not to follow them.⁷⁸

The LDP's unilateral approval of the revised treaty on May 19 transformed the anti-*Anpo* movement into a veritable national crisis. From this date, outrage against Kishi's "undemocratic" maneuver came to dominate any reasoned opposition to *Anpo* itself. "I am not about to debate with people supporting *Anpo* right now; there is no time for debating," appealed China scholar Takeuchi Yoshimi. "Let us first rebuild democracy."⁷⁹ Massive demonstrations continually raged around the Diet after May 19. It seemed that the overwhelming rise in "mass energy" that Bund leaders had been waiting for finally became a reality. But by this time, the Bund's end was nearing. "There was no longer any unity, nor were there any prospects for future action," Shima recalls.⁸⁰ The anti-mainstream *Zengakuren* began to adopt a Bund-like style of agitation, its directives emphasizing urgency with a plethora of exclamation points. But this was small consolation for the Bund, who became just another group of angry young demonstrators.

June 15 was the final explosion of the *Anpo* struggle. The two *Zengakuren*s gathered around the Diet along with a motley array of groups including actors, professors, Christians, and right wing youths eager to harass the protestors. Shima arrived early on the scene to survey the police formation on the Diet grounds and told the student leaders to target the South Gate.⁸¹ The mainstream *Zengakuren* group gathered in front of the South Gate around 16:30. The leader then shouted for the rope, but it was nowhere to be found. For about an hour, the students discussed how to break into the Diet. A student leader later explained that this confusion resulted from the lack of a central

⁷⁵ "Oshoko" refers to the act of placing incense and praying at a Buddhist altar.

⁷⁶ There were 20,800 students in the November 27 demonstrations. Koan chosachitsu, December, 1960, *Anpo toso no gaiyo*, 183.

⁷⁷ Shima, 115-116.

⁷⁸ Nishibe Susumu. *60 nen anpo senchimentaru jani*. Tokyo, 1986, p.163. Karoji Kentaro was arrested on April 26. When he left prison in November 1960, he was greeted by representatives from three separate radical student groups. The *Anpo* struggle had ended, and the Bund had dissolved. See Tachibana Takashi, "60 nen anpo eiyu no eiko to hisan," *Bungei shunju*, February 1969, 246.

⁷⁹ Nagasaki, 33-34.

⁸⁰ Ikuta, 207.

⁸¹ Shima, 123.

leadership that looked after the whole.⁸² It was clear that by this time, the Bund leaders were no longer functioning as the planners and coordinators of student protests.

Determined to conduct a “protest meeting” inside the Diet compound, Mainstream *Zengakuren* students started to pry open the South Gate around 17:30 with rhythmic calls of “*yoisho, yoisho.*” An opening appeared, and students started pouring in. A series of violent clashes between students and police ensued. Kanba Michiko was killed and over 1,000 people were injured. As a result of the shocking June 15 incident, Kishi finally gave up hopes for Eisenhower’s visit to Tokyo that had been planned to coincide with the ratification of the new security treaty. The mainstream press called for the restoration of order. “Expel violence and protect parliamentarism,” proclaimed the June 17 front-page joint statement by the seven major newspapers.

On June 18, with the revised security treaty’s automatic ratification imminent, over 80,000 student protestors gathered around the Diet.⁸³ But the Bund was powerless. Only a few Bund members attended when Shima convened a meeting that morning.⁸⁴ Shima remembered the moments before automatic ratification at midnight as follows:

I was in front of the Prime Minister’s residence with tens of thousands of students and citizens surrounding the Diet. In front of the demonstrators who snaked danced around the Prime Minister’s residence, and among the students who just sat there..., powerless, I was crouched, vomiting as if to squeeze out the contents of my empty stomach.

By my side, Ikuta was standing beside the Communist League flag, yelling angrily with arms flailing, ‘Damn it, damn it, this energy! We can’t do anything with this energy! There is no more hope for the Bund.’⁸⁵

Less than two years earlier, Shima and Ikuta had decided that there was no more hope for the Communist Party and established the Bund. As the *Anpo* protests ended with the treaty’s automatic ratification, they were confronted with the bitter reality of their own limitations.

The Bund’s *Anpo* struggle ended in defeat. They were unable to prevent the ratification of the treaty. They were also unable to maintain unity at what seemed to be the most opportune moment, when the *Anpo* protests swelled into unprecedented proportions. At the Bund’s Fifth Conference in July 1960, Bund leaders were forced to come to terms with their own failures. The Conference started with a moment of silence for Kanba Michiko. Shima then started to report his evaluation of the *Anpo* struggle. Overcome by chest pains, he was unable to continue. Ikuta took over, reading the report with the ill Shima lying down. As expected, an onslaught of criticism against the Bund leaders ensued. Ikuta did not attempt to defend himself. Nor was Shima able to counter the criticisms, and after the Conference, the Bund dissolved into separate factions.⁸⁶

Moving on and Remembering: Shima and Ikuta after Bund

For about a year after the *Anpo* struggle, Shima languished at home, drinking alcohol and smoking cigarettes. His wife Hiroko supported them financially until she finally

⁸² “6.15 Ryuketsu jiken no kiroku,” *Asahi janaru*, 3 July 1960, 10.

⁸³ Koan chosacho, *Anpo toso no gaiyo*, 183.

⁸⁴ Shima, 128.

⁸⁵ Ikuta, 194.

⁸⁶ Shima, 137-139.

fell ill from overwork. Ikuta rescued them by helping establish a private classroom that Shima managed for the next four years. In 1963, Shima returned to Todai Medical School and graduated the following year. After two years of internship, he became a practicing psychiatrist.⁸⁷

Unlike Shima, Ikuta had remained in school throughout his activist days. As he continued to devour books on economics after *Anpo*, he grew disillusioned with Marxist economics and started studying econometrics. In the third year of his PhD program in the Todai Economics Department, Ikuta decided to transfer to the University of Pennsylvania's Department of Regional Science upon the recommendation of his adviser. Ikuta wrote to a friend that this was a "good excuse" for him to "escape to America."⁸⁸ His planned escape did not go smoothly however, as he was almost denied a visa because of his past involvement in "anti-American activities." A frantic Ikuta came to Shima's house and rummaged through Bund documents, searching for evidence that could absolve him. He found nothing but damning evidence. Nevertheless, Ikuta eventually obtained his visa and successfully entered the United States in August 1964. He was nearing completion of his dissertation when a nighttime fire consumed him and his wife in their apartment on March 23, 1966. After their funeral, as friends and families met in a coffee shop in Tokyo, Shima proposed the publication of a book in remembrance of the Ikutas. The book was completed a year and a half later.⁸⁹

Ikuta's death provided Shima with the impetus to tell his and Ikuta's story of their involvement with the Bund. Shima was motivated to tell his story a second time when another tragedy struck. In 1991, Shima's second son Satoru, a twenty-three year old university student, was diagnosed with

leukemia. To tell his terminally ill son about his experience as a Bund leader, Shima wrote "Bunto shishi" ("A Personal History of the Bund") in two months, finishing it in early 1992. Shima handed the manuscript to his hospitalized son, who teasingly commented that his father had grown old to write such a thing. Satoru died in April 1993. He was twenty-four years old, the same age as Kanba Michiko when her life prematurely ended in 1960.⁹⁰ The manuscript was later published in a book entitled *Bunto shishi*. Soon after its publication, Shima Shigeo died on October 17, 2000 at the age of sixty-nine.

Conclusion

For Shima Shigeo and Ikuta Koji, the Bund was the culmination of their search for a new radical left. Their search coincided with the politically contentious issue of security treaty revision and the dawning of the high growth era. The confluence of these factors shaped the Bund, a "bright," young, action-oriented revolutionary group whose members became the "unlucky heroes" of the *Anpo* struggle. The Bund was an organization fraught with contradictions. It was a revolutionary organization intent on producing a classless society. It was also a "bright," mass organization that sought to attract a large number of student activists. Above all, it was an action-oriented organization that sought to produce political crises by planning radical protests. *Anpo* was the Bund's political stage. Without it, the Bund, full of contradictions and devoid of a viable political vision, was doomed. But the demise of the Bund began not after, but rather at the height of the *Anpo* struggle. The reason for this early decay was the perennial problem of factionalism, which would continue to define the post-*Anpo* radical student movement.

The legacies of the Bund are many and mixed. In the history of the radical student

⁸⁷ Tachibana Takashi. "60 nen anpo eiyu no eiko to hisan." *Bungei shunju*, February 1969.

⁸⁸ Ikuta, 437.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.492-495. The personal essays and documents it contains are richly informative of the Ikutas and the history of the Bund.

⁹⁰ Shima, 216-221.

movement, the Bund was pivotal in ushering in a new era by divorcing the movement from the Communist Party. After the Bund's dissolution, numerous "New Left" groups sprang from its remains. The Bund also left a distinct mark on postwar history through the 1960 *Anpo*. While they were unable to prevent the revised US-Japan security treaty's ratification, the Bund-led radical students played a major role in making the 1960 *Anpo* the biggest national crisis in postwar Japan. The "incidents" they produced were central to the *Anpo* protests. Both Kishi's rushed escape from Haneda on January 16 and the cancellation of Dwight Eisenhower's visit to Japan resulted from the

students' radical protests, not the established left's tame demonstrations. But at the same time, the students' radicalism may have bred fear in the Japanese public, which, while virulently anti-Kishi in June 1960, was above all intent on protecting democracy and peace. Indeed, the horrified reactions of the major newspapers to the June 15 incident suggest that as protests intensified, fear of spreading violence began to eclipse outrage against Kishi. The Bund radicals may thus have facilitated the swift transition from 1960 *Anpo* to the ensuing high growth era remarkably devoid of political contention. Perhaps this, above all, made these radical students the "unlucky heroes" of the *Anpo* struggle.

Japan's Asian Monetary Fund Proposal

Phillip Y. Lipsky

I. Introduction

When Japanese financial authorities proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) at the height of the Asian Financial Crisis in the fall of 1997, the international financial community seemed to release a collective gasp. The intrepid proposal for a regional alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) seemed to arise without warning and at the worst possible moment. In the eyes of many, it was even more surprising that the proposal originated from the Japanese financial bureaucracy, a group not particularly renown for its audacity or creative policy entrepreneurship. The proposal raised temporary hopes among the crisis-ridden economies of Asia but elicited a stringent rebuke from the IMF and the US Treasury, and ultimately fell to the wayside in favor of a more IMF-centered approach.¹

Although the AMF proposal stirred virulent controversy and ignited an unusually visible conflict between the financial authorities of Japan and the United States, very little analysis has been conducted after its rejection. In this paper, I will provide an exposition focusing on three aspects of the proposal. First, building off of personal interviews conducted in the summer of 2000 with several senior Ministry of Finance (MOF) officials including Eisuke Sakakibara, former Vice Minister for International Affairs, and key players such as Hajime Shinohara, one of the masterminds behind the AMF proposal, I will explain how the AMF emerged as a Japanese government initiative.

Second, I will provide an explanation of motivations. Why did the Japanese financial authorities choose to push for an AMF during the

height of the Asian Crisis? What drove the US and the IMF to stringently oppose the proposal? Contrary to analyses focusing on ideology or concerns for economic efficiency, I will provide an argument based on national self-interest. During the crisis, Japan had a much stronger preference for rapid liquidity provision due to its high levels of banking exposure and close economic ties with East Asia. Comparatively speaking, the US had weak ties and tilted towards emphasizing moral hazard concerns. Meanwhile, the lack of Japanese institutional leverage within the IMF assured that Japanese interests could not be realized within the existing international financial architecture. Thus, Japan pushed for an AMF and provided credit through a series of bilateral initiatives, while the US (and the IMF) emphasized the need for structural reforms and imposed relatively harsh conditionalities on lending.

Finally, I will discuss the feasibility for an AMF in the future. Although the debate over the AMF seemingly revolves around questions of economic efficiency, motivations and outcomes are largely driven by political concerns. This is not likely to change in the future. However, Japan appears to be adopting a gradualist approach by promoting a regional bilateral swap network that may eventually facilitate or evolve into a full-fledged institution.

II. Japan and the Asian Monetary Fund

When Japanese financial authorities proposed the creation of an AMF at the G7-IMF meetings in Hong Kong during September 20-25, 1997, most observers were taken by surprise. One analyst comments that the proposal emerged “out of the blue.”² Among officials within the US

¹ For a general exposition, see Sakakibara, Eisuke. *Nihon to Sekai ga Furueta Hi [The Day that Rocked Japan and the World]*. Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2000.

² Rowley, Anthony. “Asian Fund Special: The Battle of Hong Kong.” *Capital Trends* 2, no. 13, November 1997. <<http://www.gwjapan.com/ftp/pub/nrca/ctv2n13b.html>> (5 May 2001).

Treasury, the plan was seen as half-baked and devoid of meaningful details. Undoubtedly, the timing was peculiar – by September, both the Philippines and Indonesia had floated their currencies and the Asian Financial Crisis was increasingly showing signs of contagion. Under such conditions, stirring controversy over a proposal to significantly reform the structural dynamics of the international financial institutions could be gravely destabilizing. What led the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) to propose this regional alternative to the IMF? This section traces the AMF from its origins to its *de facto* rejection at Manila in November 18-19, 1997.

MOF bureaucrats seriously began promoting the AMF proposal starting in late August 1997. However, the proposal appears to have deeper roots and was not as half-baked as conventionally assumed. Like many initiatives emanating from the Japanese bureaucracy, the origins of the AMF proposal are not immediately transparent. In his memoir, Sakakibara merely indicates that the AMF idea had been formulated and supported by Haruhiko Kuroda (then Director of the International Bureau of MOF, later Vice Minister for International Affairs) and “others” within the country.³ At least part of the opacity seems to stem from reluctance to take credit for the rather controversial proposal. When the AMF initially surfaced, the *Nikkei Shinbun* (Japan’s most prominent economic newspaper) repeatedly described the proposal as being “advocated by Thailand and other countries” and an official MOF report takes pains to point out that “[A proposal similar to the AMF] had been already discussed among ASEAN countries in the spring of 1997.”⁴ At least initially, the Japanese financial

authorities appear to have been wary of pushing for the proposal too openly and instead chose to portray themselves as responding to an initiative emerging from other Asian countries.

According to several informed sources, however, Toyoo Gyohten and Hajime Shinohara of the Institute for Monetary Affairs (IIMA) worked closely with Haruhiko Kuroda in formulating the proposal. IIMA is affiliated with Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank, which has traditionally close ties with the International Bureau of MOF, and the President is usually a retired Vice Minister for International Affairs (as is Toyoo Gyohten). Shinohara and Gyohten had toyed with the idea for an “Asian Monetary Organization” in the fall of 1996 after the US/IMF bailout of Mexico, based on the premise that the US would not act as vigorously in the event of a similar crisis in Asia. The initial size of the fund was envisioned to be around \$20 billion. By February to March 1997, the IIMA had come up with a blueprint for the AMO and intended to promote the proposal at the May 1997 ADB meeting at Fukuoka as the “Gyohten Initiative.” However, the proposal was temporarily shelved because of unrelated events undermining Japan’s position in Asia.⁵

By August 1997, however, the tide had reversed. After Thai authorities floated the baht on June 2, Japan played a major role in facilitating bilateral commitments towards the IMF rescue package. Sakakibara quotes Thai Finance Minister Thanong Bidaya as saying, “Although I was disappointed by the Japanese government’s reaction on July 18 (when Japan refused to commit funds on a bilateral basis), now I am deeply grateful. This day will be firmly engraved in Thai history.”⁶ Japan itself committed \$4 billion to the \$17.2 billion package, an amount equivalent to the contribution from the IMF.⁷

³ Sakakibara, Eisuke. *Nihon to Sekai ga Furueta Hi [The Day that Rocked Japan and the World]*. Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2000. Pp. 182.

⁴ Ministry of Finance (Japan). *The Council on Foreign Exchange and Other Transactions*, “Lessons from the Asian Currency Crises – Risks Related to Short-Term Capital Movement and the “21st Century-Type” Currency Crisis. 19 May 1998. <<http://www.mof.go.jp/english/tosin/e1a703.htm>> (15 May 2001). Chapter 2.

⁵ According to a knowledgeable source, MOF had undermined its position within Asia by expanding the so-called “Four Markets Committee” (FMC) to a “Six Markets Committee.” The initial FMC had been set up in 1995 as an initiative by Sakakibara and included Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, and Japan. The goal was to pursue exchange rate stability and cooperative intervention. In 1996, the FMC was expanded to include the US and China, and some references were made to the committee as constituting an “Asian G6.” This was not well received by several countries, most notably Korea and Taiwan, who protested that their economic sophistication exceeded that of China. This debacle undermined MOF’s position in Asia and made promotion of the AMO proposal difficult. (Personal Interview, 11 September 2000.)

⁶ [my translation of the Japanese text]. Sakakibara, *Nihon to Sekai ga Furueta Hi*, 181.

Meanwhile, the United States took a hands-off attitude at this early stage of the Asian Crisis. The *Washington Post* noted on August 12, 1997 that the “United States [was] conspicuous by its absence” during the organization of the Thai bailout.⁸ MOF officials noted that the Thai support meeting had created an “Asian Consensus” and to some extent legitimized Japan’s role as a regional leader at the expense of the United States.

Another important development contributing to the emergence of the AMF proposal concerned the internal dynamics within MOF. Sakakibara and Kuroda had been respectively promoted to Vice Minister of International Affairs and Director of the International Bureau in July 1997, putting in place a leadership supportive of and willing to promote the AMF idea.⁹ Although Sakakibara himself was not responsible for formulating the proposal, his leadership appears to have been critical in promoting the AMF – more traditional MOF bureaucrats probably would have shied away from the sheer possibility of colliding with the US Treasury and the IMF.¹⁰

Earlier formulations of the AMF proposal such as the AMO were probably not very detailed or formalized, and several key MOF policy makers did not recognize that such a predecessor existed. Regardless of the relationship between the earlier and later versions, however, it is clear that official endorsement of the AMF proposal by MOF did not come until around August and September 1997. Sakakibara apparently played the key role of perceiving a ripe opportunity to promote an inchoate proposal informally held among several high-level players in the Japanese international financial policy elite.¹¹

According to Sakakibara, MOF began serious work on the AMF proposal following the IMF-sponsored Thai support meeting held in Tokyo on

August 11. He asserts that an “Asian sense of solidarity” pervaded this meeting and became a key factor in his decision to promote the AMF plan.¹² An informed source also noted that the Thai bailout package exposed IMF underfunding and served as a model for the AMF by demonstrating that pooling abundant Asian reserves could be an effective strategy in dealing with financial crises. The AMF would also obviate tedious and time-consuming consensus building in the future by automating commitments.¹³ Mari Pangestu at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta also notes that, “The rescue package for Thailand in fact marked the beginnings of an Asian fund. The new part of the idea is to prepare such funds in advance of the crisis, instead of raising them after the crisis has struck.”¹⁴

After the meeting in Thailand, MOF formulated a basic plan for the AMF and began to promote the idea among Asian countries in late August. At this point, the AMF was envisioned as a \$100 billion fund composed of ten members – China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. Notably, membership was not extended to the United States, and the original policy memo suggested that the AMF would not necessarily act in unison with the IMF.¹⁵ Sakakibara later indicated that he did not directly communicate the proposal to the United States because he foresaw stiff resistance and believed that the US would accept the proposal only reluctantly in the face of an “Asian consensus,”¹⁶ more or less as a *fait accompli*.

The US Treasury acted immediately after obtaining information on the AMF and actively opposed it. According to Sakakibara, then Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers called him directly at his residence at midnight and angrily started, “I thought you

⁷ MOF, *Lessons from the Asian Currency Crises*, Appendix 19.

⁸ Blustein, Paul. “Rescue Loans Are Pledged To Thailand, Without U.S.” *Washington Post*, 12 August 1997, sec C, p. 1.

⁹ Personal Interview, 11 September 2000.

¹⁰ MOF Official, Personal Interview, 11 August 2000.

¹¹ Former MOF Official, Personal Interview, 20 September 2000.

¹² Sakakibara, *Nihon to Sekai ga Furueta Hi*, 180-182.

¹³ Personal Interview, 11 September 2000.

¹⁴ Pangestu, Mari. “The rescue package for Thailand in fact represented the beginnings of the Asian Fund.” In “Forum: Is the Asian Fund a winning idea?” *Capital Trends* 2, no. 13, November 1997. <<http://www.gwjapan.com/ftp/pub/nrca/ctv2n13d.html>> (5 May 2001).

¹⁵ Sakakibara, *Nihon to Sekai ga Furueta Hi*, 183-4.

¹⁶ Former MOF Official, Personal Interview, 9/20/00

were my friend.”¹⁷ During a heated two-hour conversation, Summers allegedly criticized the plan for excluding the United States and allowing for action autonomous of the IMF. Sakakibara believes the stringent American reaction was driven by its perception that Japan was posing a challenge to American hegemony in Asia through the AMF.¹⁸ The official line of the US Treasury focused on two key factors: Moral Hazard and Duplication. According to this line of argument, the AMF would create an unnecessary incentive for Asian countries to postpone adjustment and would add very little to the pre-existing system centered on the IMF.

Although “[the AMF] received a warm reception in virtually every Southeast Asian capital” and Taiwan and South Korea were favorably disposed, support began fading immediately as the US and IMF expressed opposition.¹⁹ Sakakibara strongly implies that the US used enticements such as increased IMF quotas for Asian countries and promises regarding the NAB (New Arrangements to Borrow) in order to build support against the AMF.²⁰ An informed source also indicated that the US lobbied China to oppose the plan by emphasizing the threat of “Japanese hegemony.”²¹ Contrary to some outside sources that point to MOF “backpedaling” subsequent to US opposition,²² Sakakibara explicitly states that Japan actively competed with the US through its persistent efforts to build a consensus around the AMF. The whole affair reached a climax at the Regional Finance Minister’s meeting held in Hong Kong on November 21, to which the US and IMF attended as observers. While ASEAN and South Korea expressed support for the AMF proposal, Hong Kong and Australia remained neutral, and China voiced no opinion.²³ Sakakibara had failed to deliver his Asian consensus. Without Chinese support and in the face of grave US opposition, the AMF proposal was effectively dead.

In its place came the “Manila Framework,” a cooperative framework envisaged under four broad headings:

1. A mechanism for regional economic surveillance to complement the IMF’s global surveillance
2. Enhanced economic and technical cooperation in strengthening domestic financial systems and regulatory mechanisms
3. Measures to strengthen the IMF’s capacity to respond to financial crises
4. A cooperative financing arrangement that would supplement IMF resources.²⁴

Japan benefited from the opening of the IMF regional office in Tokyo, which, one observer notes, “is quickly developing into the locus of regional IMF activities such as economic surveillance.”²⁵ The Manila Framework, however, marked an indisputable victory for the IMF-centered approach of the US. The framework has no institutional component or the regional orientation of an AMF, and the core prescriptions are designed to enhance rather than weaken the role of the IMF.

III. Motivations

This section seeks to explain two empirical questions raised in the preceding section. First, why did Japanese financial authorities propose the AMF when they did? Second, what led the US and the IMF to oppose the proposal? I will argue that the answer to both of these questions lies in national preferences towards the tradeoff between liquidity provision and moral hazard.

The line below represents the tradeoff a country faces when confronted with a financial crisis in a foreign country. The dilemma is a familiar one. The provision of rapid, abundant liquidity to a country under crisis will comfort investors and increase the likelihood that

¹⁷ Sakakibara, *Nihon to Sekai ga Furueta Hi*, 185.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Altbach, Eric. “The Asian Monetary Fund Proposal: A Case Study of Japanese Regional Leadership.” *Japan Economic Institute Report no. 47a* (19 December 1997). Pp. 10.

²⁰ Sakakibara, *Nihon to Sekai ga Furueta Hi*, 186.


²¹ Personal Interview, 11 September 2000.

²² Altbach, “The Asian Monetary Fund Proposal: A Case Study of Japanese Regional Leadership,” 10.

²³ Sakakibara, *Nihon to Sekai ga Furueta Hi*, 189.

²⁴ MOF, *Lessons from the Asian Currency Crises – Risks Related to Short-Term Capital Movement and the “21st Century-Type” Currency Crisis*.


²⁵ Rowley, Anthony. “International Finance: Asian Fund, R.I.P.” *Capital Trends* 2, no. 14, December 1997. <<http://www.gwjapan.com/ftp/pub/nrca/ctv2n14g.html>> (15 May 2001). Pp. 2.



the crisis will subside at least for the time being. However, easy liquidity also contributes to moral hazard – investors will make riskier investments and countries will shirk from reforms such as enhanced banking regulation (See Diagram 1). If the international system were governed by a single, non-political lender of last resort, a rational policy could be undertaken on a case-by-case basis to balance the two opposing concerns. In the absence of such a centralized decision-maker, the liquidity provision vs. moral hazard tradeoff becomes distributive in nature. Political considerations and economic ties will influence state decisions, and rescue operations will be determined by the position of key creditor states on the preference line.

States will prefer rapid liquidity provision if economic ties with the crisis-economy are dense, political interests are at stake, and domestic conditions are conducive to providing funds abroad. This policy will provide a quick recovery of the crisis-economy, benefiting the creditor, while moral hazard costs will be borne over the long run by the entire international community. If these conditions are absent, the creditor will have no particular incentive to provide a rapid bailout and may use the crisis as an opportunity to extract concessions from the crisis-economy or allow conditions to deteriorate to provide warning signs against careless international lending and irresponsible domestic policies.

In the case of the Asian Crisis, Japan leaned much further towards liquidity provision compared to the US and EU due to its highly exposed banks and closer economic ties to the region. Bank exposure is a case in point. The following chart shows the amount of outstanding private lending to Thailand from the US, EU, and Japan (See Diagram 2).²⁶



Source: BIS, Consolidated International Banking Statistics

²⁶ Due to limitations on available data for lending to developed nations, the figures are provided in terms of percentage of lending to all developing countries. Data for the EU does not include Greece and Luxembourg.

As the data indicates, Japanese exposure to Thailand at the height of the crisis was extremely high compared to that of the EU and the US, standing at around 25% of lending to all developing countries. Japanese financial institutions also lent the most in absolute terms – around \$38 billion compared to \$20 billion for the EU and \$4 billion for the US.²⁷ Thus, Japanese banks stood at the greatest risk in the event of a major conflagration.

Japan also had very strong economic ties to Thailand in the form of foreign direct investment and trade. Japan is the largest foreign investor in Thailand in terms of stock.²⁸ Although the US and Japan account for about the same share of trade with Thailand, Japan consistently runs a trade surplus while the US runs a large trade deficit, making Japan more vulnerable to an economic slowdown. In terms of bank exposure, FDI, and trade, the same general pattern applied to broader East Asia on the verge of the crisis, making Japan more susceptible to the effects of regional contagion.

It is interesting to note that this exposition can be neatly reversed for the 1994 Mexico Crisis. US bank lending and economic ties to Mexico far exceeded that of Japan. Consequently, US and Japanese preferences towards the liquidity provision vs. moral hazard tradeoff during the Mexican and Thai crises were reversed. In the Mexico crisis, the US acted vigorously to organize an unprecedented and massive bailout package amounting to \$50 billion, while Japan stood aside, providing neither leadership nor liquidity.²⁹ In Thailand, the exact opposite outcome ensued, with

Japan taking leadership and pushing for a large bailout while the US stood aside.

Other possible explanations for the policy divergence include domestic political circumstances and ideology. In Japan, the historical trend of providing large amounts of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing countries, especially Asia, has created an environment comparatively favorable to the provision of credit abroad. Additionally, the International Bureau of MOF is literally down the hallway from the MOF Budgeting Bureau, the primary budgeting authority of Japan. In contrast, the US Treasury must face an unfavorably disposed Congress, and in 1994 the Exchange Stabilization Fund was tapped as an ad hoc slush fund to rescue Mexico. This enraged legislators in Congress who subsequently imposed restrictions on the use of these unappropriated funds. The restrictions only expired in September 1997, in time for the bailouts of Indonesia and Korea but too late for Thailand.³⁰

Criticism and pressure from Congress continued throughout the Asian Crisis, and in 2000 the Meltzer Commission Report severely criticized both US and IMF policies during the crisis.³¹ Finally, while the Japanese Export-Import Bank (EXIM) can provide untied loans and other aid measures to countries in distress, US law prohibits balance-of-payment support through the EXIM. This severely constrains the policy maneuverability of the US government.³²

In terms of ideology, one could make the argument that the US and the IMF subscribed to

“ALTHOUGH THE US AND JAPAN ACCOUNT FOR ABOUT THE SAME SHARE OF TRADE WITH THAILAND, JAPAN CONSISTENTLY RUNS A TRADE SURPLUS WHILE THE US RUNS A LARGE TRADE DEFICIT, MAKING JAPAN MORE VULNERABLE TO AN ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN. IN TERMS OF BANK EXPOSURE, FDI, AND TRADE, THE SAME GENERAL PATTERN APPLIED TO BROADER EAST ASIA ON THE VERGE OF CRISIS, MAKING JAPAN MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL CONTAGION.”

²⁷ Bank for International Settlements. *Consolidated International Banking Statistics*. February 2000. <<http://www.bis.org/statistics/bankstats.htm>> (8 May 2001).

²⁸ Castellano, Marc. “Rapid Recovery in Southeast Asia Strengthens Japan-ASEAN Economic Relations.” Japan Economic Institute Report no. 24a (23 June 2000). Pp. 3.

²⁹ Kindleberger, Charles P. *Manias, Panics, and Crashes*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000. Pp. 203.

³⁰ Krause, Lawrence B. *The Economics and Politics of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98*. The Council on Foreign Relations, 5 June 1998. <<http://www.cfr.org/public/pubs/crisis.html>> (19 May 2001).

³¹ Calomiris, Charles W. “When Will Economics Guide IMF and World Bank Reforms?” *CATO Journal* 20, no. 1 (2000), 85-87.

³² Hashimoto, Kohei, ed. *Domestic Determinants of Japanese Foreign Policy*. Kyoto: PHP Kenkyujo, 1999. Pp. 378-379.

a much more free market-oriented ideology than the Japanese financial authorities. Thus, they were slow to acknowledge that short-term capital market liberalization contributed to the Asian Crisis and pushed for domestic reforms that would diminish the role of the public sector. The Japanese authorities, as epitomized by Sakakibara, leaned towards supporting the Asian model of development and did not see such structural issues as lying at the heart of the crisis. Instead, prescriptions focused on greater *regulation* through means such as capital controls and better oversight over the international financial system. Explanations focusing on ideology, however, are complicated by the fact that ideology itself may be shaped by alternative factors. The US, for example, may have touted its free-market ideology as a means to secure liberalization favorable for its own multinationals and financial corporations. Japan, on the other hand, may have subscribed to the Keynesian view of low interest rates rather than the IMF's contractionary policies because it feared economic recession more than devaluation in the crisis-economies – recession would harm local sales by Japanese multinationals while devaluation, under certain circumstances, would increase their competitiveness in world markets.

Both domestic politics and ideology, however, seem to provide a poor explanation of the asymmetrical responses exhibited during the Asian and Mexican crises. The US clearly supported liquidity provision during the Mexican Crisis and several sources suggest that conditionalities were not strictly enforced.³³ Japan, on the other hand, stood aside, apathetically providing virtually no support. The ideological explanation would seem to imply a relatively consistent reaction from both countries during both crises. Domestic politics fails to explain Japanese quiescence during the Mexican crisis – domestic conditions

consistently provided greater comparative maneuverability for Japanese financial authorities. Self-interest based on the distributive tradeoff between moral hazard and liquidity provision provides a more consistent explanation. Thus, domestic politics and ideology probably served as secondary factors at best, augmenting but not overriding economic self-interest.

The AMF proposal emerged as a result of this preference divergence between Japanese and US financial authorities and one additional factor – US domination of the IMF. The IMF was created in 1945, in an era of unambiguous US economic hegemony and Japanese devastation, largely through a series of compromises between rival plans developed by Harry Dexter White of the US Treasury on one hand and by Lord Keynes of Great Britain on the other.³⁴ A wide range of literature has addressed the tendency for institutions to encapsulate and propagate conditions prevalent at inception.³⁵ Japan's position within the IMF has been similarly limited, and United States' position strengthened, by path dependencies within the institution.

Several factors deserve attention. First, American preponderance has been locked in by virtue of logistics. IMF headquarters have been located in Washington, DC since the institution was created. The advantages for a host country of supporting the headquarters of an international institution are immense, especially if located in the nation's capital. Such advantages may include: 1) Easier and rapid access to the activities of the institution in terms of research, data, and human capital; 2) Opportunities for informal networking among members of the host country government and the international institution; 3) Ideological influence through immersion of the institution's staff in the host country's academic, journalistic, and social sources of information.

³³ Calomiris, Charles W. *Statement Before the Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress*. 24 February 1998. <<http://www.house.gov/jec/hearings/imf/calomiri.htm>> (19 May 2001).

³⁴ Cohen, *Organizing the World's Money*, 90.

³⁵ See, for example, Ruggie, John Gerard (*Constructing the World Polity*, New York: Routledge, 1998) and Goldstein, Judith ("International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American 'Unfair' Trade Laws." *International Organization* 50, no. 4 (Autumn 1996): 541-564).

The close relationship between the US and the Bretton Woods institutions gave rise to the so-called “Washington Consensus” (note the location-centered naming) espousing sound macro and liberal market policies as prerequisites to economic growth. The Japanese financial authorities have consistently preferred a more cautious approach that reins in rather than lets loose market forces, but their voices have been muted.³⁶ Second, as the result of an early compromise, the managing directorship of the IMF has historically

gone to a European national, and the US exercises a *de facto* veto over the managing director nomination.³⁷ Third, IMF employees still continue to consist largely of US or UK nationals or people educated in those countries, at the expense of Japanese influence.³⁸ Finally, Japanese and Asian interests are severely

underrepresented in the IMF at the official level. Partly as a side effect of the AMF debacle, IMF quotas were increased in 1998 and redistributed to better reflect economic realities.³⁹ Prior to this redistribution at the onset of the Asian Crisis, Japan and Germany had the same share of quotas at 5.6% and South Korea’s share stood directly below that of Libya.

Thus, the AMF can be seen as an attempt by Japan to overcome its inability to obtain preferred policy outcomes via the IMF. Sakakibara mentions several instances

during which the Japanese authorities unsuccessfully lobbied the IMF to shift away from severe austerity measures, especially in reference to Indonesia. In Indonesia, he says there were two options – 1) a “large” package aiming to accomplish major structural reforms such as the elimination of wasteful national projects, a major reduction of subsidies, and a rapid restructuring of the financial sector, or 2) a “small” package focusing on stabilization of the exchange rate through cooperative interventions in the

currency market. MOF supported the second option, seeing large-scale reform under President Suharto as unrealistic and believing the IMF should stay out of political and structural issues. The IMF ignored the Japanese position and went ahead with the “large” package.⁴⁰ Japanese authorities also supported capital outflow controls like the ones imposed by

Malaysia in 1998 and also used at the early stages of the Thai crisis, another policy the IMF refused to endorse.⁴¹

The Thai rescue package highlighted these issues for two specific reasons. First, US non-participation in the package increased Japanese (and Asian) frustration over the ability of the US to nonetheless obtain its preferred policy outcomes – harsh conditionalities and long-term structural reforms oriented towards market liberalization. Second, large bilateral commitments from Asia demonstrated that

“ . . . JAPANESE AND ASIAN INTERESTS ARE SEVERELY UNDERREPRESENTED IN THE IMF AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL. PARTLY AS A SIDE EFFECT OF THE AMF DEBACLE, IMF QUOTAS WERE INCREASED IN 1998 AND REDISTRIBUTED TO BETTER REFLECT ECONOMIC REALITIES. PRIOR TO THIS REDISTRIBUTION AT THE ONSET OF THE ASIAN CRISIS, JAPAN AND GERMANY HAD THE SAME SHARE OF QUOTAS AT 5.6% AND SOUTH KOREA'S SHARE STOOD DIRECTLY BELOW THAT OF LIBYA. ”

³⁶ Sakakibara, *Nihon to Sekai ga Furueta Hi*. One exception is the World Bank report on the Asian Growth Miracle published in 1993. See World Bank. *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

³⁷ Thacker, Strom C. “The High Politics of IMF Lending.” *World Politics* 52 (October 1999), 41-42.

³⁸ Ferguson, Tyrone. *The Third World and Decision Making in the International Monetary Fund*. New York: Printer Publishers, 1988. Pp. 92.

³⁹ International Monetary Fund. *IMF Board Submits Resolution to Governors for 45 Percent Quota Increase*. Press Release Number 97/63. 23 December 1997. <<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/pr9763.htm>> (8 May 2001).

⁴⁰ Sakakibara, *Nihon to Sekai ga Furueta Hi*, 196.

⁴¹ Sakakibara, *Nihon to Sekai ga Furueta Hi*, 165.

the region could provide sufficient liquidity without relying on IMF resources:

Table 1: Composition of the Thai Rescue Package by Source

	Share of the Thai Rescue Package by Commitment (%)*	Voting Power in IMF as represented by Quota (%)
Japan	23.3	5.6
Singapore	5.8	0.2
Australia	5.8	1.6
Malaysia	5.8	0.6
Hong Kong	5.8	0.0
China	5.8	2.3
South Korea	2.9	0.5
Brunei	2.9	0.1
Indonesia	2.9	1.0
Total	61.0	12.0

*Remainder: IMF – 23.3%, WB – 8.7%, ADB – 7.0%

Source: IMF and Japanese Ministry of Finance⁴²

Bilateral commitments to the Thai package accounted for 61% of the total funds (55.2% from Asian nations) compared to a mere 23.3% provided by the IMF. Notably, the contributing countries accounted for a mere 12% of IMF quotas, far short of the US share of 18%.

Thus, the Thai rescue package convinced Japanese financial authorities that the AMF idea was both feasible and in line with Japanese interests. The AMF would have allowed Japan to shape policy outcomes more effectively in line with its preference towards easy credit.⁴³ Japan and other Asian countries would gain greater leverage to soften or change the focus of conditionalities. Additionally, the AMF could help provide a

greater headline figure for the bailout package to calm markets and disburse funds more flexibly.

In order to make the AMF proposal palatable to the US, however, Japanese policy makers claimed that the institution would act in sync with the IMF and not provide easy credit. This created a conundrum – if the AMF would not act autonomously of the IMF, its existence was moot, and increasing IMF quotas would have sufficed. Thus, to the eyes of many, the AMF proposal appeared half-baked and devoid of meaning. Sakakibara mentioned in an interview, however, that he indeed wanted to act independently and pursue policies different from the IMF.⁴⁴

In turn, the United States opposed the AMF because its preferences led it to emphasize moral hazard concerns and it feared that easy liquidity would allow Asian economies to postpone important domestic reforms. The US opted to maintain the IMF-centered approach through which it could impact policies much more effectively in line with its own preferences. Thus, the Manila Framework underscored the primacy of the IMF.

III. Conclusion – Prospects for an AMF

As this brief exposition demonstrates, debates over the AMF proposal have revolved around distributive political issues rather than the quintessential question of economic efficiency. Economically, does an AMF make sense? There is no *prima facie* rationale for why the world should only have one Fund. Although serious academic work on this topic is scarce, most criticisms focus on the potential for the AMF to undermine IMF leadership and provide overly loose liquidity.⁴⁵ As this paper has demonstrated, the definition of “overly loose” is relative.

⁴² Data available at <http://www.imf.org> and <http://www.mof.go.jp> (accessed 11/18/00)

⁴³ For a more detailed exposition on this point, see Hamada, Koichi. “From the AMF to the Miyazawa Initiative: Observations on Japan’s Currency Diplomacy.” *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* XIII, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1999), 33-50.

⁴⁴ Former MOF Official, Personal Interview, 20 September 2000.


⁴⁵ See, for example, Lewis, Jeffrey. “Asian vs. International: Structuring an Asian Monetary Fund.” *Harvard Asia Quarterly*. March 1999. <<http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/199903/9903a005.htm>> (22 October 2000).

Japan

Institutional aspects of the IMF may in fact be conducive to *underprovision* of liquidity in Asia compared to the collectively optimal point. Koichi Hamada has demonstrated that in theory, an AMF would *ceteris paribus* shift the regional norm towards greater liquidity provision.⁴⁶ Since there is some reason to believe that US inclinations towards moral hazard and Asian under-representation within the IMF currently skew the policy outcome towards underprovision, the AMF may in fact represent an economically favorable solution.

What are the prospects for a future AMF? Although US/IMF opposition stymied the initial AMF proposal, Japan seems to be taking steps towards eventual implementation. In late 1998, when Japan unveiled the “New Miyazawa Initiative,” a \$30 billion aid measure to resuscitate the crisis economies, \$15 billion was earmarked as short-term funds to be used to provide temporary liquidity to countries under crisis. In a clear break from IMF orthodoxy, a significant portion of these funds was earmarked for Malaysia, a country stubbornly resisting IMF dictates and imposing capital controls. Building off of this tentative foundation, in May

2000 Japanese Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa introduced what has come to be known as the “Chiang Mai Initiative.”⁴⁷ This initiative would “establish a network of bilateral swap and repurchase agreement facilities among ASEAN countries, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.”⁴⁸ Although the official statement carefully mentions that the initiative “differs from creating a new multilateral international organization, like the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF),”⁴⁹ the two initiatives share identical goals – to help participating economies avoid balance-of-payment crises by making emergency liquidity readily and easily available.⁵⁰



⁴⁶ Hamada, “From the AMF to the Miyazawa Initiative.”

⁴⁷ Castellano, “Rapid Recovery in Southeast Asia Strengthens Japan-ASEAN Economic Relations.”

⁴⁸ Ministry of Finance (Japan). The Council on Foreign Exchange and Other Transactions, *The Road to the Revival of the Asian Economy and Financial System – Sustainable Growth in the 21st Century and Building of a Multilayered Regional Cooperative Network*. 20 June 2000. <<http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/if022a.htm>> (15 May 2001), Appendix 8 (6).

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Castellano, “Rapid Recovery in Southeast Asia Strengthens Japan-ASEAN Economic Relations.”


MOF provides the chart on the following page to demonstrate the structural differences among the AMF, the short-term portion of the New Miyazawa Initiative, and the Chiang Mai Initiative. This chart, however, may provide a more convincing account of the *similarities* between the AMF and the Chiang Mai Initiative as well as Japan's use of the short-term portion of the New Miyazawa Initiative as a steppingstone to expand the regional swap network (see Charts).

When implemented, the Chiang Mai Initiative would help shore up the foreign reserves of countries under crisis by allowing currency swaps between participating countries. For example, if the baht came under pressure, the Thai government would be able to tap the huge foreign currency reserves of countries like Japan and China and swap baht for dollars or yen or another key currency. By virtue of its existence, the initiative would provide a disincentive to speculate against any protected currency.

Without observing future developments, definitive answers about whether the Chiang

Mai initiative will develop into a full-fledged institution are difficult to provide. As it stands, however, the initiative is bound to be plagued by collective action problems under a highly ambiguous and decentralized decision-making structure. Reliance on IMF leadership and surveillance may serve as a temporary solution, but calls for centralization resembling an AMF are bound to emerge from countries unfavorably inclined towards the Bretton Woods institutions (most notably Malaysia).

However, the distributive nature of the liquidity provision vs. moral hazard tradeoff at the international level necessarily biases the US and the EU against the creation of an AMF. The US would prefer not to see structural reforms in Asia postponed further and is disinclined about giving up the global leverage that comes with domination over a single Fund. One solution would be to depoliticize the IMF or alter the decision-making structure to be more conducive to Asian influence. Alternately, an AMF could



be created with a structure similar to the ADB – the US and EU nations would be included, but power would be shared more equally than the *status quo* in the IMF.⁵¹ These solutions would both require a greater willingness on the part of the US to allow for Asian influence in the event of a future crisis in the region. The preceding analysis indicates that the US will be

Source: MOF, *The Road to the Revival of the Asian Economy and Financial System*

⁵¹ One former Japanese senior official suggests that this may be the most practical policy. Personal Interview, September 2000.

disinclined towards these solutions. However, in the context of heightened hostility towards the IMF/US in Asia following the Asian Crisis and a much more assertive Japanese financial policy, the US may increasingly find such inclusive compromise solutions more palatable. The IMF will continue to be important in terms of

facilitating the unified involvement of creditor nations during major international crises. However, an AMF or a similar arrangement may be more effective in dealing with regional contingencies that tend to bias the US excessively towards moral hazard concerns without allowing the Asians to assume greater decision-making influence over the IMF.

The Political Philosophy of Juche

Grace Lee

Introduction

The political philosophy known as *juche* became the official autarkic state ideology of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1972.¹ Although foreign scholars often describe *juche* as "self-reliance," the true meaning of the term is much more nuanced. Kim Il Sung explained:

Establishing *juche* means, in a nutshell, being the master of revolution and reconstruction in one's own country. This means holding fast to an independent position, rejecting dependence on others, using one's own brains, believing in one's own strength, displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance, and thus solving one's own problems for oneself on one's own responsibility under all circumstances.

The DPRK claims that *juche* is Kim Il Sung's creative application of Marxist-Leninist principles to the modern political realities in North Korea.² Kim Il Sung and his son Kim Jong Il have successfully wielded the *juche* idea as a political shibboleth to evoke a fiercely nationalistic drive for North Korean independence and to justify policies of self-reliance and self-denial in the face of famine and economic stagnation in North Korea. Kim Il Sung envisioned three specific applications of *juche* philosophy: political and ideological independence, especially from the Soviet Union and China; economic self-reliance

and self-sufficiency; and a viable national defense system.³

This paper begins with a discussion of the three key components of the *juche* ideology – political, economic and military independence – as promulgated by the DPRK. The second section is a discussion of the ideological origins of the *juche* philosophy, followed by a third section on the philosophical bases of the *juche* idea. The paper concludes with an examination of *juche* as a political body of thought and an evaluation of the success with which *juche* policies have responded to the political and economic realities of North Korea.

Key Components of the Juche Ideology

The governing principles of *juche* were clearly expressed by Kim Il Sung in a speech entitled "Let Us Defend the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-Reliance, and Self-defense More Thoroughly in All Fields of State Activities," which he delivered to the Supreme People's Assembly on December 16, 1967.⁴ In it, he declared that

...the Government of the Republic will implement with all consistency the line of independence, self-sustenance, and self-defense to consolidate the political independence of the country (*chaju*), build up more solidly the foundations of an independent national economy capable of insuring the complete unification, independence, and prosperity of our nation (*charip*) and

¹ Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 401.

² Yuk-Sa Li, ed. *Juche! The Speeches and Writings of Kim Il Sung* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1972), 157.

³ Tai Sung An, *North Korea in Transition: From Dictatorship to Dynasty* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, c1983), 58-9.

⁴ Li, *Juche*, 149-206.

increasing the country's defense capabilities, so as to safeguard the security of the fatherland reliably by our own force (*chawi*), by splendidly embodying our Party's idea of *juche* in all fields.⁵

Chaju: *Domestic and Foreign Independence*

The principle of political independence is one of the central tenets of *juche* ideology. With respect to international relations, the principles of *juche* stress complete equality and mutual respect among nations. Furthermore, *juche* ideology asserts that every state has the right of self-determination in order to secure the happiness and prosperity of its people as it best sees fit. These political tenets – equal sovereignty and non-intervention – would satisfy the fierce desire for respect and security of a small and weak nation-state such as North Korea.

In practice, this political stance has caused North Korea to truly become a hermit kingdom because of the huge stigma *juche* places upon cooperation with outside powers. According to *juche* as interpreted by the DPRK, yielding to foreign pressure or tolerating foreign intervention would make it impossible to maintain *chaju*, or the defense of national independence and sovereignty. This in turn would threaten the nation's ability to defend the interests of the people, since political independence is seen as being absolutely critical for economic self-sustenance and military self-defense. Kim Jong Il predicted that dependence on foreign powers would lead to the failure of the socialist revolution in Korea.^{6, 7}

Among countries that he considered socialist peers, such as China, the USSR, Cuba and several African countries, Kim Il Sung urged cooperation and stressed the need for mutual support and limited dependence. However, while acknowledging that it was important to learn from the examples of other socialist countries, Kim Il

Sung was highly sensitive to the problems of flunkeyism towards Moscow and Beijing and the inevitable Marxist-Leninist dogmatism that he abhorred during his guerrilla days. In constructing the socialist revolution in North Korea, he warned that the North Koreans must "...resolutely repudiate the tendency to swallow things of others undigested or imitate them mechanically."⁸ Furthermore, he claimed that his regime's "success" was credited to the independent manner in which all problems were solved, conforming Marxist-Leninist principles to the specific conditions of North Korea without altering their fundamental substance.

Domestically, Kim asserted that it was imperative to build internal political forces to ensure *chaju*. The pivotal factor in the success of achieving *chaju* would be the extent to which the people rallied around the party and the leader Kim Il Sung, and later Kim Jong Il himself. This insistence on internal unity of support, stemming perhaps from the elder Kim's disgust with internal factionalism before the Korean War, conveniently helped to justify his consolidation of personal power.

Charip: *Economic Independence*

An independent and self-sufficient national economy is necessary both in order to secure political integrity and to achieve national prosperity. *Charip* – economic independence – is seen as the material basis for *chaju*, or political independence. Kim Il Sung feared that economic dependence on foreign aid would render the state a political satellite of other countries. He believed that it would be impossible to successfully build a socialist republic without the material and technical foundations that would come from an independent national economy. This economy would consist of a powerful base of heavy industry with the machine-building industry at its core, which would equip light industry, agriculture, transport, and all other branches of the economy.⁹

⁵ Li, *Juche*, 156.

⁶ Li, *Juche*, 157-8.

⁷ Jong Il Kim, *Accomplishing Juche Revolutionary Cause* (Pyongyang, D.P.R.K.: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1990), 47.

⁸ Li, *Juche*, 159.

⁹ Li, *Juche*, 160.

According to Kim Jong Il,

building an independent national economy means building an economy which is free from dependence on others and which stands on its own feet, an economy which serves one's own people and develops on the strength of the resources of one's own country and by the efforts of one's people.¹⁰

Independent food production was seen as being of particular significance because successful farming would provide the people with stabilized living conditions and means to independently support themselves. Just as important to the survival and independence of the national economy was the establishment of reliable and independent sources of raw materials and fuel. Extensive modernization of the economy and training for technically-minded cadres were considered indispensable for the construction of an independent national economy as well.

Kim Il Sung was careful to maintain that building an independent national economy on *juche* principles of self-reliance was not synonymous with building an isolated economy. Looking at the size of American aid to South Korea, which equaled its fledgling economy's gross domestic product during the immediate post-war years, Kim Il Sung recognized that North Korea would not be able to survive without significant aid from its communist sponsors. Thus, he encouraged close economic and technical cooperation between socialist countries and newly-emerging nations as an aid in economic development and ideological unity.¹¹

Chawi: *Military Independence*

The last area of independence is self-reliance in defense, a characteristic fundamental in *juche* philosophy to an independent sovereign state. The North Korean attitude towards military confrontation was summed up in this manner by

Kim Il Sung: "We do not want war, nor are we afraid of it, nor do we beg peace from the imperialists."¹² The decidedly belligerent policy of countering any perceived "imperialist moves of aggression and war" with violence was seen as the best way to defend national independence and to win the revolutionary cause.¹³ The implementation of this self-reliant defense system would involve the mobilization of the whole country and the complete inculcation of ideology in the armed forces. Those who were not directly taking up arms were to contribute to the construction and maintenance of the domestic defense industry and remain ideologically prepared, so that the home front would be united in a sense of socio-political superiority.¹⁴

Although Kim Il Sung conceded that foreign support played a secondary role in the holistic war against foreign "imperialists" and "aggressors," he heavily emphasized that the decisive factor would be the preparation of internal domestic purposes.¹⁵ Thus he pledged the government to prepare the Korean people and the army thoroughly and ideologically to cope with war and to make full material preparations to defend the country by relying on an independent national economy.¹⁶

Origins of the *Juche* Philosophy

There are three major schools of thought regarding the origins of the *juche* ideology. The first of these is the instrumental perspective, which emphasizes domestic and international relations factors. The second perspective focuses on the influence of traditional Korean politics. The last viewpoint considers *juche* to be original political thought stemming directly from the life experiences of Kim Il Sung.

Instrumental Perspective

The instrumentalist viewpoint focuses on both domestic and foreign political factors as the root of the *juche* ideology. Some scholars believe

¹⁰ Kim, *Accomplishing*, 48.

¹¹ Kim, *Accomplishing*, 48-52.

¹² Kim, *Accomplishing*, 53.

¹³ Kim, *Accomplishing*, 53.

¹⁴ Kim, *Accomplishing*, 52-5.

¹⁵ Li, *Juche*, 162.

¹⁶ Li, *Juche*, 163.

Korea that Kim's unstable power during and immediately following the Korean War caused him to deploy ideological purges in order to consolidate his political position, using the *juche* principle of national solidarity as a domestic instrument of personal cult-building.¹⁷ To this end, Kim Il Sung forbade any other ideology from being discussed or taught in North Korea. Since the content and application of the *juche* ideology were very ambiguous until the late 1960s, Kim Il Sung was the only one who could successfully wield and implement the philosophy. Thus, implementing and executing policies based on *juche* effectively consolidated Kim Il Sung's absolute political power and indirectly provided ideological justification for his dictatorship in North Korea.¹⁸

Perhaps more saliently, *juche* as the guiding principle of foreign policy was utilized as a means of balancing power between the Soviet Union and China, and as a means to curb the Soviet and Chinese influence in the country. Kim's wariness of Sino-Soviet involvement in North Korean domestic affairs was exacerbated by his personal dislike of the Soviets and the country's national inferiority complex towards major powers. Kim became uneasy about the Soviet Union's gradual movement towards peaceful coexistence with the United States in the 1960s. However, because of the economic and military aid Pyongyang was receiving from Moscow, as well as Kim's professed value for unity in the Marxism-Leninism struggle against imperialism, North Korea continued to support Soviet positions on most issues. Gradually, North Korea began to use the *juche* tenet of foreign non-intervention and national self-determination as an ideological excuse for cordoning off its governance from Moscow and Beijing. Eventually, North Korea repudiated both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China as a socialist imperialist state, accusing its leaders of abandoning pure

Marxism-Leninism principles to pursue capitalist gains.¹⁹

Traditional Political Culture

The second perspective is more long-term and focuses on the influence of traditional political culture in Korea. The scholars in this second camp argue that *juche* is a reflection of a centuries-old tradition of independence from foreign powers. Strategically located at a peninsular tip of the East Asian continent, Korea has long been a pawn of contention between its two powerful neighbors, China and Japan. From the earliest recorded history, the Korean people have fought fiercely to maintain their independence in the face of multiple invasions by Mongols, Manchurians, Han Chinese and Japanese pirates and samurais. The sum total of these invasions may qualify Korea as the most oft-invaded territory in the world. Under the Yi Dynasty, which ruled Korea from 1392 until the Japanese annexation in 1910, Korea became a highly defensive state with a foreign policy of isolation towards the outside world. When Kim Il Sung came to power in North Korea in 1945, he arguably reverted to the highly isolationist policies of pre-modern Korea.

Furthermore, this viewpoint encompasses the exposition of *juche* as a brand of Korean Leninist nationalism, a "creative adoption of Marxism-Leninism" peculiarly suited to the Korean situation, described by Kim Jong Il as

a difficult and complex revolution which had to deal with the tasks of the anti-imperialist, national-liberation revolution, with formidable Japanese imperialism as the target, and those of the anti-feudal, democratic revolution simultaneously.²⁰

Baek Nam Un, a Korean sociologist who later aided Kim Il Sung, said that the situation in Korea requires an independent and creative

¹⁷ Dae-Ho Byun, *North Korea's Foreign Policy* (Seoul, R.O.K.: Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea, 1991), 55-6, 60.

¹⁸ Byun, *North*, 71-2.

¹⁹ Byun, *North*, 62-76.

²⁰ Kim, *Accomplishing*, 18.

adoption of Marxism and Leninism, and a peculiar synthesis of nationalism and socialism. Kim Il Sung himself said:

To establish *juche* is a question of special importance for us in the light of our country's geographical situation and environments, of the peculiarities of its historical development, and the complex and arduous nature of our revolution.²¹

Individualism: Kim Il Sung's Original Thought

The third viewpoint is the North Koreans' view of *juche* as a prime example of their late Supreme Leader's brilliance and originality. This last group insists that *juche* was the intellectual result of Kim Il Sung's highly exaggerated and romanticized personal experience as a guerrilla fighting against the Japanese in the 1930s. This immediate attribution of *juche* to Kim Il Sung's personal history is emphasized by his son and heir Kim Jong Il in his book *On the Juche Idea*. He argues that his father "put forward a *juche*-oriented line for the Korean revolution" and that "...this was a historical event which heralded the creation of the *juche* idea and the birth of the *juche*-oriented revolutionary line."²² Kim Il Sung himself had at times maintained that the *juche* ideology grew out of two major frustrations he felt with the Korean revolution during the anti-Japanese struggle: first, the revolutionary vanguard had lost contact with the proletarian masses and were waging a theoretical battle without mass support; and second, that "flunkeyism" – seeking Moscow's favor – and factionalism were corrupting the revolution from the inside.²³

Philosophical Underpinnings of *Juche* Ideology

The *juche* idea is a *Weltanschauung*, or world view, that affirms the penultimate value of man's interests. According to *juche* ideology, man has ultimate control over the world and of his own destiny because he alone has *chajusong*, or creativity and consciousness. Adherents to the *juche* philosophy claim that this viewpoint of man as dominating and reshaping the world is a unique contribution of *juche* ideology to the body of philosophical knowledge. Despite this claim to originality, there is nothing particularly revolutionary or novel in the tenets of the *juche* philosophy. Kim Il Sung's policy stances on subjects such as the class struggle, the idea of the mass line, the role of the single great leader in history and the importance of belief in one's own capabilities were all drawn primarily from Chinese and Eastern European thought. Kim Il Sung's genius lay in his ability to fuse these elements together to capitalize on the North Korean drive for independence.

“ KIM IL SUNG'S POLICY STANCES ON SUBJECTS SUCH AS THE CLASS STRUGGLE, THE IDEA OF THE MASS LINE, THE BELIEF IN ONE'S OWN CAPABILITIES WERE ALL DRAWN PRIMARILY FROM CHINESE AND EASTERN EUROPEAN THOUGHT. KIM IL SUNG'S GENIUS LAY IN HIS ABILITY TO FUSE THESE ELEMENTS TOGETHER TO CAPITALIZE ON THE NORTH KOREAN DRIVE FOR INDEPENDENCE. ”

Debt to Maoist Thought

Kim's early knowledge of communism came from the Chinese communist guerrilla army with which he trained from 1935 to 1941. During this time, he was tutored and influenced by Wei Zhengmin, a superior Chinese political officer in his guerrilla group. While Kim never acknowledged the extent of his subordination to and affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party, many scholars contend that Kim was a member of the CCP.²⁴ By the end of the Korean War, Chinese influence in North Korea had overtaken that of the Soviet Union. Kim closely followed

²¹ Li, *Juche*, 157.

²² Kim, *Accomplishing*, 19.

²³ Kim, *Accomplishing*, 18.

²⁴ Byun, *North*, 62-3.

Mao Zedong's political thought and action, which heavily influenced the development of the DPRK's political institutions in the late 1940s and 1950s.

One example of this emulation was the North Korean strategy of *Chollima Undong*, which was inspired by Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward movement of 1958-1960.²⁵ The multi-year economic plans, stress upon rural self-sufficiency and nationalistic and revolutionary fervor that inspired the Great Leap Forward are all characteristics of the *juche* ideology of economic self-sufficiency. Kim's assertion that

...if one lacks the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance, one will lose faith in one's own strength, fail to try to tap the inner resources of one's country, grow indolent and loose, and fall into passivism [sic] and conservatism

is highly reminiscent of the Yan' an era of the CCP, during which a belief in the power of the will to overcome seemingly impossible barriers was permanently embedded into Maoist thought.^{26; 27}

The underlying principle of the *juche* ideology is the faithful application of Marxism-Leninism in a case-specific manner that would best suit the history, political conditions and current realities of the country. This theory of different means to the penultimate goal of communism was first stressed by Mao Zedong, especially during the rectification campaign of 1942-44 on the need to "sinify" Marxism-Leninism and halt the mechanical and dogmatic acceptance of the Soviet model as the "universal truth."^{28; 29} Thus, the main tenet of Kim Il Sung's thought can be directly attributed and traced to Mao.

Despite the overwhelming evidence, Kim Il Sung was never willing to publicly acknowledge his ideological debt to Mao, especially after the institutionalization of the *juche* ideology as North

Korea's sole political philosophy by the DPRK in the early 1960s. Following this formal linkage of the *juche* ideology with North Korean nationalism, the inferiority implications of acknowledging such a great debt to a foreign leader was probably insurmountable both for the consistency of the independent *juche* ideology and for Kim's personal pride.³⁰

Korean and Confucian Roots

The *juche* ideology that is trumpeted by North Korea as Kim Il Sung's ingenious and original contribution to the body of political philosophy is really drawn from a centuries-old tradition of Korean political thought. Kim himself has acknowledged that he drew the term and idea of *juche* from Korean scholars in the early twentieth century, who in turn drew inspiration from Confucian ideas dating back to the original state philosophy of independence espoused by Korean rulers. The tradition of strong nationalism among the Korean people coexisted with another tradition called *sadaechuii*, in which the Confucian palace officials and educated elite groups jockeyed for foreign support through sycophancy.³¹ Kim's *juche* ideology may represent his reaction to the slave mentality of *sadaechuii* as well as an indebtedness to the original nationalistic strain of Korean political culture. Aside from its tremendous appeal to the deep traditional Korean antipathy towards foreign influence, *juche* serves to intensify the nationalism of the North Korean people, who are told that world civilization originated from the Korean peninsula.³²

Application to Society

Indoctrination in *juche* ideology was seen as the primary concern in the revolutionary struggle for *chajusong* and the subsequent construction of a socialist republic.³³ Establishing a *juche* mindset meant the promotion of the attitude that the

²⁵ An, *North*, 62-3.

²⁶ Li, *Juche*, 160.

²⁷ Kenneth Lieberthal, *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform* (New York; London: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1995), 48-52.

²⁸ An, *North*, 62.

²⁹ Byun, *North*, 68-9.

³⁰ An, *North*, 63.

³¹ An, *North*, 35-6.

³² Oberdorfer, *Two*, 19.

³³ Kim, *Accomplishing*, 37.

Korean people could solve all of their problems by their own talents and initiative. Cultivating a sense of national dignity and revolutionary pride was especially important, as evidenced by the great lengths to which cultural aspects of North Korean life such as music and entertainment were monopolized and dictated by the Party under Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung's son and successor.³⁴

The Kim Il Sung regime instructed the North Korean people in the *juche* ideology using an analogy drawn from human anatomy. The Great Leader is the brain that makes decisions and issues orders, the Party is the nervous system that channels information, and the people are the bone and muscle that physically execute the orders.³⁵ This belief system, inculcated in North Koreans since early childhood, made them docile and loyal to Kim Il Sung even in the face of famines and energy crises that have devastated the country.

The *juche* ideology was widely supported among the North Korean populace because of the doctrine that the success of the socialist revolution depends upon the extent to which the masses rally around and support the leadership. When Kim Il Sung unilaterally declared *juche* to be the governing principle of all aspects of North Korean life, as well as the ideological basis of all state policies, the philosophy gained the full authority of Kim Il Sung's godlike status. Having established the infallibility of the *juche* philosophy and consolidated their own political power, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il were able to use *juche* principles of self-sustenance and political and military independence as justification for policies such as the routing of a huge percentage of national income towards military

expenditures, despite the famine sweeping through the populace. Due to the power and influence of one man, the Great Leader, the *juche* philosophy became inextricably embedded in the economic, political, military and cultural aspects of life in the DPRK.

Conclusion

Despite the repeated and strong emphasis on *juche*'s loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, *juche* as philosophical thought does not strictly adhere to Marxist-Leninist principles as North Korea purports. First, the fundamental tenets of *juche* – that man is the master of all things and decides everything, and that an ideological consciousness determines human behavior in historical development – contradict Karl Marx's proposition of economic determinism. Marx believed that individual figures had no control over the general trend of predetermined human development, and he did not give man an exalted position in the hierarchy of historical factors of importance. Kim Il Sung, in contrast, saw himself as an absolutely essential figure in the struggle of the working masses against the oppressive middle class.^{36; 37}

Juche also diverges from Lenin's focus on the educating and organizing functions of the elite revolutionary vanguard. Authoritarianism is inherent in the *juche* ideology because the guidance of an "exceptionally brilliant and outstanding leader" is considered essential to the mobilization of the masses of the working class.³⁸ Unlike Lenin, Kim Il Sung's regime advocated a single leader-headed revolutionary hierarchy rather than a core of outstanding and committed leaders to lead the revolutionary struggle.³⁹

“ MARX BELIEVED THAT INDIVIDUAL FIGURES HAD NO CONTROL OVER THE GENERAL TREND OF PRE-DETERMINED HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, AND HE DID NOT GIVE MAN AN EXALTED POSITION IN THE HIERARCHY OF HISTORICAL FACTORS OF IMPORTANCE. KIM IL SUNG, IN CONTRAST, SAW HIMSELF AS AN ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL FIGURE IN THE STRUGGLE OF THE WORKING MASSES AGAINST THE OPPRESSIVE MIDDLE CLASS. ”

³⁴ Kim, *Accomplishing*, 20-3, 42-4.

³⁵ Oberdorfer, *Two*, 20.

³⁶ Kim, *Accomplishing*, 28.

³⁷ Byun, *North*, 87-8.

³⁸ An, *North*, 57-63.

³⁹ An, *North*, 61-2.

North Korea's preoccupation with independence and its isolationism have engaged the country in a dangerous game of brinkmanship with the United States. Over the years, this has led to near-catastrophic military tension with the United States and with South Korea, especially along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, which is already the most heavily armed land zone in the world. The DPRK has taken a particularly hard-line stance on the issue of peninsular reunification. Kim Il Sung declared that any cooperation with foreign attempts to mediate or interfere would be unthinkable because it would effectively place the destiny of Korea in the hands of foreigners, directly contrary to the *juche* principle of national self-determination.⁴⁰

In economic and military affairs, North Korea is far from the independence and self-sufficiency to which it aspires. The country is in the throes of famine and is plagued by a chronic energy crisis. Far from relying on its own energy sources and agricultural production, the DPRK has been reduced to a recipient of food aid from South Korea, the United States and other countries in the international community it had previously disdained as "imperialist aggressors." Despite the huge portion of its shrinking GDP that goes to military spending, Pyongyang is still dependent on Moscow and Beijing for weaponry and technology.

Domestically, the *juche* idea has been used to legitimize Kim Il Sung's Koreanization of "Marxism-Leninism" and the consolidation of the Stalinist system under Kim Il Sung's personal power in North Korea. Furthermore, the *juche* idea has helped to shore up North Korean national pride in the face of politico-economic competition with South Korea. Kim Il Sung used the *juche* ideology and its emphasis on the supreme importance of man and its message of self-sufficiency to stir up nationalism and revolutionary energy in the North Korean people.

Internationally, Kim Il Sung used the *juche* ideology as a justification for the elimination of the influence of the USSR and the PRC. Political independence from its bigger neighbors has always been a quest of key importance in Korean history. Kim Il Sung understood that as long as North Korea avoided siding either with the Soviet Union or China unilaterally, North Korea could remain relatively autonomous in its domestic and foreign policy; this careful balancing act of neutrality was expressed in the form of the *juche* ideology.

North Korea marks the last frontier of isolationism in the world today. Because its policies and behavior may be explained by the state ideology of *juche*, an understanding of the origins, components and philosophical underpinnings of the *juche* ideology is essential to an understanding of the North Korean state and its people.

⁴⁰ Li, *Juche*, 159.

The 'ASEAN Way'

Non-Intervention and ASEAN's Role in Conflict Management

Gillian Goh

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has come under much criticism for the violation of their held principles, which are also often referred to as the "ASEAN way." In particular, scholars have pointed to situations in which ASEAN has apparently violated the sacred principle of non-intervention, which in turn has led to the questioning of the authenticity of the "ASEAN way." In fact, in recent years, ASEAN has been spoken of negatively within the scholarly community¹ and has fallen to the wayside in light of more urgent world events. However, with Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's speech on revitalizing ASEAN,² it is now time to take a closer look again at the Association, and at its potential not only within the region, but also in terms of its demonstrated uniqueness in conflict management which may be applicable to the larger international society.

In this paper, I will seek to make a differentiation between the "ASEAN way" and the principle of non-intervention. I will also compare the strategies adopted by ASEAN in managing conflict situations with those employed by the Organization of United States (OAS) in order to delineate the "ASEAN way." It will be suggested that there are some merits to the "ASEAN way" which may be usefully applied to global conflict

management. It would be useful to this paper to review some of the key ideas behind ASEAN before proceeding with the main discussion.

The 'ASEAN Way' and Non-Intervention

Although there were many contributing factors to the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the events which were derived from the unification of Vietnam have been considered to have provided the impetus for the establishment of ASEAN in 1961. However, the seeds for forming a regional organization were already in the minds of the region's leaders, as evidenced by earlier establishment of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo. Even though these earlier models were not successful, the key factor here is that a concept of shared values and of culture as the basis of collective identity were already in place. ASA's proponents, for instance, saw themselves as not only Southeast Asian, but also as part of an Asian cultural, political and economic context.³ Thai Foreign Minister and key architect of ASA, Thanat Khoman, had firmly declared that ASA was rooted in "Asian culture and traditions".⁴ Also, despite its failure, Maphilindo, too, was a prime example of the potential use of common culture in bringing the Southeast Asian region into more of a cohesive whole, and in advancing political and strategic

¹ See for example Barry Wain, "ASEAN Is Facing Its Keenest Challenges to Date," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 23 February 1998, and Murray Hiebert, "Out of Its Depth," *Far Eastern Review*, 19 February 1998, 26.

² *The Straits Times*, Singapore, 10th October 2002.

³ See Shaun Narine, "ASEAN and the ARF: the limits of the 'ASEAN way,'" *Asian Survey*, 1997 35(9):359.

⁴ Association of Southeast Asia, *Report of the Special Session of Foreign Ministers of ASA* (Kuala Lumpur/ Cameron Highlands, Federation of Malaya, April 1962), Annex B, 27-28, in Acharya, Amitav, *The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p 81.

objectives.⁵ The fact is, Maphilindo was organized around some key principles, which were later to be accepted as salient to the “ASEAN way.” Its three member states undertook not to use “collective defense to serve the interests of any among the big powers” and pledged commitment to the principle of consultation, or *musyawarah*, as the basis for settling differences among members. This would later form ASEAN’s central approach to regional interaction and cooperation.⁶

Furthermore, the members of ASEAN also agreed upon a set of procedural norms which are thought to also embody the spirit of the “ASEAN way”.⁷ These were a set of working guidelines which set out the procedure by which conflicts would be managed by the Association. Noordin Sopiee of the Malaysian Institute of Strategic and International Studies has identified some of these norms. They include the principle of seeking agreement and harmony, the principle of sensitivity, politeness, non-confrontation and agreeability, the principle of quiet, private and elitist diplomacy versus public washing of dirty linen, and the principle of being non-Cartesian, non-legalistic.⁸ It is important to note that this set of norms describe the means of carrying out action rather than the ends. That is to say, they do not identify specific goals of policy such as the preservation of territorial integrity. Instead, they prescribe the manner in which the member states should manage their affairs and interact with one another within the context of ASEAN.

Besides these norms, ASEAN members have also more formally adopted several principles. These are found in article 2 of the Association’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. It states four basic principles with which the actions of the ASEAN members should be guided. These are: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity

of all nations, non-interference in the internal affairs of one another, settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and renunciation of the threat or use of force.

This set of principles, along with the “ASEAN way,” seems to be a source of confusion for some scholars. Jürgen Rüländ, for example argues that “ASEAN’s collective identity [is] crystallized in the revered principle of non-intervention”.⁹ He goes on to dismiss non-interference as a “pious myth,” citing as prime examples of ASEAN’s violation of this rule during the Malaysian and Indonesian protests against Myanmar’s expulsion of the Rohingya Muslims to Bangladesh, the provision of sanctuary to Muslim rebels in the Philippines by Sabah’s chief minister Tun Mustapha and Indonesian pressure on the Philippines to cancel an NGO conference on East Timor.¹⁰ Indeed, the principle of non-interference has often been thought of as the principle upon which the collective identity of ASEAN hangs. It has been attributed as a “major factor in sustaining ASEAN solidarity over the years”¹¹, and has been referred to as the “foundation stone of the ASEAN way”.¹² While this is of course true to a certain extent, it needs to be qualified with the knowledge that there is more to the ASEAN collective identity, or the “ASEAN way” than the principle of non-interference. It is the underlying culturally-based beliefs governing the ASEAN actions which make up the real “ASEAN way.”

Perhaps the beliefs and norms which are associated with ASEAN’s collective identity or “ASEAN way” are best examined within a socio-historical context.¹³ Let us turn to the political culture of the member states. In traditional terms, the manner of politics found in Southeast Asia can be considered to a large extent to be

⁵ Amitav Acharya, *The Quest for Identity*, 82.

⁶ Acharya, *The Quest for Identity*, 83.

⁷ Nikolas Busse, “Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security”, *The Pacific Review*, Vol.12 No.1 (1999): 39-60, p 47.

⁸ Soesastro, Hadi, ed., *ASEAN in a Changed Regional and International Political Economy* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), iii-ix.

⁹ Rüländ, Jürgen, “ASEAN and the Asian crisis: theoretical implications and practical consequences for Southeast Asian regionalism,” *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 13 No. 3 (2000):439.

¹⁰ Rüländ, 440.

¹¹ Herman Joseph S. Kraft, “ASEAN and intra-ASEAN relations: weathering the storm?” *The Pacific Review*, Vol.13 No. 3 (2000):462. (Tay 2001)

¹² Pye, Lucien W. *Asian Power and Politic, The Cultural Dimension of Authority*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.

personalistic, informal and non-contractual. The survival of the existing empires relied heavily on a ruler's successful relationships with others in power. Unlike the West, Southeast Asia never experienced an equivalent to Roman law which might have introduced "rational bureaucracies" in the Weberian sense and brought a more formal and legalistic systemization to the local politics. According to Busse, after the process of decolonization, the traditional polity was transformed into what some specialists have called "bureaucratic polities".¹⁴ Even though formal political institutions existed in theory, in reality, most of the states in Southeast Asia were ruled by small elite circles operating on the basis of patronage networks. This had the effect of institutionalising a highly private and informal political culture. Thus, even today, a set of social etiquette exists which has its basis in indirectness and social harmony. The recent Asian Financial Crisis was a sound reminder that these practices are still deeply entrenched in the economic and political systems of the region.¹⁵

The regard for social considerateness and etiquette which the elite hold can be seen for example in ASEAN's response to (then) US Vice President Al Gore's criticism of Malaysia's policies surrounding the dismissal and subsequent incarceration of that country's Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim.¹⁶ Gore's remarks were considered remarkably callous, not only by the Malaysian government, but also by other ASEAN states. ASEAN's member states objected to this as an aggressive imposition of American "democratic values" on the politics of an ASEAN state. ASEAN diplomats rallied together and affirmed a return to the "ASEAN way" as fundamental to their political identity. It is interesting to note that cohesiveness of the "ASEAN way" and the ASEAN principles are

clearly expressed when faced or challenged by the views of other states or organisations.¹⁷

Nikolas Busse has suggested that the "ASEAN way" is the method employed by the organization in dealing with conflict situations.¹⁸ Perhaps then the best method of defining the "ASEAN way" is in fact to place it beside another regional organization and compare their methods in conflict resolution. I recognise that the comparison between the methods of different regional organizations in dealing with different conflict situations must have its limits since no two conflicts are situationally very similar, but at the same time, there is some scope here to point out the different ideologies or philosophies underlying their different approaches.

Some of the most notable cases of intervention by regional organizations to date include: Organization of American States (OAS) in conflicts in Haiti and Nicaragua and between El Salvador and Honduras; the Organization for African Unity (OAU) in Burundi, Liberia, Somalia and Sierra Leone; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Cambodia; and NATO in the former Yugoslavia. In this paper, I will make a comparison between ASEAN's method of dealing with the conflict in Cambodia and the Organization of American States (OAS) in its role in the conflict in Haiti.

Background to the Conflicts in Cambodia and in Haiti¹⁹

Cambodia

The Cambodian crisis was escalating late in 1978. In response to attacks by Democratic Kampuchea (DK) along Vietnam's southwestern border and at the request of the Kampuchea United Front for National

¹⁴ Jackson, Karl. D., "Bureaucratic polity: a theoretical framework for the analysis of power and communications in Indonesia," in Karl. D.

Jackson and Lucien W. Pye, eds., *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 3-22.

¹⁵ For more detail, see Busse, 48.

¹⁶ This occurred at a pre-APEC Business Summit convened in Kuala Lumpur in November 1998.

¹⁷ Shusterman, "Understanding the Self's Others," in Gupta and Chattopadhyaya, eds., *Cultural Otherness and Beyond* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 1998), 108.

¹⁸ Nikolas Busse, 47.

¹⁹ Thi Hai Yen Nguyen provides a clear account of these two conflict situations, on which I have based my description here. See Thi Hai Yen Nguyen, "Beyond Good Offices? The Role of Regional Organizations in Conflict Resolution," *Journal of International Affairs*, vol 55 No.2 (Spring 2002):468-479.

Salvation, Vietnamese troops launched a full-scale offensive against the Khmer Rouge which was in power at the time. In a matter of three weeks, the Vietnamese took Phnom Penh and helped establish the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).

Essentially, the Cambodian conflict was an intrastate conflict involving four domestic warring factions, these being: the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) led by Hun Sen, the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) or Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot and later by Khieu Sam Phan, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by Son Sann, and the National United Front for a Cooperative, Independent, Neutral and Peaceful Cambodia (FUNCIPPEC) led by Norodom Sihanouk. These four factions were all vying for central rule and international recognition. The conflict also embodied the elements of a proxy war – Vietnam supported the PRK and China supported the Khmer Rouge – in a war over Cambodian soil.²⁰ It is important to note that none of these three countries were members of ASEAN at the time when the conflict took place.

To add to the complexity of the issue, due to the dynamics of the confrontation as well as the genocidal practices of the Khmer Rouge²¹, the conflict could not be resolved by the restoration of the ruling party to power. The most viable solution would be to work out a power sharing agreement between warring factions and their foreign patrons. With the outbreak of conflict, the international community looked to ASEAN to lead the international response.²²

OAS in Haiti

Created in 1948, the OAS is a large association of countries in the Western hemisphere founded to promote military, economic, social and cultural cooperation among member states. At the time of

the Haitian conflict, the organization had 25 members, including the United States.

The Haitian conflict broke out when a military coup led by General Raoul Cedras, commander-in-chief of the Haitian armed forces, overthrew Haiti's president Jean-Bertrand Aristide on 29 September 1991. President Aristide, who had won 67 percent of the votes in Haiti's first democratic election, was forced to go into exile in Venezuela and later the United States. General Cedras assumed office and the military immediately returned to the pressure tactics of previous dictatorships.²³ The Haitian conflict was a true intrastate conflict because it involved General Cedras' military regime and exiled President Aristide's resistance movement. Unlike Cambodia, Haiti was a member of the regional organization at the time of the conflict's outbreak. For the international community, the solution to the Haitian conflict was to restore President Aristide to his democratically elected post. Now let us examine the methods of conflict management employed by OAS and ASEAN.

'ASEAN way' Compared with that of the OAS in Dealing with Conflict Situations

First, the OAS, unlike ASEAN, acted to resolve the Haitian conflict independently. ASEAN chose more indirect means, and involved the larger international community. From the earliest stages of the conflict ASEAN concentrated its diplomatic energies on the United Nations.²⁴ Also, the OAS took a more aggressive tack: From the onset of the conflict, OAS countries isolated Haiti diplomatically and economically – at their 3 October 1991 meeting, the OAS ministers of foreign affairs recommended that all member states suspend economic, financial and commercial links with Haiti. They also called for the suspension of all aid and technical assistance to the country with the exception of humanitarian aid.²⁵ The OAS constantly pressured the military regime to back down. It imposed an oil embargo

²⁰ Due to Vietnam's presence in Cambodia and China's backing of the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian conflict was the most complicated conflict in a third world country since the end of the second world war.

²¹ It had been responsible for the deaths of up to 1.5 million Kampuchians between 1975 and 1978.

²² Jeannie Henderson, *Adelphi Paper 328: Reassessing ASEAN* (London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999), 77.

²³ "A Case Study in Conflict," Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, at www.elca.org/dcs/peace_study08.html, qtd in Thi, 470.

²⁴ Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizée and Sorpong Peou, eds., *Cambodia – The 1989 Paris Peace Conference: Background Analysis and Document* (Millbank, NY: Kraus International Publications, 1991).

²⁵ Elizabeth D. Gibbons, *Sanctions in Haiti: Human Rights and Democracy under Assault* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999).

on 8 October 1991, denying Haiti access to foreign oil, the country's sole source of energy and fuel.²⁶ OAS also denied visas and froze assets of those individuals who had perpetrated and supported the coup.²⁷

As with the OAS, in order to force Vietnam to pull out of Cambodia, ASEAN mobilized the international community and the Security Council to isolate the country both diplomatically and economically.²⁸ But short of forming a military alliance, ASEAN did not have the enforcement power which would allow them to use harsh measures on Cambodia. This influenced their decision on their method of conflict management. ASEAN prevented the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) from obtaining the Cambodian seat at the United Nations, and thus, from becoming the legitimate government in Cambodia. In the 34th session of the General Assembly, ASEAN member states Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore played an important role in opposing India's proposal to leave the Cambodian seat vacant at the United Nations. Throughout UN sessions 34 to 37 (from 1979 to 1982), ASEAN succeeded in blocking India's motion, therefore ensuring that the Cambodian seat at the United Nations remained firmly with the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) or Khmer Rouge. ASEAN was cautious and in its approach to the situation in Cambodia. Without directly addressing Vietnam, ASEAN foreign ministers called for a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodia and the dismantling of the Phnom Penh government so Cambodians could exercise their right of self-determination through elections.²⁹ On the other hand, during the Haitian conflict, a delegation of the OAS secretary-general and six ministers of foreign affairs from the member countries confronted General Raoul Cedras at Port-au-Prince to initiate negotiations for the restoration of democracy in Haiti.³⁰ The Haitian

military, however, refused to negotiate with the commission.

ASEAN were less confrontational in their tactics, inviting the different parties for talks with the more neutral member states within the Association, such as Singapore. In April 1981, the Singaporean government invited representatives from one of the factions to participate in talks concerning the creation of a coalition government. Concurrently, Thailand's foreign minister, Siddi Savetsila, the ASEAN standing committee chairman, visited Washington, DC, to seek support for the proposition.

Finally, OAS turned to the UN late in the situation. They also chose to use the threat of military force. In late 1992, the OAS realised that the oil embargo had failed to achieve its expected results. Weakened by the lack of a naval blockade and the violations of OAS members, including the United States and non-hemispheric parties, the embargo could neither bring down the de facto government in Haiti nor make it compromise. The OAS decided that international efforts were necessary to force a settlement. In December 1992, the OAS ministers took their case to the United Nations to request a universal embargo against Haiti and the approval of a possible military intervention.³¹ This resulted in close cooperation between OAS and the UN Security Council in carrying out a global oil and arms embargo. The global embargo, strengthened by the deployment of a US naval blockade and a ban imposed on the leaders and supporters of Cedras's military regime against into the United States finally forced the coup leaders to sign a compromise pact – the Governors Island Agreement – on 3 July 1993.³² Under the agreement, President Aristide would return to power on 30 October 1993 and would designate a prime minister. The commander-in-chief of the armed forces would take an early

²⁶ (Boniface 1999), 5.

²⁷ Howard W. French, "Rival of Haiti's Ousted President Is Installed as Prime Minister," *New York Times*, 20 June 1992, L-3.

²⁸ Chan Heng Chee, "The Interests and Role of ASEAN in the Indochina Conflict," International Conference on Indochina and Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 19-21 June 1980), 12.

²⁹ It has been noted that the ASEAN members displayed an impressive ability to coordinate their responses, presenting a united front. See Tim Huxley, "ASEAN Security Cooperation- Past, Present and Future" in Alison Broinowski, ed., *ASEAN into the 1990s* (Houndmills and London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1990), 89.

³⁰ (Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 1994)

³¹ (Boniface 1999), 6.

³² (Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 1994), 10.

retirement and sanctions against Haiti would be lifted³³

Yet the signing of the accord and the lifting of sanctions did not bring peace and democracy. The military regime in Haiti sponsored acts of violence to prevent the new government from taking office. The OAS countries responded by joining forces with the UN Security Council and other UN member states to remove the military regime from Haiti so that the agreement could be implemented. On 19 September 1994, approximately 22,000 US troops landed in Haiti; one month later, the military leaders finally backed down and President Aristide was peacefully restored to power.

In the Cambodian situation, when there were signs of ceasefire violations and the Khmer Rouge declared a boycott of the elections, ASEAN only urged all parties in Cambodia to comply fully with their obligations as outlined in the peace agreement. ASEAN foreign ministers called on "all Cambodian parties to live up to the spirit of national reconciliation for the sake of Cambodia's sovereignty, independence, integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity".³⁴ ASEAN contributed much more to the success of the 1998 elections. When Second Prime Minister Hun Sen ousted First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh on 2 July 1997, ASEAN responded decisively by suspending the admission of Cambodia into ASEAN until free and democratic elections could be held in Cambodia. In addition, an ASEAN troika led by the foreign ministers of Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand joined the "Friends of Cambodia" group to mediate between the Hun Sen government and the opposition to restore democratic legitimacy to the government. Several ASEAN countries also assisted Cambodia with technical preparation and monitored the elections.³⁵ Thus without the use

of military enforcement, ASEAN achieved a satisfactory result in their management of the Cambodian situation. In truth, forging a military alliance against Vietnam at the outset would have afforded ASEAN certain advantages. It would have indicated to Vietnam that ASEAN was willing to stand up for their principles, and ASEAN would have gained the approval of the international community. An alliance would also have strengthened Thailand's position, decreasing its vulnerability as a state on the frontline. But the members of ASEAN decided against this course of action because they saw it as counterproductive and uncomfortably provocative.³⁶

Conclusion

In this paper, I have tried to show that the "ASEAN way" is much more than the principle of non-intervention. In fact, it has been applied with good results in conflict intervention.

During the Cambodian conflict, ASEAN adhered to the norms of the "ASEAN way," as described by Noordin Sopiee. From the start of its intervention, ASEAN applied its non-confrontational style to the situation, through direct and indirect measures of restraint, pressure, diplomacy, communication and trade-offs.³⁷ ASEAN played an important role in resolving the Cambodian conflict. All this happened without the need for force. The OAS, on the other hand, being stronger than ASEAN in enforcement power utilized a more direct and aggressive strategy to the conflict situation in Haiti. In deploying military force, it not only incurred a far greater cost, but also opened up the possibility of incurring the far greater costs to humanity during armed conflict. Perhaps there is scope here to further examine the "ASEAN way" as a viable strategy in global conflict resolution.

³³ [Dexter Boniface, "Defending Democracy in the Western Hemisphere: A Behavioural Analysis of the Organization of American States," International Studies Association's annual meeting (Washington, DC: 16 to 20 February 1999) at www.ciaonet.org/isa/bod01/bod01.html > p 6.]

³⁴ (Statement by ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Elections in Cambodia 1993)

³⁵ See www.hrw.org/reports/1997/cambodia/Cambodia.htm

³⁶ Interviews with former foreign ministers in ASEAN. See Busse, 50.

³⁷ ASEAN has applied a similar strategy in the dispute over Sabah, with excellent results. See A. Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organization and Order in Southeast Asia* (London: Macmillan, 1982), and T.S. Lau, "Conflict-Resolution in ASEAN: The Sabah Issue" in T.S. Lau, ed., *New Directions in the International Relations of Southeast Asia* (Singapore: University of Singapore Press, 1973).

The Political Economy of the Philippines Under Marcos

Property Rights in the Philippines from 1965-1986

Kenji Kushida

Introduction and Questions

In almost all studies of Asian economic growth, the Philippines is cited as the great exception to Southeast Asian growth “miracles.” Despite sharing similar macroeconomic fundamentals with neighboring countries, the Philippines has been left out of rapid growth occurring in the region since the 1960s. In many overviews of development in the region, this lack of a sustained economic takeoff in the Philippines is often broadly attributed to political factors, especially the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos and the corruption surrounding his regime.

To better understand the nature of power Marcos held, how it changed during his regime, and the implications for economic development during this time, I propose to examine the Philippines under Marcos using theoretical frameworks created to explain the commitment problem. The commitment problem is essentially the problem of how sovereigns or governments can make credible commitments to assure the sanctity of its citizens’ property rights. Secure property rights are a precondition for productive investment, which in turn is usually a necessary condition for economic growth. Therefore, the nature of how the commitment problem is solved, or whether it is solved at all, is important to a basic understanding of how types of government foster or hinder economic development.

Examining the Philippines under Marcos using this framework of the commitment problem leads to the following questions. What was the nature of the commitment problem under Marcos?

More specifically, what model or models best explain how Marcos dealt with the commitment problem? How did this change over time? A systematic analysis of property rights commitments under Marcos has not been undertaken prior to this attempt. This paper therefore contributes to existing literature on the history, economic history, and political economy of the Philippines, and adds a case study to scholarship examining property rights commitments.

I hypothesize the following. First, from 1966 until 1972, between the time Marcos was elected and the declaration of martial law, the commitment problem in the Philippines was resolved through the Vertical Political Integration (VPI) model, articulated by Haber, Maurer, and Rozzo.¹ Second, over the course of this period, Marcos progressively consolidated his power until he was able to break through restraints imposed on him under VPI. US financial support enabled him to do so in the manner of the framework articulated by Bates.² Third, after declaring martial law in 1972, Marcos acted as a stationary bandit, as articulated by Mancur Olsen.³

To test these hypotheses and answer the questions posed initially, I will first briefly introduce the experience of the Philippines under Marcos. Following this, I will outline the three theoretical and conceptual frameworks, along with the criteria to test whether we can identify them from the empirical evidence. Next, I will apply these frameworks to the experience of the Philippines, assessing whether the theoretical frameworks can be used to explain the empirical evidence and thereby testing my hypotheses.

¹ Stephen Haber, Noel Maurer and Armando Rozzo, *The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico: 1876-1929*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

² Robert Bates, *Prosperity and Violence: the Political Economy of Development* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).

³ Mancur Olsen, *Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000).

Finally I will conclude that nature of the commitment problem in the Philippines during the Marcos era can be modeled fairly accurately with these frameworks.

The Philippines Under Marcos – a Brief History

In 1965, Marcos won the presidential election, running as the nominee of the Nacionalista party in a bi-party electoral system. A few months earlier, he had been president of the opposing Liberal Party.⁴ Once in power, he used political appointments and rent transfers to an unprecedented degree to consolidate bureaucratic, military, and elite political support, and was able to weaken the judiciary through reappointment timing. Marcos vastly expanded the bureaucracy, much of which became functionally redundant, to create a large group of bureaucrats dependent on him for patronage and their livelihood. He expanded both the scale and role of the military, allowing it to engage in a broad range of economic activities, personally benefiting leaders and officers loyal to Marcos. He also granted monopolies to local elite whom he appointed as local political leaders, making them reliant on him for their wealth and lifestyle. During his first term, it was time for six out of nine Supreme Court justice positions to be reappointed. It has been argued that that Marcos had delayed running for president to align the timing of his presidency with the reappointments, and he appointed justices loyal to himself. The judicial system thereafter consistently ruled in favor of Marcos decrees and against opposition.⁵

In the 1969 presidential election, Marcos used massive amounts of the government budget to secure votes through patronage, buying votes, and organized violence and fraud.⁶ The constitution limited his presidency to two terms,

and in 1972, a year before the end of his second term, Marcos declared martial law. He cited the need for authoritarian rule to foster economic growth and prevent communist insurgencies, and was widely supported both domestically and internationally.⁷

Under martial law, Marcos suspended then revamped the constitution, silenced the media, and used violence and oppression against political opposition. He nationalized and monopolized increasing portions of industry and further increased spending on patronage. Throughout this time, the US and international organizations such as the World Bank and IMF generously supported the Marcos regime with aid and loans. Marcos was able to exchange solid commitment to the Philippine-US alliance with significant US aid, due to US Cold War interests of having military bases strategically located in the Philippines. It is often argued that a great proportion Marcos' patronage was funded by US aid.⁸ The World Bank and IMF regarded Marcos as emulating tactics of Lee Kwan Yew's successful authoritarian regime in Singapore, making the Philippines a "special focus" area to target funding.⁹

Theories

Vertical Political Integration – Haber

Vertical Political Integration (VPI), articulated by Haber et al., is one possible solution to the commitment problem. In VPI, the government selectively enforces property rights of a segment of asset holders. The line between government and private asset holders becomes blurred, and a third party enforces that the government will not encroach on asset holder property rights. This arrangement provides incentive for asset holders to engage in productive investment, since they are confident their

⁴ Albert F. Celozza, *Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of Authoritarianism* (Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 23.

⁵ Celozza, 28.

⁶ David J. Steinberg, *The Philippines: A Singular and a Plural Place* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), 120.

⁷ Steinberg, 121.

⁸ Jane Hutchison, "Pressure on Policy in the Philippines," *The Political Economy of South-East Asia: an Introduction* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997), 81.

⁹ James K. Boyce, *The Philippines: The political Economy of Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1993), 255.

¹⁰ Bates, 75-83.

property rights are secure, allowing the government to benefit from tax revenue and other rent.

To determine the existence of VPI, we can start by searching for characteristics Haber et al. predict that a state embodying VPI will exhibit. These include a rent-seeking coalition, economic inefficiency, negative distribution of income, political authoritarianism, and inefficiency in providing public services. If these characteristics can be identified, we can then search for necessary conditions of effective VPI. First, we must observe the selective enforcement of property rights by the government. Second, we must observe a blurred line between asset holders and government, in which asset holders are given a hand in policy-making. Third, we must identify a third party with the ability to police and enforce arrangements between government and asset holders.

In identifying a viable and effective third party, we must observe the following factors. First, there must be incentive compatibility between the government, asset holders, and third party. Second, the third party must have the ability to police arrangements between government and asset holders. Third, the third party must present a credible violent threat to the government both to enforce arrangements and to ensure that the government will not dispose the third party. Fourth, asset holders must be able to recruit a new third party, or the government and third party must have strong incentives to check each other's power.

International Context - Bates

In the argument articulated by Bates, states founded in the post-World War II era were secure from military conflict with other states, and could exploit Cold War interests of developed nations to secure funding from abroad. This freed them from the necessity of creating credible property rights commitments for the purpose of fostering economic development to procure the resources for survival.

Bates argues that states developing before the post-war modern era faced military threats to national survival. This necessitated sufficient funding for military protection, and credible

property rights were required to secure such funding. Limited governments were developed as a means to make property rights commitments credible. However, under the international system during the Cold War, local territorial transgressions by developing states threatened to spark full-fledged violent conflict between the US and Soviet Union. Developing states could therefore easily secure funding from either side by taking sides or merely promising to abstain from aggression. With easy funding options, governments of nations developing in the postwar modern era did not need to tie their hands in the form of a limited government.¹⁰

To assess the applicability of Bates' argument, first we will determine whether Cold War interests of developed nations removed military threats. Second we must assess whether the developing country had easy access to funding through taking sides with major Cold War powers. Third, we will determine whether availability of external funding allowed the government to rely less on credible domestic property rights commitments for survival.

Stationary Bandit - Olsen

The stationary bandit, conceptualized by Olsen, is a sovereign with a monopoly on domestic violence who maximizes his own self-interest by making a commitment to respect property rights. The long-term self interest of a stationary bandit is to maximize rent. To do so, the bandit recognizes that by fostering sustained economic development, he can maximize rent by taxing at the revenue-maximizing level. To foster economic development, the bandit must guarantee security of property rights to foster investment. The only constraint acting on the sovereign bandit is his own long-term self-interest.

However, this constraint is extremely weak, and Olsen points out that, as a practical matter, stationary bandits may not have long time horizons. Therefore, stationary bandit behavior can easily become predatory, in which the bandit extracts more rent from the economy than a long-term tax revenue-maximizing strategy would warrant.

¹¹ Celozza, 89.

To identify a stationary bandit, we must first examine if he has a monopoly on domestic means of violence. Second, we must try to identify behavior indicating that the sovereign is attempting to set tax rates at revenue-maximizing levels. Third, we will attempt to determine whether the time horizon of the sovereign seemed long enough to sustain a long-term tax revenue-maximizing strategy.

Applying Theories to the Marcos Regime

We will now test our hypotheses by applying each theory to the experience of the Philippines under Marcos.

VPI in the Philippines

First, let us determine whether the Philippines under Marcos exhibited the expected characteristics resulting from VPI governance. A rent-seeking coalition can be found in Marcos cronies, who were dependent on him for patronage in the form of lucrative monopolies and large perks associated with political positions. Economic inefficiency was rampant, as many sectors were protected behind tariffs and monopolies were granted to Marcos cronies, with the assurance of government bailouts if unprofitable.¹¹ Inequality in the distribution of income, already high vis-à-vis most of the world,¹² rose markedly during the Marcos era, as over fifty percent of the population slipped under the poverty line.¹³ Political authoritarianism was achieved before martial law mainly through the mechanism of patron-client relationships, in which Marcos redistributed rent in various ways to implement his political will. Provision of public services were inadequate under Marcos, as insufficient investment in infrastructure continually plagued the country.¹⁴ Thus, we observe that the Philippines during the Marcos era exhibits all the characteristics expected as outcomes of VPI governance.

This leads us to examine the power structure before Marcos declared martial law to assess whether the necessary conditions existed for effective VPI governance during this period. First, we do observe the selective enforcement of property rights under Marcos. Marcos protected the property rights of his cronies and US interests. To his cronies, Marcos granted monopolies and distributed rent, and to US citizens and business interests, he went to great lengths to assure the sanctity of their property rights of US citizens and business interests. He worked hard to overturn a number of supreme court decisions threatening the rights of foreign companies to engage in retail business and foreigners to own land.¹⁵ However, Marcos did not hesitate to violate the property rights of enemies or those who did not cooperate with him through forced nationalization of enterprises¹⁶ and outright seizure of property.¹⁷

Second, we do observe a blurred line between asset holders and government. Marcos' friends and allies and were actively involved in formulating and enacting economic policies. Economic policy-making has been described as a small circle of political and business allies and technocrats "gathered around a powerful chief executive."¹⁸

This leads us to the question of was there, and if so, who, acted as third party enforcer. I hypothesize that the segment of Filipino elite which was not directly tied to Marcos as "cronies" (referred to hereon as non-Marcos elite) initially played the role of third party enforcer. Before testing this hypothesis, let us establish the basis for this hypothesis. Historical accounts of the Philippines invariably trace the Philippine power structure throughout history as elite domination. Originally in the form of collaboration with the Spanish, then American colonial rulers, a small elite class is most often argued to have continued domination of politics and the economy largely

¹² Boyce, 39.

¹³ Rob Vos and Josef T. Yap. *The Philippine Economy: East Asia's Stray Cat?* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 24.

¹⁴ Vos and Yap, 23.

¹⁵ Celozo, 110-114.

¹⁶ Steinberg, 136.

¹⁷ Boyce, 8.

¹⁸ Boyce, 330.

¹⁹ Hutchison, 79-80.

through a colonial legacy of economic and political dominance combined with failure of land reforms.¹⁹ With this historical backdrop, the two political parties never had distinct platforms, and it has been argued that alternating power merely indicated that a certain elite group would benefit from patronage and selective redistribution, while the other group waited until it became their turn to come to power and receive the same benefits.²⁰ Thus, although it is beyond the scope of this paper to establish that the Philippines embodied a VPI system before Marcos, this is the basis for hypothesizing that the third party enforcer at the time Marcos came to power was the non-Marcos elite.

We must now test the hypothesis that non-Marcos elite was the third-party enforcer. First, the third party was able to police arrangements between the government and asset holders. The third party, by being Filipino elite themselves, were able to monitor Marcos' behavior towards Marcos elite. Had Marcos started to infringe on property rights of elite in general, non-Marcos elite would have felt effects as well. If Marcos only encroached on property rights of Marcos elite, information networks simply being part of the power structure is likely to have provided non-Marcos elite with information.

Second, we can determine incentive compatibility between the three parties: Marcos, Marcos cronies, and non-Marcos elite. The third party was essential for government because Marcos needed extensive elite support, regardless of whether they were his direct cronies or not, to initially attain and retain power. Due to the patron-client nature of Philippine politics, Marcos had to channel rent to elite, since he needed local elite to support him to receive sufficient popular votes for his initial election in 1965 as well as in 1969.²¹ Asset holders aligned third party interests with their own. Marcos cronies were interested in keeping Marcos in power, since they received disproportionate flows of patronage and rent.²² Non-Marcos cronies were also interested in

keeping Marcos in power as long as his policies benefited the elite as a whole, since they were also dependent on policies retaining disproportionate wealth allocations to the elite.

Third, the third party threat was credible. Non-Marcos elite did have the potential power to form a coalition to defeat Marcos in the 1969 election. Therefore, Marcos still depended upon them for reelection in 1969, making the threat from non-Marcos elite credible.

Fourth, although it does not seem possible for asset holders to recruit a new third party, the government and third party did have strong incentives to check each other's power. Since the third party is non-Marcos elite, it does not seem possible that Marcos cronies could recruit a new third party. If Marcos decided to collude with the non-Marcos elite, there would be little that former Marcos cronies could do. However, collusion would have been unlikely, given the family and kinship networks determining the composition of Marcos cronies. Furthermore, incentives were strong for the government and third party not to let one another become too powerful. Since Marcos depended on non-Marcos elite support for reelection, he had strong incentives to keep them dependent on his patronage and redistribution to keep them from forming too powerful an opposition. At the same time, it was also in the interest of non-Marcos elite to prevent Marcos from becoming too powerful, lest he selectively violate their property rights.

Thus, non-Marcos elite fulfill the conditions for a third-party enforcer, both confirming the existence of a third party enforcer and testing positive our hypothesis that the third party enforcer was the non-Marcos elite.

We conclude that Haber's framework of VPI fits the Philippines well between 1965 and 1969. However, after Marcos was reelected, the third party's position was progressively eroded, and almost eliminated, after Marcos declared martial law. After Marcos' reelection, as it was his last

²⁰ Eva-Lotta E. Hedman and John T. Sidel, *Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial Legacies, Post-Colonial Trajectories* (London: Routledge, 2000), 18; Celozza, 20-21.

²¹ In actual practice this meant that he relied on local elite to mobilize their networks of vote-buying, ballot-box fixing, the threat of violence, and organized turnouts of voters who had already deceased (Steinberg, 120).

²² It may also be mentioned here that Marcos cronies were generally not the most affluent, established elite to begin with. They were a second tier elite class that joined the higher elite.

term as presidency, the opposition not longer had the credible threat of defeating him in elections. Moreover, by this time Marcos had successfully all but eliminated the threat of opposition forces forcibly removing him from power and he had greatly consolidated his power over the bureaucracy, military, and local politicians through patronage and distributing rents. Thus, by the time Marcos declared martial law, the third party was no longer essential for government nor posed a credible threat. After 1969, and especially after 1971, the system of VPI no longer functioned in the Philippines.

Bates applied to the Philippines

Let us now test our second hypothesis that Marcos consolidated his power and eroded the credible threat of the third party due to factors argued by Bates. First, we must determine whether Cold War interests of developed nations removed military threats to the Philippines. During the time Marcos was in power, the Philippines served as the main strategic base for US forward deployment in Southeast Asia. During the Vietnam War, Clarke Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base.²³ Even after the Vietnam War, the US considered the Philippines to be one of the prime strategic locations in fighting the Cold War in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia.²⁴ With heavily vested US military interests in the country, along with a reciprocal military alliance with the US,²⁵ it is safe to conclude that the Philippines had little to worry about in terms of territorial aggression by its neighbors.²⁶

Second, Marcos did take sides and was able to obtain easy access to funding. Throughout his time in power, Marcos consistently made solid commitments that the Philippines would remain a

US ally. In return, the US considered the Philippines their most important ally in Southeast Asia, granting large amounts of aid.²⁷ While Marcos was a senator before his presidency, he had taken a position against sending Philippine troops to Vietnam. However, once in power, he “vigorously campaigned for the approval of the Philippine Congress to send [Philippine troops] to Vietnam.”²⁸ This switch in positions was explicitly to gain US financial aid for the economy and to vastly expand the military.²⁹ Furthermore, Marcos courted US business interests by overturning several Philippine Supreme Court rules that threatened to ban US enterprises from engaging in retail or own land.

In addition, international organizations such as the World Bank and IMF also contributed developmental assistance to the Philippines, although direct influence of Cold War interests is difficult to establish. In 1971, the Consultative Group for the Philippines, chaired by the World Bank, was developed to mobilize official financial flows and developmental assistance. The World Bank designated the Philippines as a “country of concentration,” granting more than average lending for a country its size.³⁰ It has been argued that financial aid by international institutions reflects cold war interests of developed nations because they dominate the agenda of such institutions,³¹ but this has not been fully substantiated.

Third, external funding did allow Marcos to rely less on credible domestic property rights commitments. It has been widely argued that the magnitude of rent Marcos transferred as patronage to consolidate his position would not have been attainable without US financial support of his regime. Based on strong correlations between foreign capital inflows and capital flight, along with anecdotal evidence, it has been argued that

²³ Steinberg, 119.

²⁴ Steinberg, 123; Celozza, 110.

²⁵ The Philippine American Security Alliance.

²⁶ Furthermore, empirically, the only significant threats to Philippine territory, after its independence, came after the Cold War was over and the US pulled out of the country altogether. I refer to the conflict over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, which are claimed by several Southeast Asian nations as well as China.

²⁷ Celozza, 101.

²⁸ Celozza, 78.

²⁹ Celozza, 101.

³⁰ Boyce, 255.

³¹ Saneh Chamarik and Susantha Goonatilake ed. *Technological Independence – The Asian Experience* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1994) <<http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu04te/uu04te00.htm>>.

a large amount of foreign capital was channeled directly as rent to Marcos elite.³² Therefore, Marcos was much less dependent on domestic economic growth to provide him with rent to redistribute,³³ and could selectively violate domestic property rights by forming monopolies and nationalizing industries.

Furthermore, Marcos was able to put himself in a position where the declaration of martial law, implying the loss of any remaining restraints on his commitment to property rights, was welcomed by his external sources of funding. When Marcos declared martial law, he was widely supported by the US government and business community as well as international institutions. President Nixon, interested in maintaining its military bases, and US businesses, interested in Marcos' assurances of property rights protection, welcomed Marcos' authoritarian power as stabilizing US interests.³⁴ International organizations such as the World Bank and IMF "looked forward to funding another of the series of Pacific Basin economic miracles."³⁵ Therefore, external funding greatly aided Marcos in attaining a position which enabled him to encroach on the property rights of non-Marcos elite. Thus, Bates' argument can be applied to the Philippines to help us understand how Marcos was able to move away from the VPI system to consolidate his power and remove credible threats by the third party.

Applying the Stationary Bandit Concept

After consolidating power and declaring martial law, Marcos extracted more rent from the economy than would be expected from a stationary bandit. Olsen's framework explains this as Marcos having a relatively short time horizon.

First, Marcos had a monopoly on domestic means of violence. Almost immediately after becoming elected, he consolidated his power over

the military. He appointed himself as secretary of national defense,³⁶ installing trusted supporters and friends in high positions.³⁷ He expanded the economic opportunities of the military, distributing rent to his officers and cronies. At the same time, aided by US financial support, he increased the size of the military, populating new divisions with supporters who owed their livelihood to him.³⁸ Marcos also expanded the role of the military, replacing much of the police force functions.³⁹ Marcos thus created a large, powerful military structure, with individuals within the structure largely dependent on him for their livelihoods and lifestyles – in short, a monopoly on domestic means of violence.

Second, Marcos extracted more rent from the economy than we would expect from a long-term tax-revenue maximizing strategy. His methodology was to grant monopolies and receive rent, to nationalize enterprises to assure his cronies maintained profits despite failing businesses, and to make himself the center of almost all important business transactions, receiving cuts at each step. Monopolies reduce tax revenue in the long-run by creating inefficiencies in the form of deadweight economic losses. Marcos created monopolies in most major industries, creating massive economic inefficiency. Further adding to the inefficiency, Marcos nationalized many enterprises, increasing the number of government-owned corporations from thirty-two to over three hundred by the time he was overthrown.⁴⁰ In some cases he directly appropriated the excess profits as rent, and in other cases he used public money to bail out failed enterprises run by his cronies to assure them personal profitability. Against his opponents or non-cooperative elite, he also forcibly nationalized many enterprises to personally ruin them and receive short-term profits.⁴¹ Finally, he channeled

³² Boyce, 305, 321-321, 329.

³³ It may even be argued that, judging by the massive external debt accrued during the Marcos era, Marcos would not have been able to consolidate his power to the degree he managed to without heavy external funding.

³⁴ Celozo, 115; Steinberg, 123.

³⁵ Boyce, 329.

³⁶ Celozo, 77.

³⁷ Steinberg, 130.

³⁸ Celozo, 77-79

³⁹ Celozo, 77

⁴⁰ Steinberg, 168.

⁴¹ Celozo, 89.

all major economic activity through himself, leading to the commonly cited wheel-and-spokes analogy, in which all business needed to first pass through Marcos. In every case, he extracted rent exchanging economic inefficiency for short term personal profit.⁴² This behavior by Marcos suggests he was extracting rent from the economy at a much higher level than if he were maximizing his long-term tax revenues.

The high level of rent extracted by Marcos can be explained by the argument that his time horizon was relatively short. Prior to getting thrown out of power in 1986, Marcos had been seriously ill, and had battled for his life.⁴³ However, he had not set any succession mechanism into place. It may be assumed that he planned to pass power onto his family and children, but such plans were never made public. Some argue that he was incapable of fathoming himself as fallible or of contemplating beyond his own rule.⁴⁴ In any case, if Marcos' time horizon was limited to a reasonable expectation of his own lifespan, and did not extend to include a dynasty of rulers – his grandchildren and descendants – then, his rent extraction beyond tax revenue-maximizing levels is to be expected. Thus, Olsen's framework of a stationary bandit can be used to explain Marcos' intense rent-seeking behavior and his often-cited plundering of the economy.

Conclusion

Thus, the initial hypotheses posed test positive for the different periods of Marcos' reign. We are now in a position to understand how shifts in the nature of the commitment problem of the Philippines under Marcos led to the shift in his power from elected president to dictator. Between 1966 and 1972, the commitment problem was partially resolved through Vertical Political Integration, with non-Marcos elite enforcing Marcos' commitment to property rights. However, during this time, Marcos was able to take

advantage of the international environment to secure funding by making solid commitments to the US, allowing him to distribute patronage and enlarge the government to consolidate his power. As his power became consolidated to the point that the third party no longer posed a credible threat, VPI no longer resolved the commitment problem, and Marcos declared martial law in 1972 to become a stationary bandit. With only long-term self interest constraining him, Marcos did not have a long enough time horizon to cause him to tax society at revenue-maximizing levels. Instead, he transferred massive amounts of rent from the economy to himself and his cronies, liberally violating the property rights of non-Marcos elite as well the general populace.

Although economic growth during the Marcos era was largely influenced by external factors such as global commodity prices and the international debt crisis in the 1980s, both VPI and any form of banditry will cause productive investment levels to be much lower than under limited government. Therefore, if it can be determined that neighboring countries had more effective solutions to the commitment problem, even if not to the level of limited government, we can understand growth rates in the Philippines to be fundamentally constrained.

This study has provided a basis for further inquiry into the nature of the commitment problem in the Philippines before and after Marcos. It has been suggested here that VPI existed before Marcos came to power, and no systematic study has been performed on the nature of the commitment problem after Marcos. I hope that this study serves as a beginning to understand not only shifts in the nature of commitment and its implications for growth in the Philippines, but also as a beginning in the process of applying literature on commitment to important empirical cases as a means to understanding power shifts and economic growth.

⁴² Steinberg, 132.

⁴³ Steinberg, 140.

⁴⁴ Steinberg, 117.